- (1.) R. B. Mehrotra, J. The petitioner is the tenant of house No. 55 Harrisganj Police Station Rail Bazar, Kanpur on the first floor, comprising of a room and kitchen, which for sake of convenience will be referred as "disputed premises" mt. Basanti Bai, Respondent No. 3 is the owner of the disputed house. Smt. Basanti Bai filed Case No. 9/85 before the prescribed authority on the ground of personal need for evicting the petitioner by giving application as provided by Section 21 (1) (a) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Re gulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 which for the sake of conve nience will be referred to hereafer as the "act". The Prescribed Authority by the order dated 8-5-1986 allowed the application of the landlady (owner of the house) and passed the order for eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner filed appeal under Section 32 of the Act. The said appeal, was dismissed by the appellate authority by the order, dated 9 August, 1988. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments, the petitioner filed in this Court, the writ petition No, 22245/88.
(2.) THIS Court by its judgment dated 10th May, 1989 allowed the writ of the petitioner, and set aside the order of appellate authority, dated 9th August, 1988 and ordered the appellate authority to decide the appeal in the light of directions given on the writ petition. The order passed by this Court, is important in the context of the decision of the present writ petition. In the aforesaid judgment this Court decided the writ petition referring to the ratio of law laid down by this Court in Smt. Satya Misra v. Second Additional District Judge, 1977 U. P. RCC page 738, and held as under : - "on the touchstone of the principles laid down above, we must consider the facts of the present case. In this case a finding has been recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the landlady and other persons who are alleged to be living with her, they are haying a joint messing and common kitchen. THIS, however, is quite contrary to the own allegation made in para 5 of the repli cation filed by the landlady before the Prescribed Authority where it was stated that they were not running a common kitchen. THIS admission has not been explained anywhere nor any such evidence has been referred either in the order of the prescribed authority or in the appellate court where this may have been explained. Apart from the above, there is no specific finding recorded by the prescribed authority or the appellate court that any of these persons Rama Shankar, Jai Shankar, and Vinod Kumar are living with the landlady with the object of assisting her in any manner and that the really needs their assistance in that regard. A clear finding on this question is necessary before it can be said that the need of a particular person should also be treated as the need of the landlady herself. Since these two vital questions have remained untouched in the orders of the courts below, it is neces sary that the matter should be reconsidered in the light of the observation made above by recording a clear finding on the points. The order of the appellate court], therefore, suffers from a manifest error of law and cannot be sustained. " In the context of the above judgment, the lower appellate court again by its judgment dated 19-4- 1990 dismissed the appeal of the petitioner aggrieved by the aforsaid judgment, this writ petition has been filed. There is no controversy between the parties as regards the under mentioned facts. The disputed premises in which the petitioner is residing consists of only one room and a kitchen, and along with petitioner, reside his wife Smt. Bimla Devi, their three sons and three daughters.
(3.) THE respondent/landlady has alleged in her application the existence of the following members in her family : (1) Petitioner herself (aged about 60 years) (2) Sri Rama Shanker Trivedi aged 52 years, brother. (3) Sri Jai Shankar Trivedi aged about 36 years son of Rama Shanker Trivedi. (4) Smt. Suman aged 30 years wife of Sri Jai Shankar Trivadi. (5) Sri Vinod Kumar aged about 25 years son of Sri Rama Shankar Trivedi (6) Smt. Lalita Devi alias Renu aged about 23 years wife of Sri Vinod Kumar. (7) Kumari Rajni Trivedi, aged about 10 years, daughter of Sri Jai Shankar Trivedi. (8) Chiranjiv Sanjai aged about 8 years son of Sri Jai Shankar Trivedi. (9) Chiranjiv Ajai aged about 6 years son of Sri Jai Shankar Trivedi. 7. In the paragraph 4 of her petition, the petitioner alleged that her aforesaid brothers and other two sons, daughter-in-laws, grandsons and grand daughters do not fall within the definition of "family" as enjoined by the U. P. Act No. 13/72, however, the aforesaid persons are permanently residing with the petitioner in the house No. 55 Harrisganj, Kanpur, and they have been looking after and managing the amenities, supervision and maintenance of the petitioner, and at present also they are doing the same, in view of the circumstances mentioned in para 3 of the petition, apart from the petitioner, the need of the alleged other persons personal need in respect of residential necessity also deserves to be considered and is as such enjoined by law. 8. Only the above question arises for determination in this writ peti tion, whether the landlady is entitled by virtue of Section 21 of Act to evict the tenant also on the basis of the need of the other persons residing with her, even if they are outside the purview of the definition of her 'family' as defined in the Act. In the impugned judgment the appellate court held that the landlady on account of old age for her help kept the other members of her family, specially considered that in the circumstances of the case it was neces sary for the members of her family to live with her and also considered that her brother and members of the family of her brother are residing with the landlady for the last 20 years. In this connection while considering the need of the landlady, the appellate authority found it to be in accordance with law to consider the need of the family of brother and the family of the children of brother residing with the landlady. In this very context, the appellate authority also considered if the landlady for her convenience is running her kitchen separately or is residing separately even then in the context of the application the tenant can be evicted for the need of the brother of the landlady and members of her brother's family. . 9. In Sri Narain Das v. Jawaharlal Shortiya and others, 1982 (2) RCC 697, this Court held that as per provisions of Section 21 of the Act, on the basis of the need of brother of the owner of the house and the need of brother's wife the application of the owner of the house cannot be allowed on the ground of personal need, relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is as under: "reading the two judgments as a whole, it is obvious that while discussing the issues the courts below have not treated the need of Sri K. G. Bhatia as the need of the landlord himself. THE need of Sri K. G. Bhatia and his wife has been treated as separate and distinct subject and not as subordinate of incidental to the needs of the landlord. No such circumstances have been pointed out in the judgment of either of the two courts below as may lead to the conclusion that the landlord was obliged in any way to provide for sustenance of Sri K. G. Bhatia and his wife as his dependants. THE courts below have undoubtedly given the need of Sri K. G. Bhatia and his wife a primary importance, which was wholly impermissible. As the impugned orders have been influenced by the personal need of Sri K. G. Bhatia and his wife, the orders cannot be sustained in law. THEy are clearly contrary to the express provision of the statute, namely Section 3 (g ). " 10. In Srimati Bhagwati Devi v. District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1980 All RC 422 it was laid down that in Section 3 (g) of the Act the definition of 'family', is exhaustive and on the basis of the need of the persons not falling within the definition of the 'family' ; family as defined in the Act the application of the landlord given on the basis of personal need under Section 21 of the Act cannot be allowed. It was laid down in that case that the need of the mother-in-law of the landlord cannot be held to be the need of landlord, because the mother-in-law of the landlord is not caused by the definition of 'family' as envisaged in Section 3{g), the relevant portion of the said judgment is as under: "the definition given in the said Act does not take within itself a mother-in-law. THE definition has been given in the Act itself. THE same is to be treated as exhaustive and it is not open to a court to bring in person other than those mentioned in the definition. " 11. In Devi Dayal v. the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad and others, 1983 All RC 763 this Court laid down that as per Sec. 21 (l) (a) of the Act the need of the brother of landlord cannot be held to be bona fide need of the landlord, the relevant portion of the judgment is as under: "on the allegation the house obviously could not be released under Section 21 (1) (a) and the Prescribed Authority rightly held that the provisions could not be involved by landlady for convenient and comfortable living. He was further right in observing that necessity of brother could not be covered in expression bona fide requirement of the landlord. " 12. It is clear with reference to the above decisions that in the context of the personal need of the landlady, on the basis of the need of the brother of the landlady or any other relation who are not covered by the definition of family as enjoined by Section 3 (g) of the Act, the landlady is not entitled to get the tenant evicted from the disputed premises. In the context of the above decisions the only point that survives for consideration in this writ is whether while considering the bona fide need of the landlady, the need of the persons residing with the landlady, his/her brother and members of the family of the brother can bs held to the bona fide uesd oi' the landlord ? With reference to the application, the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that the landlady is a widow and it is necessary for her assistance that her brother should reside with her. With reference to the above context, the lower appellate court has observed that the total need of the brother fof the landlady should be deemed to bo the need of the landlady, in this connection some judgments of the High Court have been referred. 13. It is essential to read together Section 21 (1) of the Act and Section 3 (g) thereof. THE purpose of enactment of the Act by the legislature is essential to be taken into consideration for interpreting the above sections. 14. Under the Transfer of Property Act, it is the right of the landlord to evict a tenant from premises in dispute at any time without any reason by serving a notice under Section 106 of the said Act. In the whole country, on account of the paucity of residential and non residential accommodations, the necessity arose that tenant should not be evicted from the tenanted pre mises without adequate grounds, merely on the sweet will of the landlord and taking into consideration the above circumstances coupled with the social conditions, the Rent Control and Eviction Acts were passed in the whole country with respect to urban areas and in that very process, in the Uttar Pradesh, Act No. 3 of 1947 and Act No. 13 of 1972 were enacted by virtue of which it was provided that the landlord can evict tenant only under the conditions prescribed by the Act. THE Act has been passed with the objective of ameliorating the condition of tenant. From the above analysis is clear that having regard the purpose of the enactment, the provisions of the Act should be interpreted benevlently in favour of tenant vide Mangat Rai v. Kedarnath 1980 SC 276 para 19. 15. On the above basis, reading cumulatively the provisions of Sec tions 21 (1) (a) and 3 (g) of the Act, the conclusion is inevitable that while adjudging the bonafide need of the landlord, only the need of those persons can be considered whose residence is most essential for the convenience of land lady. Only the personal need of those persons can be held to be the bonafide need of the landlord, in case their residence with the landlord is unavoidable for the comforts of the landlord, but there is no justification for treating the requirement of large family of those persons as the bona fide need of the landlady. In the context of the present petition only the persons whose resid ing with the landlord is hightly essential as being conductive to the comfort and supervisions of the landlandy can be held to the bonafide need of the landlady but not the need of large number of family members, of the persons whose residence necessary for the help of the landlady. 16. In the judgment of the lower appellate court has held that the need of the landlady's brother and all the members of his family - family should be deemed to be the need of the landlady. This conclusion is not in accordance with law. 17. In this very context it is worthy of mention that in para 12 of the writ petition it has been alleged that during the pendency of the appeal one tenant named Umashanker has vacated his accommodation in favour of the landlady and the said accommodation has come in the possession of the landlady, so in the light of this altered situation also the need of the landlady deserves to be re-assessed. 18. In view of the above discussion, it is essential for the lower appel late court to decide the factum as to the residence of which member is essential for the comforts of the landlady and genuine need of such member be considered, but it is not proper to hold the need of the entire large family of such a member as the need of the landlady, moreover, in view of the altered circumstances numerated in this judgment also, it has become essential to re-consider the bonafide need of the landlady. 19. In view of the above discussion the judgment of the Sixth Addi tional District Judge is set aside and it is hereby directed that the District Judge Kanpur Nagar should decide the appeal afresh in the light of the obser vations made in the body of this judgment. 20. THE writ petition is allowed with costs. 21. Under the mandatory provision of Section 7 of Official Language Act, the Registrar of the Court is directed to get English translation of a copy of this judgment through a competent person within a month and after getting approved by the Court, copies be made available to parties according to rules on receipt of application for copies. Without annexing the English translation, the copies of the judgment be not issued to the parties, nor the copy of the judgment be set down to court below without annexing the translation. Petition allowed. .;