- (1.) R. A. Sharma, J. All these writ petitions, which involve common questions of facts and law, have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, Agra Ice Factory and Cold Storage v. State of U. P. and, others. Writ Petition No. 11134 of 1985 has been made the leading case, from which the relevant facts shall be given hereinafter.
(2.) PETITIONER is a registered partnership firm. It has built a cold storage on plots Nos. 4142, 4144, 4145, 4146, 4151, 4152/1, 4152/2 and 4154, located by the side of Naraich - Hathras Road, Agra (total area being 2 Bighas 2 Biswas and 10 Biswansis), in 1967 with the permission of the Government of India under Cold Storage Order, 1964. This Cold Storage was registered with the Directorate of Industries, Government of U. P. on 15-11-1968 and was granted a licence under the Regulation of the Cold Storage Act, 1975. PETITIONER is carrying on the business of cold storage since then. A notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 read with sub-section (4) of Section 17 of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued on 27-8-1976 for acquiring large number of plots including the plots in question over which the petitioner has established the cold storage for planned industrial development in district Agra through U. P. State Indus trial Development Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corpora tion ). On 28-8-1976 notification under Section 6 of the Act was also publi shed. On 12-9-1976 a notice under Section 9 of the Act was published in a Hindi news paper 'amar UJALA'. The petitioners, who have established their industries over several plots, which were acquired by the aforesaid notifications, made representation before the Govern men t of India and the Government of U. P. , complaining against the impugned acquisition and requesting for release of their land from acquisition. The Government of India vide its letter dated January 29, 1977 informed the petitioners that it has taken up the matter with the Corporation, who has informed it that the matter is being considered for release of the plots over which industrial units were existing at the time when the above notifications were issued. Petitioners were, therefore, advised to approach the Corporation in this connection. The District Magistrate, Agra vide letter dated June 6, 1977 asked for the details of the plots over which industrial units are existing for exemption from acqui sition. The Government of U. P. vide its letter dated October 13, 1977 inform ed the Director of the Corporation that the Government has decided to exempt the land over which industrial units exist from acquisition on payment of 50% betterment fee by these units. The Government of U. P. , however, instead of itself releasing the petitioners' land from acquisition wrote a letter dated November 26, 1977 to the Corporation requiring it to release the land over which the industrial units exist from acquisition by execution of convey ance deeds in their favour. The Government adopted this course for releas ing the petitioners' land from acquisition, because in its opinion possession of the land had already been taken and, therefore, land cannot be exempted from acquisition by it in view of the provisions contained in Section 48 of the Act. Petitioners thereafter continued to represent the matter in this connec tion before the State Government and the Corporation. The Corporation vide its letters dated 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985 (Annexures 14 and 16 to the writ petition) informed the petitioners that the Corporation can allot plots on lease on payment of development charges at the rate of Rs. 8 per spuare yard and required the petitioners to confirm their acceptance of the proposal. Petitioners thereafter have filed these writ petitions before this Court for release of their land from acquistion and for getting the aforesaid two letters quashed. Prayer for quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act has also been made. Incidental and consequen tial reliefs have also been claimed. Both the Government and the Corporation have filed counter affida vits and the petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavits in reply thereto. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners have made three submissions in support of these petitions, namely, (i) the State Government was fully compe tent to release the land of the petitioners from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act, because its actual possession was not taken by it and, therefore, there was no vesting of the land in the Government under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act, (ii) notifications under the Act acquiring the land were issued without application of mind in a mechanical manner, and (iii) there was no justifica tion for applying the urgency clause contained in sub-section (4) of Section 17 and dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act. Sri Chandra Prakash learned counsel for the Corporation and the learned Standing Counsel, apart from disputing the above contentions, has raised two preliminary objections, namely, (i) the petitioners, being firms, have no locus standi to file these writ petitions ; and (ii) petitioners are guilty of excessive delay and laches, so far as their challenge to the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act is concerned. Before dealing with the questions raised by the petitioners, it is necessary to decide the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. As regards the first objection, their contention is that a firm is neither a natural nor a juristic person and, therefore, it has no locus standi to file writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the acquisition proceedings. In their support they have placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in M/s Agarwal Stone Mill v. U. P. State Electricity Board, 1993 ACJ 361. It is true that the Division Bench in the above case has laid down that firm has no right to file the writ petition, because it is neither a natural nor a juristic person.;