Amitava Lala, J. - (1.) The aforesaid cases are taken up for analogous disposal. In all the cases more or less similar prayers have been made for quashing first information reports under Sections 2/3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 and stay of arrest of the accused in connection thereto. By and large four categories of cases are involved herein. First. category cases are those where several previous cases are initiated/ pending prior to initiation of investigation under this Act. Second category cases are those where single case was initiated/pending prior to initiation of investigation under the Act. Third category cases are those where in spite of acquittal under the Criminal Procedure Code investigation has been initiated or kept pending under this Act. Last category cases are those where no previous case was pending under any other law prior to initiation of investigation under this Act.
(2.) Therefore, in all the cases investigations by the police authorities under the Act are challenged under writ jurisdiction. A Full Bench judgment of this High Court reported in 1987 (24) ACC 164 (Ashok Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P. and Anr.) can not be avoided whenever any discussion is necessary in this respect. Let us see the ultimate ratio of such judgment hereunder: 137. These petitions had been filed mainly on the (ground that UP. Act 7 of 1986 was ultra vires the Constitution. We have not been able to find substance in any one of the grounds to attack of ' the Act. So far as our power to quash the investigations and the proceedings pending before the, Special Judges challenged in some of the writ petitions before us are concerned, we are of opinion that this is not possible to be done in these cases. Judicial opinion seems to be settled and we have several authorities of the Supreme Court where interference fry the Court into police investigation has been disapproved. This question arose in connection with an application under Section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal in State of Bengal v. S.N. Basak AIR1963 SC 447 , 1962 (0)BLJR891 , [1963 ]2 SCR52 . Kapoor, J. quoted with approval the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC page 18); where the Privy Council observed: The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to interfere in an appropriate case when moved, under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. 138. This view was followed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal AIR1985 SC 195 , 1985 CriLJ516 , 1985 (1)Crimes86 (SC), 1984 (2 )SCALE942 , (1985)1 SCC317 , [1985 ]2 SCR256 and Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Vlrendra Kumar Sharda v. Rajiv Poddar AIR1985 SC 1668 , 1985 CriLJ1858 , 1989 Supp(2)SCC385 . In this case, the-Supreme Court observed:We consider it absolutely unnecessary to make a reference to the decision of this Court and they are legion which have laid down that save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the court and the judicial process should not interfere as the stage of investigation of offences. 139. Of course, the decisions cited, above were in connection with Section 482 Cr.P.C, but the scope of interference under Article 226' of the Constitution is narrower. The power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 226 being extraordinary is to be exercised sparingly and only in Appropriate cases. The power to issue certiorari cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a Court of appear. The High court cannot in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not chosen to confer such a right. The High Court's function is limited to see that the subordinate court of Tribunal or authority functions within the limits of its power. It cannot correct errors of fact by examining the evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
(3.) In the aforesaid judgment the Full Bench also held that the Act is punitive in nature unlike the U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970, which is otherwise preventive in nature. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid judgment and having its binding effect no further discussion is necessary, but because of following Division Bench judgment it appears to us that discussion is yet open. However, there is no room for further discussion about the vires of the Act admittedly.;