- (1.) SANJAY Misra, J. The petitioner who was working as Assistant Station Master, Bundki railway station was served with a charge-sheet dated 16-2-1999 on two charges regarding interpolating the date in the fitness memo by changing the same and for shortage of Rs. 1,836/-in the sale of railway tickets during July, 1998 and August, 1998. By an order dated 2-6-1999 an Inquiry Officer was appointed who found that the charges against the petitioner were established. A notice dated 20-12-1999 was given to the petitioner who replied to the same on 14-3-2000. The disciplinary authority upon considering the same imposed the punishment of removal from service by the order dated 10-4-2000. The appeal of the petitioner was rejected on 30-5-2000. In revision the revisional authority reduced the punishment of removal from service to compulsory retirement. The O. A. No. 397 of 2001, Anwar Ahmad v. Union of India & Ors. , was dismissed on 2-5-2002. This writ petition has been filed for quashing of the aforesaid orders. Counter- affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged and learned Counsel for the parties have been heard.
(2.) THE first argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was denied full and proper opportunity to defend himself during the enquiry. It is contended that one Sri. R. K. Sharma, ASM was not examined during the enquiry he being a vital witness to whom leave application and sick fit certificate was handed over. THE petitioner has, therefore, been deprived of an opportunity to defend himself. It is also contended that in the normal course shortage of cash in sale of railway tickets occurs and the same is made good by the concerned official. THE Enquiry Officer it is contended has not considered these aspects of the matter and, therefore, the enquiry report dated 18-12-1999 is vitiated in the eye of law. It has also been contended that the appellate order and the revisional order are non-speaking orders and therefore, suffer from the vice of non-application of mind and the punishment awarded to the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge found proved against him. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further contended that learned Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the matter and as such the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has contended that full opportunity was given to the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner never applied for summoning Sri R. K. Sharma, ASM as his defence witness. It has been contended that Sri R. K. Sharma was not included in the list of prosecution witnesses and therefore, it was open for the petitioner to summon him as a defence witness. It is also contended that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority afforded full opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner prior to passing of the orders. The revisional authority gave personal hearing to the petitioner and purely on humanitarian ground and sympathetic consideration, the punishment of removal from service was reduced to compulsory retirement. It is contended that in so far as charge No. 2 is concerned the only defence put up by the petitioner was that shortage of Rs. 1,836/-in the sale of railway tickets occurs usually and it is made good by the concerned official. As such he submits that on the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer the charge of shortage is itself proved. However, it is contended that witnesses were examined and documents were considered by the Enquiry Officer while recording his finding that the said charges are established. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. , (1987) 4 SCC 611, and has relied upon Paragraphs 25, 26 and 27. His contention is that a judicial review of administrative action is not directed against the decision, but a directed against the decision making process. The choice of quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority. He submits that interference would only be required if the punishment is outrageous and in defiance of logic. Learned Counsel for the respondents submit that in the present case the punishment of dismissal awarded to the petitioner cannot be said to be strikingly disproportionate.
(3.) IN the case of B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of INdia & Ors. , 1996 (1) LBESR 424 (SC) : 1996 SCC (L&s) 80, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as quoted below : "judicial review is not an appeal from a decision of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of law. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/tribunal is concerned to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether Rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to each a finding of fact or conclusion. But the finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical Rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory Rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of reach case. The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. IN a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/tribunal. IN Union of INdia v. H. C. Goel, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. " In the case of Union of India & Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, it has been held that reasonableness and rationally are grounds for judicial review and the principle of proportionality can be invoked where the Court has to find out whether the authority concerned has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors.;