K. L. SHARMA, J. - (1.) This is a revision under section 11 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), directed against the judgment and order of remand dated June 17, 1995 passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal, U. P. , Lucknow, in Appeal No. 88 of 1994 whereby the appeal has been allowed and the matter has been remanded to the Chairman, NOIDA, for reconsideration and fresh decision. I have heard Mr. Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned counsel for the applicant as well as Mr. R. D. Gupta, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party and perused the material brought on record. The revisionist is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at N-225, Greater Kailash I, New Delhi 110 048 and has got its factory at C-100, Sector II, NOIDA, district Ghaziabad for the manufacture and production of the electronic typewriters. The company having its new industrial unit in the State of Uttar Pradesh was granted eligibility certificate for exemption from sales tax under section 4-A of the Act for a period of four years with effect from July 26, 1985 but it was confined to May 30, 1986. No reason was however given in the eligibility certificate dated March 16, 1989 why the exemption has not been granted for the entire period of four years and why it was confined from July 26, 1985 to May 30, 1986. The revisionist filed an application before the Chairman, NOIDA to grant eligibility certificate till the full period of four years up to July 25, 1989. The Chairman, NOIDA, exercising its statutory powers dismissed the said application. Then revisionist filed Writ Petition No. 505 of 1991 in the Allahabad High Court. It was allowed on November 12, 1992, making certain observations and for fresh decision by the Chairman, NOIDA. However the revisionist's application was again rejected on June 7, 1993 by the Chairman, NOIDA. The applicant also filed an application on September 1, 1993 to the Chairman, NOIDA for amendment of the exemption certificate extending the period up to July 25, 1989, in pursuance of the decision of the honourable High Court in Writ Petition No. 505 of 1991. The Chairman, NOIDA called for a report from the Superintendent of Central Excise which was received on June 27, 1994. This was considered by a Committee which found the closure of the factory for more than six months and submitted a report to the Chairman NOIDA for rejection of the application. Being aggrieved against the rejection of the application on November 15, 1994, the applicant filed a Writ Petition No. 1386 of 1994 before the High Court which was however dismissed on December 9, 1994, on the ground of alternative remedy. Then the applicant filed an appeal before the Trade Tax Tribunal, Lucknow, which after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Chairman, NOIDA, for readjudication by a speaking order. The applicant has now filed this revision for the reason that the Tribunal was itself competent to record a finding of fact and the remand order is illegal on the fact of the record. Mr. Bharat Ji Agrawal, contended that the entire material was available with the Tribunal which was competent to record a finding of fact about the closure of the Industrial unit for a continuous period of more than six months, but the Tribunal has committed illegality in remanding the matter again to the Chairman, NOIDA which has already recorded a categorical finding disbelieving the evidence. Mr. R. D. Gupta, learned Standing Counsel, has submitted in reply that the material was of course available with the Tribunal but it was within its discretion either to record a finding of fact itself or to remand the issue for a finding by the authority concerned. I have carefully perused the impugned order dated November 15, 1994, passed by the Chairman, NOIDA and the order of remand dated June 17, 1995, passed by the learned Tribunal. I find that the Chairman, NOIDA merely approved the report of the committee of three members consisting of Area Development Officer, NOIDA, Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, NOIDA, and Additional Director of Industries, NOIDA. These three officers considered the material on record as well as the statement of the Superintendent of Central Excise but disbelieved all the evidence on the ground of doubt, and recommended that no exemption should be granted because the factory has remained closed for more than six months continuously. The officers have not attached any evidentiary value to the statement of Superintendent of Central Excise who is equally concerned with the collection of Central excise for the purpose of the Union Government. The interest of the Superintendent of Central Excise is adverse to that of the assessee like that of the Trade Tax Department against the assessee. Therefore the statement of the Superintendent of Central Excise who is a public servant and engaged in the discharge of statutory duty in fiscal matters cannot be lightly distrusted and ignored. There is a legal presumption under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that official acts have been regularly performed. Such a legal presumption cannot be rebutted by mere scepticism of the local officer. However despite the adverse inference drawn by the officers there remains a fact that there was a statement of public servant available on record who could speak to the best about the manufacture and production or closure thereof for any period whatsoever. If the officers and the Chairman, NOIDA have not been able to appreciate this material on record properly according to the accepted principles of evaluation, the Tribunal was itself competent to appreciate not only the material on record but also the facts and circumstances as well as to apply a reasonable approach for the purpose of dispensing justice. If the Tribunal has found that the Chairman, NOIDA has not recorded any categorical finding by a speaking order that the industrial unit had discontinued production for more than six months, the Tribunal should have done it particularly in view of the prolonged litigation on the question of fact during last about nine years. It does not serve any interest either of the Revenue or of the assessee if the matter is prolonged indefinitely and the authorities are involved in unnecessary exercise of their powers resulting in the waste of public time and money. Therefore I do find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist. The remand order is not legally justified and the finding of fact must be recorded by the Tribunal on the basis of the material available on record. For the aforesaid reasons this revision is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed in appeal is hereby quashed and the learned Tribunal is hereby directed to rehear the appeal and record a fresh decision in the appeal after recording the finding of fact in the light of the observations made hereinabove within a period of three months. Petition allowed. .;