- (1.) I. S. Matbur, J. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 10-1-1994, passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad, allowing the criminal revision Nos. 215/93 Har Pal v. Basudev and others and 223/93 Om Pal Singh and others v. State and quashing the orders dated 14-5-1993 and 18-5- 1993 under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. respectively. The learned III Additional Sessions Judge has further directed by this order, that, the property shall be released in favour of the opposite parties Om Pal and others.
(2.) IT appears that the police submitted a report under Section 145, Cr. P. C. on 2-5-1993 to the effect that there was a dispute between the parties relating to plot Nos. 138 and 204 of Khatauni No. 229, Village Aabidpur Kadi and there was apprehension of breach of peace in connection with the possession. A report was made to the Magistrate to draw; proceed ings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. on this report, the learned Magistrate passed an order under Section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. He called upon the parties to maintain status quo and produce their evidence regarding possession of the land. On 18-5-1993, learned Magistrate, finding the case to be one of emer gency, ordered the attachment of the property under Section 146 (1) Cr. P. C. The property was accordingly attached and it was given in the Supurdgi of a Receiver on 25-5-1993. But later on Supurdar was changed and the pro perty was given in the Supurdgi of Gram Sabha. A suit, being suit No. 30/93 Har Pal Singh v. Paley and others, in respect of the same property was pending. The suit was for permanent injunction but the question of title was also involved therein. An applica tion for temporary injunction was moved in that case and by order dated 5-2-1993, learned Civil Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo. Both the parties filed revisions against the order of the learned Magistrate. The learned 111 Additional Sessions Judge hat, allowed both the revisions with the finding that a civil suit was pending between the parties and the proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P. C. was not competent. He further directed, in the order, that the property, which according to the police report was taken from the possession of Om Pal, be released to him. The petitioner is particularly aggrieved by the later part this order. It is alleged that proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. could not have been dropped and the Magistrate should have been directed to proceed to determine the question of possession. It is further alleged that the learned Sessions Judge has erred in holding Om Pal and others to be in possession and directing release in their favour.
(3.) I have heared learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It is difficult to accept the sweeping submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that, once a civil suit is pending, no proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. could be initiated or continued. In Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. and others, 1985 AWC 128, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: "when a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parellal criminal pro ceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to chal lenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. " In Dharampal and others v. Ramshri (Smt.) and others, 1993 JIC 466 (SC): (1993) 1 SCC 435, Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that the deter mination by the Civil Court may not necessarily be a final determination and it may be by way of order of injunction of appointment of receiver. The Supreme Court has observed: "the determination by a competent court of the rights of the parties spoken of there has not necessarily to be a final determination. The determination may be even tentative at the interim stage when the competent court passes an order of interim injunction or appoints a receiver in respect of the subject- matter of the dispute pending the final decision in the suit, the moment the competent court does so, even at the interim stage, the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate has to come to an end. Otherwise, there will be inconsistency between the order passed by the civil court and the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146 itself takes cognizance of such a situation when it states that "magis trate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of any breach of peace with regard to subject of dispute. ";