Mulla, J. - (1.) This is a reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh, recommending that the conviction of the applicant in this case be set aside and the case be remanded for retrial in accordance with the law.
(2.) Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the applicant entered the house of one Deota Din on the 10th January, 1955, and committed a theft of about Rs. 20/-. Deota Din and his wife were not present in the house but before the applicant couldl ieave the house the wife of Deota Din came back and immediately raised an alarm. The applicant was arrested on the spot and a first information report was immediately written and the applicant was sent to the Police Station together with the report. The case came up for trial before a first class Magistrate who tried the applicant summarily under Section 380, I. P. C., and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. He dictated his order to the readier of the Court who knew typing and then signed it.
(3.) The applicant went up in revision before the Sessions Judge and the Sessions Judge found that the trial court did not comply with the provisions of Section 265 (1), Cr. P. C, which were mandatory and therefore he made this reference. Section 265 (1) reads as follows:-- "Records made under Section 263 and judgments recorded under Section 264 shall be written by the presiding officer, either in English or in the language of the Court, or, if the Court to which such presiding officer is immediately subordinate so directs, in such officer's mother-tongue." The Sessions Judge interpreted the words "shall be written by the presiding officer" as meaning that they must be in the handwriting of the trial court. The learned Sessions Judge relied for this interpretation on a case reported in 'A. S. Nagappa Settv v. Holalkere Municipal Council', 1955 Mys 109 ( (S) AIR V 42) (A). It is a single Judge decision of the Mysore High Court and the facts of that case are similar to this case. In that case also the Magistrate dictated the judgment to a stenographer and the learned Judge was of the opinion that this was a violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 265 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was further held in that case that the rule laid down under Section 367 (1), Cr. P. C. which stated that where the decision is not written by the presiding officer with his own hand every page of such judgment should be signed by him, does not apply to an order passed under Section 263, Cr. P. C. There is no other decision barring the decision cited above on this point. An earlier decision of the Madras High Court 'Subramanya Ayyar v. The Queen', 6 Mad 396 (B) does not specifically deal with this point. In that case it was held that a Magistrate should sign the judgment himself and that duty cannot be deputed to a clerk nor can a stamp be used in place of a signature. However, in the course of the decision it was observed that when the law permitted a Magistrate to try a case summarily it provided as a safeguard for the accused that in non-appealable cases the record and in appealable cases the judgment should be written by the presiding officer. No interpretation of the word "written" was given in this decision. I have carefully considered the two decisions cited above and with all respect to the learned judge who gave the Mysore decision I cannot agree with his interpretation. The interpretation of any law, in my opinion, cannot be made in too rigid a manner, specially when such an interpretation leads one to ridiculous conclusions. The spirit of the law can never be ignored and only that interpretation can be accepted which is in keeping with the spirit of law. If the phrase "shall be written by the presiding officer" is to be interpreted to mean that the judgment must be in the handwriting of the presiding officer it would mean that even if the presiding officer types a judgment himself it would offend against the provisions of this law. The Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1898 and those who framed the Code perhaps did not know that typewriters would be available to courts and judgments could be typed. At that time they were only safeguarding against someone else other than the presiding officer writing out the judgment and the presiding officer merely signing that judgment.;