Desai, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by the defendant against whom a decree for ejectment has been passed by the courts below. The connected appeal is by another defendant against whom in another suit a decree for ejectment has been passed by the courts below at the instance of the same plaintiffs. Since the same questions are involved in the two appeals they are being disposed of together.
(2.) The respondents, claiming to be tenants of the plots in dispute in the two suits, sued the appellants for ejectment on the ground that they had taken unlawful possession of the plots: The suits were filed in the court of a Munsif. They were contested by the appellants on various grounds but not on the ground that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to hear and determine them. The defence failed in both the suits with the result that they were decreed. Appeals were filed against both the decrees; the appellants pleaded for the first time in the lower appellate court that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suits. The lower appellate court observed that they ought to have been instituted in a civil court and that the subsequent amendment to Section 180 U. P. Tenancy Act under which such suits should be instituted in a revenue court only had no retrospective effect and did not divest the learned Munsif of his jurisdiction to determine them. It dismissed the appeals and hence these Second Appeals. These appeals came up before our brother Upadhya, who finding that there was conflict of authority on the questions of law arising in them has referred them to a Bench for decision.
(3.) The main question before us is of jurisdiction. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure a civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The suits in question were instituted in 1945 when the U. P. Tenancy Act No. XVII of 1939 was in force. Section 242 of it provided that: "All suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court, and no court other than a revenue court shall.....take cognizance of any such suit..... .based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit." Section 180, with which we would be concerned to these appeals, is one of the sections mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. At that time when the suits were instituted Section 180 provided that: "Any person taking.....possession of a plot or plots of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law.....without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled." In the definition of the word 'tenant' it is stated that the word includes a sub-tenant except when a contrary intention appears. In Ori Lal v. Ganeshi Lal, AIR 1947 Oudh 104 (FB) (A) it was decided by a Full Bench that a suit by a tenant against a trespasser would lie in a civil court and not In a revenue court under Section 180. One of the reasons advanced in support of the view was that the word 'tenant' in Section 180 was not Intended to Include a sub-tenant and, therefore, a tenant of a plot of land could not be said to be entitled to admit a trespasser as tenant and consequently could not sue him under that section. It was on account of this decision that the respondents Instituted the suits in the court of the learned Munsif. Since they could not sue under Section 180, the jurisdiction of a civil court was not barred. While the suits were pending section 180 was amended by the U. P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act No. X of 1947. After the amendment section 180 read as follows : "A person taking ..... possession of a plot of land without the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot... .shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled." Explanation II was also added by the same emendment and it provided that: "A tenant entitled to sublet a plot of land in accordance with the provisions of the law....may maintain a suit under this section against the person taking... .possession of such plot otherwise than in the circumstances for which provision is made in Section 183." Section 183 refers to a suit by a tenant for ejectment of a person claiming rival tenancy rights. The appellants did not claim rival tenancy rights and, therefore, the suits for their ejectment could not lie under Section 183. According to the explanation added under the Amendment Act, the respondents, who were entitled to sublet the plots in dispute in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act, could maintain the suits under Section 180 in a revenue court against the appellants. The lower appellate court, however, held that the amendment made in Section 180 was not retrospective and that the jurisdiction that vested in the civil court before the amendment of the Act was not taken away by the amendment. The question is whether this view is correct. 3a. The Amendment Act came into force on 14-6-1947; it contained Section 31 which laid down that: "All suits pending under the said Act on the date of the commencement of this Act ...... shall be decided ...... in accordance with the provisions of the said Act amended by this Act". In other words, retrospective effect was given to the Amendment Act by Section 31 but only in respect of suits pending under the U. P. Tenancy Act on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act. The present suits which had been filed in a civil court, were not suits pending under the U. P. Tenancy Act and, therefore, they were not required by Section 31 of the Amendment Act to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act as it stood after the amendment. This is the view that has been taken in Bhagwati Chaube v. Ram Adhar Chaube, 1952 All LJ 87: (AIR 1953 All 219) (B), Shakal Narain v. Avadh Narain, S.A. No. 1781 of 1947 D/- 28-11-1950 (All) (C). But merely because Section 31 did not apply it could not be contended that the amendment made in Section 180 had no retrospective effect. The Amendment Act, as we said just above, came into force when the suits were pending and the learned Munsif was bound to take into consideration its provisions when disposing of the suits, The position after the amendment of the U. P. Tenancy Act was that the suits that were pending in his court were suits, though not instituted under Section 180, based on causes of action in respect of which relief could be obtained through suits under Section 180. On account of the interpretation placed upon Section 180 in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi Lal (A) tenants could not obtain relief against trespassers by means of a suit under Section 180 but after the amendment they could obtain relief by such a suit. Therefore, Section 242 at once came into effect to bar the learned Munsif from continuing to hear the suits. Under Section 242 he was debarred not only from entertaining the suits taut also from hearing and determining them. So long as a revenue courts could hear and determine a suit under Section 180, the jurisdiction of a civil court to hear and determine it was barred by the provisions of Section 9 C P. C. The learned Munsif might have had jurisdiction upto 13-6-1947 to hear and determine the suits but on 14-6-1947 he was divested of the jurisdiction. As soon as a revenue court became entitled to hear and determine them, he lost his jurisdiction because two different courts could not possibly have jurisdiction to hear them. If a revenue court had jurisdiction, that of a civil court was barred by the provisions of Section 242 U. P. Tenancy Act and Section 9 C. P. C. When the learned Munsif ceased to have jurisdiction to hear and determine the suits he should have returned the plaints for presentation to a revenue court. It was really not a question of giving retrospective effect to the provisions of the Amendment Act; it was a question of giving effect to them as soon as they came into force in matters to which they applied.;