- (1.) MESSRS. Suresha Nand Juyal and Mahesha Nand Juyal, both sons of Madhwa Nand Juyal, filed the present writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the State of Uttar Pradesh for the land which was to be acquired for the benefit of the respondent No. 2 for the purposes of a store house and a godown. The two petitioners other wise brothers were joint holders of the land fin question. The petitioner No. 1 had retired from the army on a monthly pension of Rs. 279 and was an ex-military personnel. During the pendency of the writ petition he died. The substitution of his heirs has been permitted.
(2.) THIS is a case which in the overall circumstances, shows the misutilisation of sovereign powers by the State of Uttar Pradesh in attempting to wrest from a citizen from the back door what could not be received on an entry from the front door. The respondent No. 2, on record, was a lessee of the petitioners. It is a statutory body. The lease was reduced to a document, a copy of which is appended as Annexure 1. It is dated 15 December, 1978. The lease, initially was for a period of five years and there was an option to' renew it further for another term. It was extended for another term and con sideration in pursuance of the lease as rent lay deposit upto October, 1988 with the Central Office of this respondent at Dehra Dun and this is witnessed by the Annexure-RA-1. Thus, there is no issue on record that the respondent No. 2 was the tenant of ths petitioners. Also not in issue is the fact that of the very premi ses which the respondents were in occupation an tenants, they resorted to acquiring the property when a notification dated 25 August, 1987 was issued exercising powers under Sections 6, 9 and 17 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Pursuant to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, dated 7 May, 1986 by taking recourse to emergency provisions for the acquisition of the very land of which the petitioners were the owners and the respondents lessees. Thus, on these two basic facts there is no controversy that the land which was subjected to acquisition proceedings by the respondents was the very land where the respondent No. 2 had the status of a lessee. The respondents made a request that the lease be extended. The petitioners did not agree to the proposal. As this inevitably meant that the respondent No. 2 would have to unwind its occupation from the premises of the petitioners and the lease had to be determined by efflux of time upon its own clauses and conditions. The respondents took recourse to a step by which, in effect, they intended to transpose themselves from the status of lessees to that of an owner. This matter with simple facts is an example of misutilisation of sovereign powers by the State of U. P. and that also in a rush and hurry of the nature which cannot be nor has been justified. On the record, the fact that there was a lease between the petitioner and the respon dents is an accepted situation. That the respondent No. 2 had deposited rent as late as October 1988 is also a matter of record. While the respondent No. 2 was a tenant any engagement and communications this respondent had with the State of U. P. to suggest that the land of the petitioners be acquired, was a mala fide action. On this the record is glaring and naked. While the respondent No. 2, was a lessee or a tenant, as the document dated 15 Decem ber, 1978, recorded this status, during the period of tenancy the notifications under Secs. 4, 6, 9 and 17 of the Act were issued. And that also to acquire the property and asset of an ex-military personnel in the poverty of the meagre pension and coming from an area where men serve the nation away from their lands, because they in their environs and region are in generality poor. If this is how the properties of citizens will be extracted out of their hand where a State organisation first walks into a property as a tenant and then eyes on it to become its owner by the use of absolute and dominant powers, then this may be an exercise which may be good as long as it is under contemplation, but not a matter which a Court can condone.
(3.) A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of State of Uttar Pradesh which has been affirmed by an Ahalmad in the office of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Pithoragarh. In reference to the possession, a very vague statement has been made to the effect that the record of memo of possession could not be sent to the Executive Engineer, soon after the delivery of posses sion on 17-12-1988. This only implies that |whereas the possession may have been recorded, but in so far as giving effect to it came, the record had not seen the Central Office of the Executive Engineer at Dehra Dun. The Court cannot permit the State to change its status from tenants to owners by misutilising sovereign powers by either requisitioning the property or acquiring it and that also in a rush by further misusing the emergency powers which are reserved under the Act for very special purposes. As the nation steps into a new world to function in an open economy and the State itself is shedding its business ventures, as far as possible, contracts with citizens shall have to be honoured. Should the State occupy lands and houses of citizens in pursuance of a covenant and contract, then the State would have to honour its contractual obligations and not wriggle out of them by the muscle of sovereign powers, in usurping properties. The equity of a contract is to be honoured.;