- (1.)The Petitioner was an intermediary in village Dhorahi Tappa Bansi, Pargana Sidhwa Johna, District Deoria and held certain plots as his sir and khudkasht. The Petitioner's intermediary rights were abolished by the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and by virtue of Section 18 of that Act, he became the Bhoomidhar of the plots of which he was the sir and khudkasht holder. On March 21, 1960, a notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act was made which was published in the UP Extraordinary Gazettee dated March 23, 1960. By another notification under Section 4 dated April 6, 1960, published in Hindi Gazettee dated April 9, 1960, a clerical mistake in the original notification was corrected. Thereafter a notification under Section 6 was published in the UP Gazettee dated May 21, 1960. The Petitioner has challenged the acquisition of his plots under these notifications.
(2.)The first contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the proprietary interest in the plots having already passed to the State Government under the provision is of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, there could be no reacquisition of the same land. According to him, under the Land Acquisition Act, only land can be acquired and Bhoomidhari rights are not land. In substance, the contention is that, unless land is itself acquired, no interest in the land can separately be acquired. The land, in the present case, vests in the State Government and therefore, it is contended, the land cannot be acquired and consequently no interest, in the land can be acquired. I am unable to agree with this contention. A somewhat similar question arose before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the Government of Bombay v. Esufali Salebhai, 1910 ILR(Bom) 618. It was held by Chandavarkar, J.:
To acuquire a land (under the Land Acquisition Act) is not necessarily the same thing as to purchase the right of fee simple to it, but means the purchase of such interests as clog the right of Government to use it for any purpose they like.

The definition given to the word "land" in Section 3(1) of the Act is not exhaustive.... The use of the inclusive verb "includes" shows that the legislature intended to lump together in one single expression viz., "land"--several things or particulars, such as the soil, the buildings on it, any charges on it and other interests in it, all of which have a separate existence and an capable of being dealt with either in a mass or separately as the exigencies of each case arising under the Act may require."

The other learned Judge, Batchelor, J., held:

Government are not debarred from acquiring and paying for the only outstanding interests merely because the Act, which primarily contemplates all interests as held outside Government, directs that the entire compensation, based upon, the market value of the whole land, must be distributed among the claimants. In such circumstance , there is no insuperable objection to adopting the procedure to the case on the footing that the outstanding interests, which are the only things to be acquired, are the only things to be paid for.

I respectfully agree with the views of both these learned Judges. It appears from a perusal of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, particularly Section 16 that the provisions are aimed at extinguishing all or the outstanding interests in land, so that possession of the land may be taken and the land may vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. If the land in the ultimate analysis belongs to the Government, it is permissible under the Land Acquisition Act to acquire other interests in the land as well as benefits arising out of the land and things attached to the land or permanent fastened to anything attached to the land. The Act requires compensation to be paid for all interest held in the land. The Petitioner's Bhumidhari rights were certainly interests in the land and they could validly be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Petitioner also relied upon Section 199 of the UP ZA and LR Act which provides that no Bhumidhar shall be liable to ejectment. This section only applies so long as the person remains a Bhumidhar of the land but once his Bhumidhari rights have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, he ceases to be a Bhumidhar of the land and the protection of Section 199 is net available to him.

(3.)The only other contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the land has not been acquired for a public purpose. The notifications state that the land is acquired for the Government Seed Multiplication Farm. I am unable to agree with learned Counsel for the Petitioner that acquisition for this purpose is not acquisition for a public purpose. A seed multiplication farm is a public necessity and is of great importance these days. Further, in view of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 6, the declaration under Section 6 is conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is needed for a public purpose.