Yashwant Varma, J. - (1.) A writ petition preferred by the first, second and third respondents (hereinafter for the sake of convenience to be referred to as 'the original petitioners') has come to be allowed by a learned Single Judge on 10 March 2015. The writ petition as originally framed sought quashing of a chart drawn up by the second appellant, which amongst others included the names of the original petitioners as teachers not being entitled to the payment of salary. A further direction was sought for the payment of salary to the original petitioners from February 2003. During the pendency of the writ petition and pursuant to directions issued in two separate proceedings, the second appellant passed an order on 7 July 2005 and turned down the claim of the original petitioners for the grant of salary and other benefits. This order was challenged by way of an amendment application which was duly allowed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge in terms of the judgment assailed before us has allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of 7 July 2005 and has further issued a direction calling upon the appellants to pay the entire arrears of salary of the original petitioners along with 8% simple interest from the date it fell due till the date of actual disbursement. A further direction has been issued providing that in the case of such of the petitioners, who may have retired during the pendency of the writ proceedings, apart from the payment of arrears of salary, payment of retiral dues along with interest at the same rate will also be ensured. The State is in appeal.
(2.) The litigation between the original petitioners and the appellants has a history. The learned Single Judge has referred to the same in great detail. We will however, briefly note the salient facts which would be relevant for the disposal of the instant appeal.
(3.) The original petitioners are stated to have been appointed as Assistant Teachers in the Adarsh Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Sewan Kala, District Ballia against sanctioned posts pursuant to an approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) on 1 October 1981. By an order dated 26 March 1982, the DIOS cancelled the order of approval and directed the management to terminate the services of the original petitioners. Challenging the said order of the DIOS, the original petitioners instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif Ballia for a declaration that the order dated 26 March 1982 be declared as null and void as also for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the State respondents therein from interfering in their services. The DIOS as well as the State of U.P. were arrayed as the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 while the committee of management was the first defendant. This suit was decreed partly vide judgment dated 5 May 1983 and the order of the DIOS was declared null and void. The relief of permanent injunction was however refused. The judgment rendered by the trial court was taken in appeal by the committee of management alone by filing a civil appeal. Cross objections were filed by the original petitioners in this appeal insofar as the relief for permanent injunction was declined. The lower appellate Court by its judgment dated 25 July 1986 dismissed the appeal filed by the committee of management. The cross objections however, were allowed and the suit of the original petitioners was decreed in toto. A permanent injunction was issued restraining the defendants therein from dispensing with the services of the original petitioners or from withholding their salary on the basis of the order dated 26 March 1982. The judgment and order of the lower appellate Court was assailed by the committee of management by preferring a second appeal in this Court. The application seeking stay of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court was refused on 22 September 1998. The second appeal, as the learned single Judge has recorded, was dismissed for want of prosecution on 17 February 2014 and no application for restoration was filed. Significantly neither the State nor the DIOS preferred any appeals. Consequently the judgment and decree insofar as they were concerned attained finality.;