- (1.) G. P. Mathnr, J. A large number of writ petitions have been filed by Cable T. V. Operators challenging the notices issued by the authorities for payment of entertainment tax under the provisions of U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979. Four such petitions in which leading arguments have been advanced are being disposed of by a common order which shall also decide all other cases of this bunch of writ petitions.
(2.) THE case of the petitioners, in brief, is that many man made Satel lites have been launched by various countries, corporations and other agencies which have been put into or hit around the earth and they are packed with variety of instruments and equipments. Some of these Satellites are encircling the globe and moving with it at the same speed and in the same direction in geo-stationary orbit positioned in the outer space about 35000 Km above the surface of earth. THEy are being used extensively for transmitting sound and picture to the earth in the form of Wireless Signals, THE Signals emitted and sprayed by such Satellites can be directly received and collected on an appro priately designed dish- shaped receptacle known as Dish-Antenna which is aligned to face the satellite in the direct line of vision. THE signals so received when processed through a series of electronic equipments, can be fed to a Television set by means of a conducting metal wire to recreate audio visual effect on the Television Screen. THE Dish-Antenna can be installed anywhere but has to be aligned to any of the satellites available in the direct line of vision. THE programmes which are broadcast be State run Doordarshan are also transmitted through Satellites which have been projected in the orbit by Indian Space Research Organisation. Such programmes are tracked in diffe rent cities and then relayed through transmitters placed on high rise towers commonly known as T. V. Towers. THEse programmes can be viewed on Television sets within a limited area by putting a small roof-top/indoor antenna made of suitably designed small hollow metal tubes. THEre are other Doordarshan programmes known as D. D. Metro which have to be tracked and picked up by users directly from the satellites by using a dish-antenna, However, some corporations and private organisations like B. B. C. , Star T. V. , M. T. V. and Zee T. V. are operating from outside India and beam their; pro grammes through satellites. THEse programmes cannot be directly received by T. V. sets. THE petitioners have installed dish-antennas which receive and collect the signals from the satellites and these signals are then processed and amplified in the control rooms of the petitioners and are then transmitted through special cables to the Television sets of the subscriber who pay a fixed monthly amount as fee for getting this service. In this manner a subscriber is able to view programmes broadcast by B. B. C. , Star T. V. , M. T. V. and Zee T. V. etc. THE entire set up is generally called cable T. V. Net work. THE petitioners claim that the nature of the activity carried on by them does not fall within the scope of ''cinema" and "cinematograph" either under the Cinematograph Act or U. P. Cinema (Regulations) Act, 1955 as they do not exhibit moving pictures in public. THE Assistant Commissioner. Entertain ment Tax issued notices to the petitioners to pay entertainment tax at the rate of 30% of subscription charges received by them from their subscribers. THE petitioners further contend that the service provided by them does not came within the ambit of U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act and consequent ly the demand of entertainment tax from them is without any authority of law. THE stand of the State on the other hand, however, is that the petitioners are carrying on a business which enables their subscribers to view a variety of programmes broadcast by different corporations from India and outside India, on their Television sets in their own residence and get entertainment for which they pay money to the petitioners. Thus the activity of the petitioners is fully covered by the provisions of U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act and they are liable to pay entertainment tax. In this State, the Legislature had first enacted United Province Enter tainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937. It was enacted with reference to entry Nos. 35, 36 and 50 of the Provincial List of the Government of India Act, 1935. Subsequently this Act was repealed and the State Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was published in the U. P. Gazette on Septem ber 10, 1979. It has been enacted with reference to Entry Nos. 33, 54 and 62 of the State list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Act has been further amended by U. P. Acts No. 1 of. 1982, 29 of 1985, 12 of 1989, and 14 of 1990. It may also be noticed that Cinematograph Acts of 1918 and 1952 and U P. Cinemas (Regulations) Act, 1955 had been enacted to regulate exhibitions by means of Cinematograph. In Section 2 of U. P. Cinemas (Regula tions) Act, 1955 a new clause (aa) was added to Section 2 by U. P. Act No. 21 of 1986 to define 'exhibition by means of Video' and a comprehensive set of rules known as U. P. Cinema (Regulation of Exhibitions by means of Video) Rules, 1988 were also 1 ianud. The U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 was further amended by U. P. Act No. 12 of 1989 and Section 4-A and 4-B were added for levying entertainment tax on Video Cinema and Video Shows in public service vehicles and hotels. It may further be noticed that till recently, there was no control of any kind on Cable Television operators. In order to exercise some kind of control and regulate the activity being carried on by Cable T. V. Operators, an Ordinance known as 'the Cable Television Net Works (Regulations) Ordinance, 1994, was promulgated on 29th Septem ber, 1994 which has been replaced by Cable Television Net Works (Regulation) Act 1955 and the Central Government also made "the Cable Television Net Works Rules, 1994". Since under U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, the words "cable Operators". "cable Service Programmes" and - 'subscriber" have not been defined, it will be appropriate to bear in mind the same meaning of the aforesaid words as is given in the Cable Television Net Works (Regula tions) Act, 1955, The relevant provisions of Section 2 of the aforesaid Act are being reproduced below : 2 (a) "cable operator" means any person who provides cable service through a cable television net work or otherwise controls or is responsible for the management and operation of a cable television network ; (b) "cable service" means the transmission by cables of programmes including re-transmission (by cables of any broadcast television signals); (c) "cable television network" means any system consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, control and distribution equipment, designed to provide cable service for reception by multiple subscribers : (i) "subscriber" means a person who receives the signals of cable television networks at a place indicated by him to the cable opera tor, without further transmitting it to any other person. 4. The principal submission of Shri Prabodh Gaur, who led the argu ments on behalf of the petitioners, is that the nature of activity being carried on by a Cable T. V. Operators is such that it does not fall within the purview of the Act and as Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied and collected except by authority of law, the levy of entertainment tax on the petitioners is wholly illegal. He has submitted that the petitioners do not provide any entertainment nor do they admit persons to any entertainment on payment which is essential for applicability of Section 3 which is the charg ing section and, therefore, they cannot be held liable to pay any entertainment tax. In order to appreciate the argument ot the learned counsel, it will be convenient to refer to Section 2 (a), 2 (g), 2 (1), 2 (m) and 3 (1) of the Act which read as follows: 2 (a) 'admission to an entertainment' includes admission to any place in which the entertainment is held ; (g) 'entertainment' includes any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race (including horse race) to which persons are admitted for payment and in the case of cinematograph exhibi tions, includes exhibition of news reels, documentaries, cartoons, advertisement shorts or slides, whether before or during the exhi bition of a feature film or separately i 2 (1) "payment for admission's includes ; (i) any payment for seats or other accommodation in any form in a place of entertainment ; (ii) any payment for a programme or synopsis of an entertainment; (iii) any payment made for the loan or use of any instrument or contrivance which enables a person to get a normal or better view or hearing or enjoyment of the entertainment, which without the aid of such instrument or contrivance such per son would not get; (iv ). . . . . . . . . . . . (v ). . . . . . . . . . . . 2 (m) 'proprietor' in relation to any entertainment includes any person- (i) connected with the organisation of the entertainment, or (ii) charged with the work of admission to the entertainment, or (iii) responsible for, or for the time being in charge of, the management thereof ; 3 (1) subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall. . be levied and paid on all payment for admission to any entertainment, other than an entertainment to which Section 4 or Section 4-A or Section 4-B applies or a compounded payment is made under the proviso to this sub-section an entertainment tax at such rate not exceeding one hundred and fifty per cent of each such payment as the State Government may from time to time notify in this behalf, and the tax shall be collected by the proprietor from the person making the payment for admission and paid to the Government in the manner prescribed : Provided. . . . . . . . . . not exceeding forty per cent of the gross collection capacity. . . . . . . . Explanation. . . . . . . . . . S. The submission of Shri Gaur is that the entertainment tax can be levied on all payment for admission 10 any entertainment and in view of Section 2 (a) of the Act, payment should be made for getting admission to any place in which the entertainment is held. In absence of admission to any place in which entertainment is held, no tax can be levied. The cable T. V. operator neither provides any place nor charges any money for granting admission to any place. Similarly the subscriber neither comes nor seeks admission or entrance to any place provided by the operator but he views the programes on his own Tele vision and in his own residence or place of living. Section 3 can have no application where the person making payment is not admitted to any place which has been set apart or provided by the organiser of the entertainment. He further submitted that in England, an Excise duty called "entertainments Duty" was chargeable on all payments for admission to any entertainment under Section 1 (1) of the Finance (New Duties) Act, 1916. Though the word 'place' was not specifically used in the aforesaid Act but contextually 'place' was considered integral to admission. Reference in this connection has been made to Halsbury's Laws of England (Second Halisham Edn) Vol. 28 Para 681, wherein it has been stated that the duty of excise is payable on all payments for admission to any place of entertainment other than those which are specifi cally exempted. Reference is also made to Markand Saroop v. M M Bajaj, AIR 1979 110 where while considering the provisions of U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937, it was observed that the admission to an entertain ment would include admission to any place in which the entertainment is held. Thus, it is submitted that the word 'place' has always been linked to admission despite its non-use in the statute. 6. Sub-section (a), (g) and (1) of Section 2 show that the definition of the word 'admission to entertainment', 'entertainment' and 'payment for ad mission' is not exhaustive but is only illustrative as the Legislature has used the word include' in all the expressions. 'the intention of the Legislature is to enlarge the meaning of the words occurring in the sub-section and they must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the definition clause declares that they shall include. Sri Gaur has, however, submitted that there is no inflexible rule that wherever the expression' include' has been used the meaning of the word must necessarily be enlarged and in support of his sub mission, he has placed reliance Hindustan Alumunium Corporation v. State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 1649 (para 10) where with reference to a notification issued under Section 3-A of U. P. Sales Tax Act, it was held that the expres sion 'include' did not enlarge the meaning of the word 'metal' and it had been used in the same sense in which it is marketable as a primary commodity. 7. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (twelfth edn) the use of word 'include' in the definition clause has been explained in the following words on page 270 : "sometimes, however, the word 'include' is used 'in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute ; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include'. In other words, the word in respect of which 'include' is used bears both its extended statutory meaning and 'its ordinary, popular, and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable. " 8. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Maxdoor Sangh, AIR 1960 SC 610 Mr. Gajendragadkar, J. observed as follows : "the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and can not be treated as restricted in any sense. Where the courts are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be in appropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation. " 9. In S. G. R. Tiles Manufacturing Ltd. v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1977 SC 90, it was held as follows in para 3 of the reports : "we may refer to the often quoted observation of Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps, (1899) AC 99 at pp. 105-106 that when the word 'include' is used in interpretation clauses to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases in the statute these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include". Thus where 'includes' has an extending force, it adds to the word or phrase a meaning which does not naturally belong to it. " This has been reiterated in M/s. Doy Pack System Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 782 and in P. Kasilingam v. P. S. G. College of Technology, 1995 (3) JT 193. It is, therefore, well settled that the normal rule is that the use of the word "include" in interpretation clauses enlarges the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the Statute. 10. Section 2 (a) provides that admission to an entertainment' includes admission to any place in which entertainment is held. The meaning of the word 'admission' is as follows : (1) Oxford English Dictionary : "the action of admitting to some position, standing, or privileges. The action of admitting to a place and its privileges, into a society or company of men or class of things. " (2) New Lexicon Webster Dictionary : "the action of admitting; of giving access or entrance; entry into an office or status like admission to the bar. (3) Webster's Third New International Dictionary : "acceptance into an office or position; permission or right to enter (as a place of membership ). The right to enter as a member or entry into an office or status is also covered within the ambit of word "admission". By way of example, there may be a writers' club and a person who is admitted to the said club does not gain entry to any place but gets a right to participate and deliberate in the meetings of the members of the said club, wherever they are held. Similarly, the ex pression "admission to the Bar" does not connote entry to a place but con notes the right to act and plead as a pleader or Advocate. Therefore, the contention that as while defining -'admission to an entertainment" in Sec tion 2 (a) of the Act the words "admission to any place" have been used, it is necessary that the admission must be to a place which has been provided by proprietor of the entertainment in order to attract Section 3 (1) of the Act, cannot be accepted. 11. Shri Gaur has submitted that the Preamble of U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 stated that a tax was being imposed on admission to places of public entertainment. There is no reason why element of place which was intrinsic to the meaning of admission so as to sustain a charge under the old Act should now be isolated and thrown out of the 1979 Act as no essential. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance upon para 613 of Vol. 36 of Kalsbury's Laws of England (Simonds Edn): "where a statute of limited operations is repealed by one which ex pressly re-enacts its provisions in an amended form, it may be presumed that the operation of the re-enacted provision was not intended to be extended to class of persons hither to not subjected to it. " It may be noticed that Section 37 of 1979 Act specifically repealed the U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937. The Preamble of the present Act reads as follows "an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to taxes on entertainments, amusements and on certain forms of betting in the State of U. P. ". Therefore, in view of the fact that the Legislature itself has given a different Preamble of 1979 Act, the element of admission, which was present in 1937 Act, cannot be imported for interpreting its provisions. 12. Sub-clause (iii) of Section 2 (1) defines "payment for admission" as any payment made for the loan or use of any instrument or contrivance which enables a person to get normal or better view or hearing or enjoyment of the entertainment which without aid of such instrument of contrivance, such per son would not get, Therefore, if any person charges any money for enabling any person to use any instrument or mechanical device which enables such person to get a normal view of the entertainment which without aid of such device, he would not get, it will come fully within the clutches of Section 3 of the Act. The programmes being broadcast by foreign media like B. B. C. Star T. V. and M. T. V. or by D. D. Metro cannot be received directly on television sets. The Cable T. V. operators receive the wireless signals on their dish-antennas and after processing them through electronic equipments, they are transmitted to television sets of the subscribers through the conducting metal wires. The role played by them will be clear from paras 2 and 8 of Writ Peti tion No. 135j of 1993- (Universal Communications System v. State of U. P. which are quoted below : Para 2 : "that several such satellites are visible in the sky over the Indian Sub Continent. The signals emitted and sprayed by any such satellite can be directly received and collected on an appropriately designed dish- shaped receptacle known as dish-antenna, aligned to face that satellite in the direct line of vision. The signals so received, can be fed to a television set by means of a conducting metal wire to recreate an audio-visual effect on the television screen. Para 8 : "that as already stated earlier, the signals are first collected and received by dish antenna. They are then processed and amplified in the control room of the petitioners and connected through special cables to the television sets of people, willing to pay a monthly maintenance charge. The number of channels transmitted through the cable varies from petitioner to petitioner depending upon the range of the equipment and facilities possessed by them. The entire set up is generally called Cable T. V. Network. The peti tioners generally have upto a hundred customers each. " There cannot be slightest doubt that a subscriber gets a normal view of the programmes only with the use of instruments which are provided by the cable T. V. operator and without the aid of such instruments, these programmes can not be viewed. For making use of those instruments the subscriber makes payment to the cable T. V. operator. The money paid by the subscriber is thus clearly a payment for admission to an entertainment. The activity carried on by the petitioners is thus fully covered by the provisions of Section 3 of the Act and they are liable to pay entertainment tax. 13. In Gopal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U. P. , 1982 ALJ 608 a Division Bench while considering the question as to whether entertainment tax was leviable on video games observed as follows : ". . . . . . Admission to the premises where the Video Machines are installed may be free but payment is admittedly made it one wants to play the game. The money charged for use of the Video Machine is an admission to entertainment and the payment made by the person who uses the machine is the payment for admission. In any case, it is a payment connected with entertainment which a person is required to make as a condition of attending the entertainment. " The apex Court in M/s. Geeta Enterprises v. State of U. P,, AIR 1983 SC 1098 expressed complete agreement with the above observation and approved the ratio of the case. This principle is fully applicable here also. 14 Sri Gaur also submitted that for attracting sub-clause (iii) of Sec tion 2 (1) of the Act, use of the instruments should be in the physical sense of the term, namely, that the person who gets normal view of the entertainment must himself use the instrument. In our opinion, there is no scope for restrict ing the meaning of the word "use" to such an extent. The use of instrument can be direct or indirect. Once the instruments of cable T. V. operator are connected to the television set of the subscriber by wire or cable the mere fact that someone else is operating the control room can make no difference as the subscriber gets full benefit of the instruments installed therein and it is through those instruments that the wireless signals beamed by the satellites are. convert ed into such type of signals which can be directly received by an ordinary television set. Thus, it cannot be held that a subscriber does not himself use the instruments or devices which have been installed by a cable T. V. operator. 15. It is next submitted that the cable T. V. operators do not themselves provides an entertainment as the same is provided by the proprietor of the television station from where these programmes are broadcast. The conten tion is that the cable T. V. operators are merely extending the facility and as such they do not come within the purview of Section 3 of the Act. As shown the definition of word "entertainment" as given in Section 2 (g) is not exhaus tive but is illustrative. Since the Legislature has used the word 'includes' the same has to be extended. There can be no doubt that with the use of the equipment installed by cable T. V. operator, a subscriber is able to see the pro grammes which he would not be able to do otherwise. Therefore, in so far as the subscriber is concerned, the said entertainment is provided by the con cerned cable T. V. operators, if the argument of learned counsel is accepted, it will lead to an absurd result. A proprietor of Cinema hall does not himself provide any entertainment as the same is provided by the Stars and Artists who have acted in the film. Such a restricted interpretation of the word "entertainment" can never be accepted. 16. Sri Ashok Khare has submitted that in view of the language used in Section 3 of the Act, the liability of tax is on an act of entertainment and not on the person providing entertainment. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on Westan India Theatre v. Cantonment Board, AIR 1959 SC 582 and Y. V. Shrinvasamurthy v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 894. The contention is that there has to be a tax on each act of entertainment for which payment is charged and there cannot tea tax on monthly or yearly basis. In our opinion, the word 'entertainment' used in Section 3, in view of its inclu sive definition, cannot be given any restricted meaning. It will be doing violence to the language used in Section 3 to hold that the entertainment con templated therein is relatable only to a single act or number of acts of enter tainment. It may be a series of acts of entertainment or the said entertainment may be spread over to several hours or days and the tax would have nexus to the mode and manner of payment. If payment for series of entertainments is made separately for each one of them then the tax would have to be paid on each such payment but if the payment is made by way of a consolidated amount on weekly or monthly basis, the tax has to be paid on such consolidat ed amount. 17. In Ramesh Sippy v. State, AIR 1989 Bom 250 levy of tax under Bombay Entertainment Duty Act on machines in Video parlour was challenged on the ground that the same was levied on lump sum rate on the basis of Rs. 500 per machine per month within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and at the rate of 250 per machine per month in other areas. It was contended that the tax was payable even in a case where the machias, though could be used but in fact was not used and thus depended upon its capacity to provide entertainment. It was also contended that as the tax was levied on the machine it was not on an act of entertainment and consequently the same was illegal. The contention was repelled on the ground that in rela tion to taxing statutes the Legislature enjoys a large discretion in the matter of classification and it must be given full freedom to determine the manner in which tax should be imposed. The tax levied in lump sum basis on the number of machines was oly convenient method to levy the tax in so far as Video parlours were concerned. In para 8 of the reports it was observed as follows : "the tax contemplated by the Act is not a tax on ownership of machine or its possession. In the normal circumstances, when a video game machine is installed in a video parlour, it could safely be inferred that it is used as a source of entertainment. Therefore, in substance it is a tax on act of entertainment. This is clear from the fact that a lump sum tax is fixed irrespective of capacity of a machine. Tax does not vary with the cost of machine or its make. Machine is chosen as a mere criteria for the purpose of calculation. Incidence of tax is not on the machine but is on the act of entertainment. From the definition of video game parlour it is clear that it is a place of entertainment where persons are required to make a payment for the purpose of work ing a machine installed therein which operates electronically, or mechanically or electro mechanically. Therefore, the machines installed in the video game parlours are part and parcel of the act of entertainment. Since any other mode of imposition of tax was either impossible or impracticable, legislature has chosen to impose a tax in lump sum at a flat rate. But from this alone an inference cannot be drawn that the tax is levied on the machine itself and not on the act of entertainment. " Recently in Venkatshewara Theatre v. State of A. P. , AIR 1993 SO 1947 the constructional validity of Sections 4 and 5 of Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1988 and Act No. 16 of 1991 came up for consideration before the apex Court. The mode of levy based on "per payment on admission" which necessitated enquiry into the number of shows held and the number of persons admitted to a Cinema theatre for each show was amended and levy was made on the basis of theatre's collection capacity per show for a prescribed number of shows in a week. The challenge to the amended provision was repelled with the following observations : "once it is held that tax on entertainment could be levied by either of the two modes, viz , per payment of a admission or gross collec tion capacity per show, it is foe the legislature to decide the particular mode or modes of levy to be adopted and whether a choice should be available to the proprietor of the cinema theatre in this regard. The legislature does not transgress the limits of its legis lature does not transgress the limits of its legislative power con ferred on it under entry 62 of List II if it decides that consolida tion levy on the basis of gross collection capacity per show shall be the only mode for levy of tax on entertainment. " For taking the above view, the Court relied upon a series of decisions rendered in East India Tobacoo Com. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1733, Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1637, Gannon Dunkarely and Co. v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 (1) SCC 364 and also a decision of U. S. Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, (1972) 411 US (1) page 41, wherein, it has been held in the field of taxation the Legislature is permitted to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular person or association. 18. Shri Khare has next submitted that in the notification issued by the State Government on April 13, 1989 there is no specific entry regarding rate of tax which is leviable on a cable T. V. operator and the respondents are taking recourse to Entry No. 5 which is residuary clause for levying tax. The sub mission is that a taxing statute cannot be vague and in absence of some definite publication that the activity being carried on by a cable T. V. operator is liable to be taxed at a particular rate, the tax cannot be imposed. Entry No. 5 of the Notification, dated April 13, 1989 regarding rates of Entertain ment Tax reads as follows : 5. All other classes of entertainments Thirty per cent of each pay ment not covered by items 1 to 4 (including for admission mimicry carnival, puppet show, magic show, giant show, games of skill and video games ). We have examined the notification issued by the State Government in this regard. It is not worthy that though the notification mentions about exhibition in a cinema, house, Joyrides in aeroplanes, horse racing, it does not mention some well known form of entertainment like a music programme, theatre or dance show. It cannot be contended that these programmes do not provide any entertainment or that they would not be liable to tax. In our opinion, the language used in Entry No. 5 is all comprehensive and will cover all types of entertainment including that provided by cable T. V. operators even though it is specifically not mentioned in the notification. 19. Shri Frabodh Gaur has submitted that the Act as it was enacted in 1979 could not have possibly taken into consideration the advent of Video Cinema and Cable T. V. and with that end in view it was amended by U. P. Act No. 12 of 1989 and Section 4-A and 4-B were introduced which makes proprietor of a Video Cinema as well as proprietor of a public service vehicle or of a hotel where exhibition by Video is given liable for payment of tax. Since, there is no corresponding amendment for making a cable T. V. Operator liable to entertainment tax, it is contended, the provisions of the Act should not be held applicable to him. Sri Gaur has also referred to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes page 256 where after making reference to Russel v. Scott, 1948 AC 422 and IRC v. Wolf Son, 1949 (1) AER 865, the law regard ing imposition of tax is stated in following words : "statutes which impose pecuniary burdens are subject to the same rule of strict construction. It is a well settled rule of law that all charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambi guous language, because is some degree they operate as penalties : the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the obligation, and language must not be strained in order to tax a transaction which had the legislature thought of it, would have been covered by appropriate words. 'in a taxing Act', Said Rowlatt J. 'one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. " Reference has also been made to Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan v. Excise Com missioner, AIR 1971 SC 378 where similar view has been taken by the Apex Court. The submission is that as the activity of a Cable T. V. Operator is not specifically or directly mentioned in the Act, the levy of Entertainment Tax is illegal. 20. We have given our careful consideration to the submission made by the learned counsel. We are unable to accept the submission that in absence of a corresponding amendment the activity carried on by Cable T. V. Operator would not come within the purview of the Act. We have to gather the intention of the Legislature from the provisions of the Act and then to examine whether the petitioners are realising any amount for admission to an entertainment. If they are so doing, they are liable to pay entertainment tax. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law enunciated by the learned counsel. However, at the same time, we cannot ignore the current thinking with regard to interpretation of statutes where on account of progress being made by the society and development in Science and Technology, the courts are confronted with new problems which had not been visualised at the time when the laws were enacted by the Legislature. In this connection, it may be useful to refer to some decisions of Supreme Court where this view has been expressed. In Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxmi Narain Chopra, AIR 1962 SC 159 at page 163, it was observed as follows s ". . . . . . In a modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for a modern Legisla ture making laws to govern a society which is fact moving must be presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning the same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situation, if the words are capable of comprehending them. ' In S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 while interpreting Sec tion 123 of the Evidence Act, which is a very old provision having been enacted in the last century, it was observed that the interpretation of every statutory provision must keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does' not prohibit suffer adjustment through general interpretation so far as to accord with requirement of the fast changing society which is undertaking rapid social and economic transformation. It was further observed that the language of statu tory provision is not static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and con cepts change, as they are bound to do in any country like ours, so must be meaning and the concept of the statutory provision undergo a change. In S. P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta, AIR 1987 SC 222, it was observed as follows : "we are of the opinion that law should take pragmatic view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made and also take cognizance of the current capabilities of technology and life style of the community. It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act. We agree with the views of Justice Krishna Iyer in Busching Schmitz Private Ltd'* case (supra) that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. " Similar view has been taken in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 686 where steel tanks for storing petro leum products were held to be "land" or "building" and exigible to property tax under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. In view of the aforesaid authorities the law seems to have been settled that in a fast developing society, it would not be correct to confine the intention of the Legislature to the mean ing attributable to the words used at the time of making of enactment. In a scientific age, the legislature must be presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning of the word which it may attract with the advance in science and technology. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel not to see the intention of legislature cannot be accepted. 21. Sri Anil Kumar has submitted that many provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder are unworkable with reference to a Cable T. V. operator and placing reliance upon U. P, Bhoodan Yagya Samiti v. Brij Kishore, AIR 1988 SC 2239 wherein it was held that in order to interpret a law one must look to the whole act and try to understand the background and pur pose for which the same enacted, it was urged that the Act cannot be made applicable to the petitioners. Learned counsel has submitted that Sections 5, 6, 7, 13, IS (a) and 24 to 27 of the Act and Rules 3 to 6 of the Rules framed thereunder cannot be enforced or made applicable to a Cable T. V. operator. In our opinion, the difficulty posed by learned counsel is more imaginary than real and the provisions of the Act can be made applicable to a substantial extent. The Cable T. V. Operator can deposit the tax in advance on weekly or monthly basis, depending upon the manner of realisation of subscription charges from the subscriber and can easily give prior information to the Authorities before commencing the service. In this manner Sections 5 to 12, 14, 15, 24 to 27 of the Act will become workable. Wherever the word 'person' has been used it may be substituted by the word 'subscriber'. Sec tion 13, however, may not apply to a Cable T. V. Operator. Having given our careful consideration to the provisions of the Act, we do not think that merely because one or two provisions thereof cannot be strictly enforced, the whole Act should be held to be inapplicable. 22. In Writ Petition No. 13007 of 1994-Sudhir Kumar Gupta v. D. M. , a supplementary affidavit was filed on November 18, 1994 annexing copy of a letter dated March 21, 1992 sent by Sri K. P. Singh, Special Secretary, U. P. Government to the Commissioner of Entertainment Tax, U. P. wherein it is written that he had been instructed to say that there was no provisions for imposing any tax upon the exhibition of films by cable T. V. Operators under the Rules which were in force. On the basis of this letter, it was urged by S/sri V. K. Birla and Vivek Chaudhary that it was the stand of the State itself that there was no provision or imposing any tax upon the Cable T. V. Operators and, therefore, demand for payment of entertainment tax made by the authorities is illegal. A supplementary counter affidavit was thereafter filed on behalf of the State, wherein it is stated that the aforesaid letter was in fact a correspondence between the Special Secretary and the Commissioner of Entertainment Tax with regard to on particular writ petition, notice where of was given to the State counsel and the view expressed therein was purely tentative in nature. Subsequently, specific orders were passed by Joint L, R. Government of U. P. on May 10, 1994 directing the learned Chief Standing Counsel to contest all the writ petition which had been filed at Lucknow Bench and thus the letter dated March 21,1992 of the Special Secretary was superseded by the decision of State Government. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid letter sent by the Special Secretary has no binding effect It was sent with regard to only one writ petition and there also the Hindi word "kadachit" was used, meaning thereby that the officer was of the opinion that probably there was no provision of law for imposing tax upon exhibition of films by the Cable T. V. Operators. Subsequent decision of the State Government as communicated by Joint L. R. clearly superseded the aforesaid letter of the Special Secretary. That apart, we have to interpret the provi sions of the Act and if the petitioners are liable to pay tax under the Act, they cannot get over the same by a mere letter of a Special Secretary which appears to be wholly unauthorised in law. The letter cannot create any kind of right in favour of the petitioners nor can it supersede the provisions of a Statute made by the Legislature. 23. Sri Ranjit Saxena in Writ Petition No. 823 of 1994 (M/s. Osho Resorts v. D. M.) has submitted that the demand of tax from his client, who is running a hotel and providing Video Service to his customers in the rooms is illegal. As mentioned earlier, Section 4-B of the Act was introduced by U. P. Act No. 12 of 1989 w. e. f. April 15, 1989 and sub-section (3) thereof lays down that where exhibition by Video is given in rooms let out to lodgers in hotel, the proprietor of such hotel shall be liable to entertainment tax at such rate which will not exceed rupees one hundred per week for every room having the facility of Video exhibition, as the State Government may notify from time to time, in view of this specific provisions, the challenge, made in this writ petition against demand of entertainment tax is liable to be rejected. 24. A close scrutiny of the whole matter from legal point of view leaves no room for doubt that the nature of activity being carried on by a Cable T. V. Operator is fully covered by the provisions of the Act and he is liable to pay tax. If a proprietor of Cinema who makes a heavy investment in land, building and equipment or a proprietor of Circus who has to maintain a large establishment and where artists risk their life to provide entertainment have to pay entertainment tax there is no reason why a Cable T. V. Operator who makes much less investment and provides almost continuous entertain ment of various kind and from various sources should not pay entertainment tax. 25. The writ petitions lack merits and are dismissed. Interim orders are vacated. 26. Before parting with the case we would like to place on record that though there is a mushroom growth of Cable T. V. network in every big or small town and a substantial revenue of the State is involved, the learned Standing Counsel tendered virtually no assistance during the course of hearing of the writ petition. Petitions dismissed. .;