D. K. Seth, J. - (1.) In this case the petitioner has challenged the award dated 2-9-1992 ' passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (I), U. P. , Allahabad, by which the respondent No. 3 was directed to be reinstated in service with half wages. 2 The facts in brief are that the respondent No. 3 was included in the select list from which he alongwith others used to be appointed in short term vacancy as conductor Driver from time to time by U. P. Roadways which is a Government Department w. e. f. 1-6-1972 (herein after referred to as U. P. State Board Transport Corporation) when the State Government incorporated the petitioner. The respondent No. 3 and others whose name appeared in the select list were being given short term employment against short term vacancy whenever it arose. The respondent No. 3 was appointed for a faxed period on temporary basis from 1-5 1993 to 31-5-1993 and thereafter from 1-8-1975 to 31-8-1975 ( Annexure-1 to the writ petition ). It appears from the Annexure-1 to the writ petition that he was given appointment against short term vacancy. His service was terminated by an order dated 30-8-1975 with one month's pay in lieu of notice which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. According to the petitioner the respondent No. 3 had raised this dispute in 1982 which was rejected and was not referred by the State Government as this dispute was raised after lapse of the seven years. Thereafter he again raised dispute in 1990 after lapse of 8 years and this time on the report of Regional Conciliation Officer the State Government referred the dispute to the Tribunal Annexure-3 to the writ petition) allowed the claim of respondent No. 3 and directed the petitioner to reinstate with half back wages till reinstatement. 3. Shri S. K. Sharma appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that in view of the earlier refusal to make reference subsequent reference was barred by principle of res judicata. Secondly he contends that the petitioner being temporary employee and his service having been terminated, no dispute can be entertained on such discharge. Third point raised by Shri Sharma is that employees of the U. P. Roadways were serving with petitioner Corporation on deputation remained State Government employees and there was no relation of employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 and such dispute cannot be raised in between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3. In support of his contention he relies on the judgment reported in the case of Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ALR 1980 (6) 81. He also relied on the case of (Miss) A. Sunderambal v. Government of Goa Daman and Din, 1988 FLR (463 ). 4. Shri H. K. Mishra, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3 submits that the petitioner might have been selected by the U. P. Roadways the Department of Government but still then he was employed by the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation in 1/75 after creation of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation. Therefore he cannot be said to be an employee of the Government. His second contention is that the question of res judicata does not arise in the facts of the case inasmuch as it has been held in the award that the petitioner was unable to produce any documents to connect the earlier dispute with the respondent No. 3. Therefore in the absence of the material it cannot be said that there was earlier refusal to refer the dispute. He further submitted that even if the petitioner was employed by the State, he was entitled to a notice but there was no notice whatsoever and neither any opportunity was given to him. 5. The contention that the second reference is barred cannot be sustained. Inasmuch as when a reference under Section D (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act is made by the Government, it exercises administra tive function. Such function is neither judicial nor quasi judicial Prem Kakar v. Stale of Haryana, (1976) 3 SCC 433. While making a reference the Government does not adjudicate anything. Therefore the principle of res judicata cannot be attracted if on the second occasion reference is made after refusal on the first occasion. Government is entitled to make refe rence even after its refusal Western India Watch Co. Ltd. v. Workers Unions, (1970) 1 SCC 225, mere fact that on previous occasion Govern ment had taken the view that no reference was called for does not entitle the Court to conclude that there could be no cause for subsequent reference Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 2 SCC 806. 6. However the above rule cannot be an absolute one. In case of inordinate delay and an un-explained inordinately or) gap between the two attempts to get a reference court may intervene. Inasmuch as in such case there might be dearth of evidence leading to speculation which is undesirable. It must be shown that the workman was vigilant and that he was not responsible for the delay of that there was no latches a negligence on the part of the workman. However in the present case the employer having not been able to prove the earlier reference. The said question becomes immaterial. But then if the reference is taken to be the first one, then it must be said that it was inordinately delayed. There is nothing in record to show that the workman had explained the delay or that he was not guilty or negligence of latches. 7. Now the Tribunal has believed the oral evidence and had held that the workman was continuously employed since 1971 till 30th August, 1975. The Tribunal relied on the evidence of one Ram Naresh Singh, an employer's witness. If such a situation is accepted then the workman was an employee, of the Government and his continuation with the U. P. S. R. T. C. after it was created on 1st June, 1972 was on deputation. If it is on deputation then there was no relation of employer and employee between the workman and the U. P. S. R. T. C. the petitioner herein. The Tribunal has not relied on any documentary evidence. It has simply believed the oral evidence. Nothing has been shown to prove that the workman in continuous employ ment. The conclusion of the learned Tribunal appears to have been arrived at without any material evidence. It is very difficult to believe that a workman continues to work without any letter of appointment or any other paper in relation to his employment. There is nothing to show that the employment of the workman was regularised. On the other hand the document produced by the employer goes to show that the workman was employed for definite period which appears to be a short term one. 8. Therefore the finding of the teamed Tribunal appears to be perverse and based on no material. As such the order of the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained and therefore quashed. The matter is referred back to the Tribunal for deciding afresh in accordance with law on the basis of the material already on record as well as those as may be adduced by either of the parties. All points are kept open. The parties should be given adequate opportunity for this purpose. The learned Tribunal shall decide the case afresh, without being influenced by this order, as early as possible preferably within a period of one year from the date of a certified copy of this order is produced before the learned Tribunal. 9. Certified copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within a week Decided accordingly. .;