KUNWAR SRI TRI VIKRAM NARAIN SINGH Vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
LAWS(ALL)-1956-3-9
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on March 09,1956

KUNWAR TRI VIKRAM NARAIN SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Bhargava, J. - (1.) I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of my brother Mehrotra, J, and agree with him but I would like to add a few words on the merits of the case.
(2.) The facts brought out in this petition show that originally the Sanad granted in favour of B. Ausan Singh conferred on him the rights of a proprietor in the pergana and he became entitled to realise the revenue which was payable by the sub-proprietors instead of the Government. Subsequently, however, this grant was resumed and it was decided that his successor B. Shiv Narain Singh was to be considered as the Tehsildar of Pergana Syudpore Bheittree and was to be allowed to hold the office hereditary. B. Shiv Narain Singh and after him his son B. Har Narain Singh did not agree to work as Tehsildars and to bear all expenses of administration and loss in collection. Ultimately this dispute ended in the grant of a sum of Rs. 36,330/- as pension to B. Har Narain Singh and his heirs, the amount being calculated on the basis of one-fourth of the revenue of the said Pergana which thereafter became payable directly to the Government. On these facts, it is clear that from the time of the grant of this pension all rights of B. Har Narain Singh and his successors in the Pargana itself ceased. They were no longer proprietors of the Pergana or any land situated in it. They became entited merely to a pension though the calculation of the pension was based on the land revenue assessed on the land in the Pargana. Thereafter B. Narain Singh and his successors were not shown in the revenue records or treated by the Government as having any proprietary right or interest in the Pergana or One land situated in it. The pension payable to them had therefore no relation to any right remaining vested in them in the land of the Pergana. On the ground that the pension was calculated on the basis of one-fourth of the land revenue of the Pergana it was contended by the learned Advocate General that this pension must be treated as a grant of a right or privilege in respect of land revenue of land situated in estates which comprised the pergana. In my opinion, it is not essential to decide whether this contention can be accepted. It is suiffcient to hold that, even ii' this argument be accepted, Clause (b) of Section 6 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not determine such a grant as the grant was certainly nor, in favour of a person having any right or interest in land vested in the State under this Act. The distinction sought to be drawn by the learned Advocate-General between the scheme of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and that of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act which was considered by the Supreme Court in 'Firm Chhota Bhai Jetha Bhai Patel Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh', 1953 SC 108 (AIR V 140) (A), does not appear to me to exist and to make any difference in application of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned above. Under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act all proprietary rights in any estate or mohal vesting in a proprietor passed from him and vested in the State. Since the pro-prietary rights vested in the State the Supreme Court held that the right or privilege referred to in Clause (b) of Section 6 of that Act was the right or privilege of the proprietor or any person having interest in the proprietary right through the proprietor. Applying this principle to Section 6(b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and keeping in view the difference that under this Act all estates vest in the State, it must be held that the right or privilege referred to in Section 6(b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is the right or privilege of an intermediary or any person having an interest in the estate or any land situated in any estate. As T have said above, the pension granted to B. Har Narain Singh and his successors cannot be held to be a right or privilege of an intermediary or a person having any interest in any estate or land situated in any estate acquired under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The effect of the interpretation of Section 6(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act by the Supreme Court therefore, is that the scope of Section 6(b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act must also be held to be limited to rights or privileges of an intermediary or other persons having an interest in any estate or land situated in the estate acquired under the Act, so that the pension granted to B. Har Narain Singh and his successors cannot be held to have been determined under this provision of law. I, therefore, concur with the order proposed by my brother Mehrotra, J. Mehrotra, J.
(3.) The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by one Sri Tri Vikram Narain Singh of Banaras for issue of a writ or Mandamus directing the opposite parties not to interfere with the applicant's right to regular payment of pension, allowance or malikana payable to the applicant in lieu of his hereditary estate in respect of pergaha Syudpore Bhettree in the district of Banaras.;


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