- (1.) V. D. Chaturvedi, J. This Criminal Revision is preferred against the judgment and order dated October 12, 2004 passed by Sri R. K. Gupta, Family Judge, Azamgarh in Case No. 296 of 1998, Prema Devi v. Phool Chand Yadav, whereby he has dismissed the revisionist's petition moved under Section 125 Cr. P. C. for maintenance allowance.
(2.) THE relevant facts giving rise to this revision are that the petitioner Smt. Prema Devi filed a petition under Section 125 Cr. PC. for her maintenance stating that her marriage with Phool Chand Yadav (respondent No. 2) was held on 1-6-1993 according to Hindu rites and rituals; that she started living with him, discharging her duties as his wife; that the opposite party Phool Chand Yadav demanded a golden Seekari and a Motorcycle and warned that if these items were not given he would burn her alive; that after her Gauna held on 20-5-1994 she again went to her husband's house, but her husband's demands still persisted and he had attempted to kill her by burning her alive and by injecting poison; that on 10-6- 1997 the opposite party (Phool Chand Yadav) settled his another marriage with the daughter of Hari Ram of village Rasoolpur, P. S. Khuthan District Jaunpur; that opposite party and Ors. increased the atrocities upon her; that they had beaten her, regarding which a case under Sections 498-A, 342, 504, 506 I. P. C. was registered; that she was ousted from the house by the opposite party; that she was incapable of maintaining herself whereas her husband had a good income from his profession as an Advocate; that he was a Pradhan also. She prayed for the maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month. The opposite party (Phool Chand Yadav) stated in his written statement that his marriage with the petitioner was held in 1990 and Gauna was held in 1993; that at the time of Gauna she had a child of 3 months in her womb which she concealed; that on festival of Guriya she went with her father; that the opposite party went to her paternal house for her Vidai but she refused to live with the opposite party's joint family and asked him to live (separately) with her; that he never demanded any ornament, motor cycle or any other item; that on 29-5-1997 a Panchayat was held wherein both the parties agreed to live separately and to marry with any other person of their respective choice; that stipulated amount of Rs. 26,700/- was paid by the opposite party to the petitioner; that the petitioner lodged a case against the opposite party for offence under Sections 498-A, 342, 504, 506 I. P. C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act and that the petitioner was leading an adulterous life. On these grounds the petition was requested to be dismissed. The evidence of both the parties was recorded, whereafter the learned Judge dismissed the petition holding that (the revisionist) Prema Devi was the second wife of Phool Chand Yadav and thus was not a legally wedded wife and was not entitled to get the maintenance allowance.
(3.) I have heard Sri R. P. Yadav, learned Counsel for the revisionist and the learned A. G. A for the State. Sri D. K. Singh the Counsel for opposite party No. 2 (Phool Chand Yadav) was not present even on the revision of the list, hence he could not be heard. I have perused the record. The plea that respondent Phool Chand Yadav already had a married wife before his marriage with the revisionist was never taken by the respondent in his written statement. The respondent Phool Chand Yadav went beyond his pleading in stating that he was already married with a woman named Urmila and that Prema Devi was his second wife. This plea of second marriage was first time taken at the stage of evidence. In the like way the respondent led the evidence beyond the pleading that Prema Devi had remarried one Om Prakash. This plea was also not taken in his written statement. The trial Judge dismissed the petition on the former plea. It is well-settled principle of law that a party cannot go beyond his pleading. The proceedings under Section 125 Cr. P. C. are quasi-civil proceedings hence the parties were bound by their pleadings. They were not supposed to raise any plea other than the pleas mentioned in their respective pleadings. The learned trial Judge, therefore, erred in basing his judgment on a plea which was never pleaded in the written statement by the respondent. The judgment of the trial Court, therefore, cannot be allowed to sustain on this very ground.;