Janardan Sahai, J. - (1.) A suit under section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act was filed by Sukhan the father of the petitioners against Chotty, the predecessors of the respondents 4 to 6. There is no dispute about the pedigree of the parties. Sukhan the father of the petitioners and Chotty the predecessors of the respondents were brothers. The case of the petitioners is that the land in dispute was acquired by the joint family and Sukhan and Chottey were the tenants. It was also alleged that the rights of the parties have previously been determined and they have been found to be Sirdars but the order was no implemented. In the written statement the plaint allegations were denied and it was alleged that the property in dispute was acquired by Chottey the predecessors of the respondents. The Trial Court recorded a finding that it appeared that there was a compromise between Sukhan and Chottey on 27.8.54 in a suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and a compromise decree was passed. The Trial Court then proceeded to consider the effect of the decree. It found that when the suit under section 59 of the aforesaid Act was filed, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had already come into force. The suit under the U.P. Tenancy Act was not maintainable and the compromise was not binding. The Trial Court also considered the evidence on the record and found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the land was either acquired by Chottey in representative capacity or that it was jointly acquired by Sukhan and Chottey and that neither tire title of the plaintiff nor his possession was established. Aggrieved the plaintiff-petitioners preferred an appeal which was dismissed y the Additional Commissioner by his order dated 28.2.1973 against which a Second Appeal was preferred before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed on 25.8.1986.
(2.) I have heard Sri K.P. Yadav holding brief of Sri P.K. Yadav Counsel for the plaintiff-petitioners and Sri S.C. Mandhyan Counsel for the defendant-respondents.
(3.) It was submitted by the petitioners' Counsel that the mere fact that the earlier suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not maintainable would not operate to nullify the effect of the compromise that was entered in the said suit in which the co-tenancy rights of the petitioners predecessors were admitted and that the said compromise would act as an estoppel and the petitioners were entitled to succeed in the present suit on the basis of the said compromise itself. In support of his contention Counsel for the petitioners relies on a decision of this Court in Chet Ram & another v. Director of Consolidation, Etawah and others, 1970 AWR 775, in which it was held that a decree passed on the basis of the claim of the plaintiff as co-tenant having been admitted in the written statement is binding on the parties even if the suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not maintainable. Reliance is also placed upon the decision in Jagan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation,1972 RD 96, which was a case under section 145 Cr. P.C. in which a compromise was entered into and it was held that even though the Criminal Court may have had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title but a compromise regarding shares could be entered into and that the respondent could become a co-tenant by the admission .of the petitioner.;