- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. Quashing of the order dated 11th August, 1986 (Annexure '13'), the order dated 29th July, 1987 (Annexure '14') and order dated 9th May, 1988 (Annexure '17'j passed on appeal there out arising out of the charge-sheet dated 25th June 1979 (Annexure ('3') and the report of enquiry dated 10th March, 1986 (Annexure '10') are the orders impugned and relief sought for in this writ petition.
(2.) THE petitioner's case, as appears from the writ petition, is that after having been appointed on 18th February, 1974, the petitioner was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding under Regulation 39 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, hereinafter referred to as 'the said Regulation', initiated by issue of charge-sheet dated 25tb June, 1979 (Annexure '3') resulting into an enquiry and a report after the petitioner had filed his reply (Annexure-6) and his participation in the enquiry. Without giving him proper opportunity to inspect documents despite his request, made by Annexure '?', punishment was inflicted upon the petitioner by the discipli nary authority under Regulation 39 (l) (d) of the said Regulations by bringing down permanently his basic salary to the minimum scale of pay applicable to him and implemented the same with effect from 11th August, 1986. THE petitioner's appeal preferred under Regulation 40 before the respondent No. 2 was decided on 29th July 1987 the said orders were challenged by means of a writ petition being Writ Petition No. Nil of 1987 which was disposed of by order dated 24th September, 1987 with the observation that under Regulation 49 of the said Regulations, the petitioner has a remedy by way of Second Appeal though the same is termed as review. THErefore, if the petitioner files a review, the same should be disposed of on merits. The Review Petition filed on 10th October, 1986 was decided by res pondent No. 4 on 9th May, 1988 (Annexure '17' ). It is this order after which the present writ petition has been filed. Contesting the said case, the respondents contended that the finding of enquiry is justified on the materials placed before the authority and that the enquiry was held after providing sufficient opportunity to the petitioner. The order of punishment was passed after affording opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed order of punishment. The punishment inflicted under Regulation 39 (1) (d) is justified. There was no infirmity in the charge-sheet or in the order of punishment or in the proceed ings. The order on appeal under Regulation 40 and that under Regulation 48 are justified and the present writ petition is not maintainable on account of the fact that the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of submission of Memorial to the Chairman under Regulation 39 which he had not resorted to.
(3.) THE petitioner attacked the proceedings and report of enquiry on the ground that he was not given sufficient opportunity to defend himself and he was not allowed inspection of the records despite requests made in writing and that the report of enquiry is perverse and is not based on materials on record and there are gross irregularities and that the orders passed by the appellate authority under Regulations 40 and 49 are bad and cannot be sustained and that after the counter affidavit has been exchanged, the preli minary objection as to alternative remedy cannot be raised. By means of the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner has controverted the facts narrated in the counter-affidavit and reiterated those in the writ petition. The preliminary objection taken by the respondents to the maintain ability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy has been pushed through with great endeavour by the respondents relying on the decision in the case of Satyapal Singh Chouhan v. Chairman-cum-Chief Executive Officer, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Noida Com plex, Ghaziabad (sic ). Relying on the said judgment, Mr. Goyal contended that the petitioner having a remedy by way of industrial dispute under the Industrial Dispute Act if he considers himself to be a workman within the meaning of the said Act or he may have his remedy under the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act if he is not a workman but a Government servant. In the case relied upon by him, the observation is similar as has been contended by Mr. Goyal. The learned counsel for the petitioner iii this case has conten ded that the petitioner is neither a workman within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act nor he is a Government servant within the meaning of U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act and, therefore, those two alternative remedies are not available to him. Nothing has been produced before the Court by Mr. Goyal to show that the petitioner is either a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act or a Government servant under the Public Services Tribunal Act. In my view, an employee of Life Insurance Corporation of India cannot be a Government servant within the meaning of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act It is doubtful as to whether the petitioner is a work man within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as well. Further more it was observed in the said judgment that alternative remedy does not operate as a complete bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court acts in its discretion taking into consideration the facts and circumstan ces of the case. In the present case, the petitioner had travelled a long way and that affidavits having been exchanged and alternative remedies being doubtful, as indicated above, the principles of the said decision cannot be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.;