K. R. SHARMA, J. - (1.) This revision has been filed under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act which includes Trade Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" against the judgment and order dated January 15, 1993, passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Moradabad Bench II, in Second Appeal No. 664 of 1988 (83-84) U. P. whereby the Commissioner's Appeal No. 923 of 1988 (83-84) U. P. and Appeal No. 924 of 1988 (83-84) Central were dismissed and the second appeal of the assessee Nos. 664 of 1988 (83-84), U. P. and 665 of 88 (83-84) (Central) were pearly allowed reducing the tax liability by Rs. 3,744. 65. I have heard Sri Bharatji Agarwal, learned counsel for the revisionist assisted by Sri R. K. Agarwal and Sri U. K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel assisted by Sri M. M. Rai, Trade Tax Officer, Trade Tax, U. P. Learned counsel for the revisionist has pressed only following three ground out of five grounds mentioned in para 17 of the memo of revisions : " (a) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in imposing tax on the pieces of case iron, steel angles again when the tax has already been paid on the said commodity while purchasing the same in U. P. by the applicant. (b) Whether, the tribunal was justified in law in imposing tax on bagasse ? (c) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in rejecting the account books in respect of petrol unit ? It has been contended by Mr. Bharatji Agarwal learned counsel for the revisionist, in respect of the first ground that the learned Tribunal has committed an illegality by treating the case iron, steel angles as a different commodity attracting sales tax liability. He has further submitted that these items are declared goods under section 14 (iv) of the Central Sales Tax Act for which tax was paid at the point of purchase and on tax on sale of these goods could be levied in view of the special provisions of section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The learned Standing counsel has replied that the iron scraps and steel angles were new commodities entirely different from the declared commodities and were exigible to sales tax under the Act. The relevant position in law can be examined with reference to the provisions of section 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Central Act" ). Section 14 of the Central Act declares a list of goods of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. In clause (iv) of section 14, the following goods have been declared as goods of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce : " (iv) iron and steel, that is to say - (i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, case iron scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap; (ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes); (iii) skelp bars, tin bars, sheet bars, hoe-bars and sleeper bars; (iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted, in coil form as well as straight lengths); (v) steel structurals (angles, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections); (vi) sheets, hoops, strips and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in riveted condition; (vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii) discs, rings, forgings and steel castings; (ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories; (x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings; (xi) steel tubes, both welded and seamless of all diameters and lengths including tube fittings; (xii) tin-plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tinfree plates; (xiii) fish plate bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails - heavy and light crane rails; (xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets; (xv) wire rods and wires - rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper; and (xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories. " Section 15 prescribes restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within the State in the following terms : " 15. Restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State.- Every sales tax law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely : (a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed four per cent. of the sale or purchase price thereof, and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage; (b) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade commerce, and tax has been paid under this Act, in respect of the sale of such goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax levied under such law shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be provided in any law in force in that State; (c) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any paddy referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (i) of section 14, the tax leviable on rice procured out of such paddy shall be reduced by the amount of tax levied on such paddy; (d) each of the pulses referred to in clause (vi-a) of section 14, whether whole or separated, and whether with or without husk, shall be treated as a single commodity for the purpose of levy of tax under that law. " These provisions of the Central Act make the position clear that if particular goods have been declared as goods of special importance as described in section 14, tax will be levied at only one stage either on sale or purchase of such declared goods inside the State and shall exceed 4 per cent. of the sale or purchase price thereof. In the present case, the iron and steel which were purchased by the assessee were admittedly declared goods under section 14 but after the manufacture scrap-iron was left out and it was sold by the assessee as iron scrap. The assessing authority treated this iron scrap as a different commodity other than the declared goods and levied the sales tax on its sale. This question was answered against the assessee throughout and the learned Tribunal treated these iron scraps as a different commodity attracting sales tax at the point of sale. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the tax at the point of sale. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the tax at the time of purchase had been actually paid on the iron and steel of which the iron scrap was left out in the process of manufacture and it cannot be treated as a different commodity attracting the sales tax again on the point of sale. In support of his contention he has cited a number of rulings which I propose to deal as follows : In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahi Traders [1989] 73 STC 228; 1989 UPTC 737, the honourable Supreme Court was considering the nature of cut pieces obtained in the process of cutting raw or tanned hides and skins and coloured leather, with reference to the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the Central Act. The honourable Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the cut pieces continue to be hides and skins eligible for special treatment under section 15 and were not exigible to sales tax on the point of sale. In the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1989] 74 STC 176; 1989 UPTC 1072, the honourable Supreme Court considered the nature of galvanised iron pipes and tubes with reference to the provisions of section 14 (iv) (xi) of the Central Act and held that galvanised pipes are steel tubes with the meaning of section 14 (iv) (xi) of the Central Sales Tax Act and ever after the process of galvanising, it remains a steel tube and the view of the Kerala High Court was set aside. In the case of Telangana Steel Industries v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1994] 93 STC 187; 1994 UPTC 847, the honourable Supreme Court considered the nature of iron wires with reference to section 14 (iv) (xv) of the Central Act and held that iron wires cannot be taken as a separate taxable commodity and if wire rods which were purchased by the appellant had suffered sales tax, the same should not be realised from the sale of wires by virtue of special treatment to such declared goods under section 15 of the Central Act. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319; 1976 UPTC 282, the honourable Supreme Court considered the question of single point tax on iron and steel goods and on interpretation of section 14 of the Central Act held that each of the categories falling under "iron and steel" in clause (iv) of the Central Sales Tax Act (even prior to its amendment by Act No. 61 of 1972) constitutes a new species of commercial commodity. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act were not violative of section 15 of the Central Act and the goods in question sought to be taxed were taxable only once as a separate taxable commodity. On the basis of these decisions, the learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the iron scrap sold by the revisionist was a declared commodity under section 14 (iv) (xv) and was entitled to special treatment under section 15 of the Central Act and as such sales tax on the point of sale of iron scrap was not again exigible under the Act, as the tax on the iron and steel purchased by the revisionist had already been paid at the time of purchase. The learned Standing Counsel has contended that the iron scrap was a different commodity and its sale attracted sales tax on the point of sale also. In support of his contention he referred to the decision in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. India Metal Industries [1980] 46 STC 304, wherein the Madras High Court also considered single point tax on declared goods of iron and steel and held that the decision of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of P. L. Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319; 1976 UPTC 282 will govern taxability on the sales of steel bars and rods manufactured out of tax-paid steel scraps. In this case the facts were different from those of the present revision. In the case considered by the Madras High Court the assessee had used the steel scraps for conversion into steel bars and rods and the State Government had imposed sales tax on the sale of steel bars and rods. The learned Standing Counsel also placed reliance on the case of P. L. Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319 (SC); 1976 UPTC 282, which has already been alluded to hereinabove. The learned Tribunal has also referred to these decisions in its judgment. The question whether the steel scraps sold by the assessee as such is a different commodity for the purposes of tax on its sale cannot be merely decided on the basis of one or the other criteria. There are several criteria to ascertain the correct nature of the goods in question. The honourable Supreme Court has in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 referred to the several criteria in the following words : ". . . . . The goods purchased should be consumed, the consumption should be in the process of manufacture, and the result must be the manufacture of other goods. There are several criteria for determining whether a commodity is consumed in the manufacture of another. The generally prevalent test is whether the article produced is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as distinct in identity from the commodity involved in its manufacture. Commonly, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and there may be several stages of processing and a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change. But it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Where there is no essential difference in identity between the original commodity and the processed article it is not possible to say that one commodity has been consumed in the manufacture of another. Although it has undergone a degree of proceeding, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity. " In the present case, the court is considering the question whether the pieces of cast iron and steel angles sold by the assessee was a different commodity in its identity from iron and steel. The scrap of iron and steel is the residue in the form of cut pieces of the iron and steel for which tax at the stage of purchase has been paid by virtue of section 15 of the Central Act and no processing or manufacture has changed the nature of the cut pieces of the iron and steel. Therefore, there is no doubt at all that the cut pieces of iron and steel continued to have the same identity as the iron and steel which were declared goods under section 14 (iv) and for the purchase of which tax was paid at the time of purchase and by virtue of restrictions imposed by section 15, no State Government can impose tax on the sales of the cut pieces of the declared goods. The learned Tribunal has committed an error of law by not correctly appreciating the decisions cited before it. Therefore, this finding of fact is not sustained. I hold that not tax liability is attracted on the sales of pieces of cast iron and pieces of steel angles. The learned counsel for the assessee has argued on the 2nd point that the bagasse being the residue of the sugarcane should not be treated as a different commodity exigible to the sales tax but the learned Tribunal has committed an error of law by treating it as a different commodity attracting liability of sales tax. He has further submitted that the revisionist had paid purchase tax on the purchase of sugarcane out of which bagasse has been left out in the manufacturing process and no tax on sale of bagasse can be levied under the U. P. Sales Tax Act in view of the bar created by section 13 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961. The learned Standing Counsel has however submitted that the bagasse is a commodity different from sugarcane and as such it attracts sales tax on its sale under the Act. Therefore, the substantial question arising for consideration is whether the bagasse will be treated as a different commodity exigible to sales tax under the Act. In support of his contention Mr. Bharat Ji Agarwal has cited a decision in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. v. Prag Ice and Oil Mills [1991] 80 STC 403; 1991 UPTC 815 in which the honourable Supreme Court considered the nature of the residue of groundnut oil and held that the residue left after going through the process of the acids and chemicals, continued and remains to be the groundnut oil and is taxable at 1 per cent. He has further cited a decision of a division Bench of this Court in the case of Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Limited, Gadarpur, Nainital v. State of Uttar Pradesh STI 1989 All. 294. In this case the specific question regarding nature of bagasse was considered and this Court has held that so far as bagasse is concerned, it is the residue from the milling process of the sugarcane. It consists of body, fibre, some unextracted juice and 40-50 per cent. of the water. The learned Tribunal while holding that bagasse is a different commodity attracting liability of sales tax on its sale, has not correctly followed the decision in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63. In my opinion, the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal that bagasse is a different commodity is not correct. The bagasse is a residue of the sugarcane left after its processing and continues to be the residue of the sugarcane and does not become a different commodity, if its juice, sucrose and water contents are squeezed out of sugarcane. Section 13 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 reads as follows : " 13. No sale or purchase tax under any other Uttar Pradesh Act shall be payable in respect of any transaction of sale or purchase of sugarcane in respect of which a tax is payable under this Act, anything contained in the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 to the contrary notwithstanding. " It is clear form bare provisions of section 13 that the U. P. Sales Tax Act does not apply to sugarcane and no tax either on sale or purchase of sugarcane is exigible under the U. P. Sales Tax Act. If tax on purchase of sugarcane has already been paid by the assessee under the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961, the residue of the sugarcane if sold, cannot be subjected to sales tax. The learned Tribunal has committed an error of law by holding that bagasse will be attracting liability of sales tax under the Act. This finding is also liable to be set aside. I hold that bagasse being the residue and the result of the sugarcane after its processing is not exigible to sales tax under the Act even on its sale. The learned counsel for the revisionist has on the 3rd ground urged that the learned Tribunal committed error of law in rejecting the account books of the assessee in respect of the petrol unit merely for the reason that no bill was prepared for credit memo at the time of survey. Mr. Agarwal has submitted that as per business practice of the petrol pump, the petrol is also supplied to customers on the basis of credit memos and regular bills for payment are prepared either quarterly or monthly. He has also shown a credit memo in respect of the petrol purchased by him and also a monthly bill in respect of all the credit memos showing total amount of price of petrol and an receipt in respect of payment thereof, by way of example, to elucidate his point that preparation of bill on the basis of credit memos depends upon the practice of the petrol seller. On the basis of non-preparation of the bill in respect of the credit memo immediately, as found at the time of survey, a conclusion could not be drawn that the account books of the assessee are not properly and regularly maintained as required under law. The learned Standing Counsel for the opposite parties submitted that all the accounts of sales and purchase by a dealer must be regularly and properly maintained in the account books prescribed by law. There is no doubt that section 12 of the Act prescribes maintenance of true and correct account showing the value of goods sold and bought by the dealer in the ordinary course of business and also to maintain the stock books in respect of the raw material as well as the products obtained at every stage of production, in the case of manufacturer. Rules 72 and 73 of the U. P. Sales Tax Rules prescribe as to how accounts will be maintained and the period for which accounts will be retained and preserved. I do not find any provision whereby the dealers are enjoined to prepare the bills at the same time at which the credit memos are issued and the goods are sold in credit. The accounts are maintained as and when the purchases and sales are made. When the sale is made on credit, a credit memo is issued and that by itself is sufficient to show the true and correct account of the sales on credit. The bill for payment in respect of the credit sales can be prepared according to the agreement between the seller and the purchaser, but it must finally be prepared and maintained and disclosed in the turnover of the sales for the particular month. It does not matter whether the bill has been also paid by the purchaser within that month or subsequently. It is for the dealer to realise the money of the goods which he has sold on credit. IT is not for the assessing authority or the Tribunal under the Act to reject the account books merely on the ground that a solitary credit memo issued at the time of survey was not accounted for in the form of bill at the same time. The explanation offered by the dealer at the time of survey as to why the bill had not been prepared in respect of that solitary credit memo was unreasonably rejected by these authorities as well as the learned Tribunal. Therefore, the unrealistic and unreasonable view adopted by the learned Tribunal in rejecting the account books of the petrol unit of the assessee cannot be sustained by this Court and has to be set aside. The Tribunal will have to accept the account books and record the finding of fact relating to the assessment on the basis of the account books. I hold that the rejection of the account books of the petrol unit of the assessee is unjustified and illegal. For the aforesaid reasonable the findings of fact on the grounds raised in this revision are liable to be quashed and the learned Tribunal has to be directed to decide the appeals in the light of the findings and observations made hereinabove. Therefore, the revision is hereby allowed and the impugned judgment dated January 15, 1993 passed by the learned Tribunal in Second Appeals Nos. 664 and 665 of 1988 are set aside and the Tribunal is hereby directed to rehear and decide the appeals afresh on the basis of the findings recorded and observations made hereinabove, as expeditiously as possible. Let a certified copy of order be issued within 3 days on payment of usual fee. Petition allowed. .;