Vinod Prasad - (1.) -An order under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. cannot be challenged by prospective accused. An order under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. is an administrative order seeking the direction to the police. Prospective accused cannot appear and argue that the Magistrate does not have any power to direct the police to lodge the F.I.R. for cognizable offence. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is wholly illegal. Under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. no new investigation is ordered. It is the same investigation, which is to be carried out by the police under Section 156 (1), Cr.P.C. Investigation under Section 156 (1), Cr.P.C. is carried out after the registration of F.I.R. under Section 154 (1), Cr.P.C.
(2.) THE Apex Court in number of cases State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SCC 462 ; Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary's, 1993 SCC (Cr.) 36 ; Union of India v. W. N. Chadha, (1996) SCC (Cr.) 1171 , has laid down the law that the prospective accused has no right to be heard and in what manner the investigation is to be done and by whom the investigation has to be done is the choice of investigating agency. Accused has no right to challenge and plead that the investigation should not be done or that it would be done in particular manner. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, AIR 2006 SC 2872 : 2006 (3) ACR 2486 (SC). It has been held by the Apex Court in that judgment as follows : "As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. See : Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, 1992 (4) SCC 305, and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. See : Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, 1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1990 ACR 1 (SC), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 309, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, 1995 (6) SCC 194 : 1996 ACR 123 (SC) : State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan, AIR 1999 SC 1044 : 1999 (1) ACR 541 (SC) ; State of U. P. v. O. P. Sharma, 1996 (7) SCC 705 : 1996 ACR 437 (SC) ; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, 1997 (2) SCC 397, Satvinder Kaur v. State Government of NCT of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 3596 : 1999 (3) ACR 2292 (SC), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, 1999 (3) SCC 259 : 1999 (1) ACR 710 (SC) and in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (3) SCC 89 : 2002 (1) ACR 605 (SC)". In the present case since cognizable offences were disclosed, the Magistrate was fully justified in passing the impugned order of registration and investigation.
(3.) THIS application is dismissed.;