Sanjay Misra, J. - (1.) HEARD Shri K.L. Grover, learned Counsel for the petitioners. None has appeared on behalf of respondents. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 26.5.1995 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Muzaffarnagar whereby the petitioners were held to be unauthorized occupants of shop No. 231 and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has proceeded to declare the vacancy. The main contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent No. 3 is a registered Waqf with the Waqf Board and is the owner and landlord of shop No. 231, Shamli Muzaffarnagar Road, Muzaffarnagar. He contends that by virtue of the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995 with effect from 25.9.1994 the exemption was granted from the operation of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 by virtue of section 2(1)(bbb) to "any building belonging to or vested in a wakf including a wakf -alal -aulad".
(2.) HIS contention is that the proceedings in question were pending prior to the enforcement of the aforesaid sub -clause but upon its enforcement the proceedings in so far as the building owned by the respondent No. 3 is concerned could not have been continued and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer holding therein that the provisions of the Amending Act would not be applicable to the proceedings is erroneous and illegal. It has been contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma and another : 2004 (4) SCC 1 has clearly laid down the law while dealing with the case with respect to the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 4 as quoted hereunder: - We do not find merit in the above arguments. There is a difference between a mere right and what is right acquired or accrued. We have to examine the question herein with reference to sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. It is correct that under section 4 of the Rent Act, the tenant is not bound to pay rent in excess of the standard rent, whereas under section 9 he has a right to get the standard rent fixed. Such a right is the right to take advantage of an ejectment and it is not accrued right. In the case of D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India it has been held that right of a statutory tenant to pay standard rent is a right to be governed by the Act and if the legislature repeals the Act or a part of it, the statutory tenant can do nothing about it. It is a mere right and not a vested right. To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of Thyssen Stahlunion GmbH v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. in which it is held that right to be governed by the Act is not a right of an enduring nature. What is unaffected by repeal is a right acquired or accrued under the Act. That till the decree is passed, there is no accrued right. The mere right existing on date of repeal to take advantage of the repealed provisions is not a right accrued within section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act. Further there is a vast difference between rights of a tenant under the Rent Act and the rights of the landlord. The right of a statutory tenant to pay rent not exceeding standard rent or the right to get standard rent fixed are protective rights and not vested rights. On the other hand, the landlord has rights recognized under the law of contract and the Transfer of Property Act which are vested rights and which are suspended by the provisions of the Rent Act but the day the Rent Act is withdrawn, the suspended rights of the landlord revive (See Parripati Chandrashekharrao and sons v. Alapati Jalaiah). Lastly as held by this Court in the case of D.C. Bhatia the object of the amending Act, 1988 was to rationalize the Rent Act whereby protection given to the richer tenant is withdrawn. The object of the Amendment Act, 1988 is to strike a balance between the claims of the landlords who get meager rent, particularly in times of inflation and the tenants who equally need protection from arbitrary eviction. In the circumstances, we hold that in view of section 3(c) as amended, the application for fixation of standard rent filed by the tenant on 11.4.1978 has been correctly dismissed as infructuous. We have gone through the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. Amrit Lal and Co. was a case involving rights of a landlord under section 14(1)(b) of the said Act. It was held that a ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under section 14(1)(b) of the Rent Act would not constitute a vested right of landlord, but it would be a right within the meaning of section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act if proceeding for eviction is pending, however, the tenant has no vested right under the Rent Act as the tenant has only a protective right. In the present case, we are concerned with the nature of rights of the tenant under the Rent Act. The ratio of this decision supports our above view. It is, further contended that by virtue of aforesaid amendment with effect from 25.9.1994 the provisions of the Act could not be made applicable to the building held by the respondent No. 3 and in proceedings which were pending on the date of enforcement of the aforesaid provision could not be continued any further and they would be without jurisdiction and would be liable to be quashed.
(3.) WITH the insertion of section 2(bbb) by the amending Act the building in question was exempted from operation of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. While dealing the provisions of section 2 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the nature of exemption in section 2(1) are based on the nature of ownership of the property and on the nature of the use to which the property is either put or intended to be put. The buildings under Clauses (a) and (b) were exempted on the basis of the nature of ownership of the property and if the building satisfies the ownership requirements set out therein, it automatically goes outside the purview of the Act. It was held that even if previously a building was subject to the provisions of the Act, it will cease to be so the moment it is purchased by a Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation or a recognized educational institution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Satya Narain Pandey v. State of U.P. : AIR 1988 SC 676 has held in paragraph 15 that the buildings falling under Clauses (a) and (b) go out automatically from the purview of the Act and therefore, a different rule cannot apply in respect of the other clauses of section 2(1). The clauses (bb) and (bbb) were inserted by U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995 w.e.f. 26.9.1994. The nature of exemption to buildings under the aforesaid two clauses is based on the nature of ownership of the property and in case the buildings under Clauses (bb) and (bbb) satisfies the ownership requirements set out in the clauses, it automatically goes outside the purview of the Act.;