- (1.) By the instant revision accused-revisionist assails correctness of order dated 22.7.2016 passed by the A.C.J.M. IInd Saharanpur in Criminal Case No.1432/2015 (Jagdish Vs. Prem Singh) whereby application for discharge moved by the revisionist was rejected.
(2.) Heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the dispute is essentially of civil nature. In reference to the property in question revisionist filed a Suit No.192 of 1984 against Jagdish for specific performance of contract before the Civil Court. O.P. No.2 filed his written statement and took the defence as stated in the present complaint. The suit was decreed and findings were recorded contrary to what was stated by O.P. No.2 in his complaint.
(3.) He has further submitted that this Court in the case of Raunaq Vs. State of U.P., 1987 CrLJ 445 when confronted with similar controversy, in para 9 and 10 of the report observed the following:- "9. It was held in Sarnam Singh v. State,1967 AllCriR 423 that, it would be highly detrimental to the administration of justice and would shake the confidence of the public in the same if a categorical finding recorded in favour of the accused on a point in an earlier case is allowed to be set at naught on the same point in a subsequent case which was an offshoot of the previous case. If this were allowed there would be two contradictory findings in regard to the same matter, which cannot but have a very detrimental effect on the administration of justice. 10. In Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokechom Bira Singh, 1965 CrLJ 120 (SC), it was observed that the rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel of res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of Section 403(2). I respectfully agree with the said observations.";