- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. A short but simple and very interesting question has been raised by Sri A. K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and has very nicely formulated the same, namely whether the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court has jurisdiction to set aside and/or recall the order of ex parte Award after the same was sent for publication in view of proviso to sub-rule (9) of Rule 10-B of the Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules, 1957. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 10-B is quoted below : "10-B. Proceeding before the Labour Court. Tribunal or National Tribunal- (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear a. any stage of the labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex parte and decide the refer ence/application in the absence of the defaulting party : Provided that the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may on the application of either party filed before the submission of the award revoke the order that the case shall proceed ex parte, if it is satisfied that the absence of the party was on justifiable ground. " Proviso to the said sub-rule specify "the order that the case shall proceed ex parte" may be revoked on an application of either party, if filed before the submission of the Award, provided if it is satisfied that the absence of the party was justified. In the present case the admitted facts are that the proceeding was fixed on 26-9-1989 for evidence both oral and documentary. On the said date the workman did not appear, though learned counsel for employer was present and no evidence was filed on behalf of the workman. Therefore, no claim Award was passed on 26-9-1989. While passing the said Award the learned Presiding Officer had also directed, "let six copies of this award be sent to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour for pub lication. " The said order was also passed on 26-9-1989.
(2.) SRI A. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the said direction clinches the issues inasmuch as by means of the said direc tion the learned Presiding officer had submitted the award for its publication. Therefore the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal could not have exercised the jurisdiction to recall the order or award since according to him by reason of submission of the said award for publication, he becomes functous-officio. Sri M. P. Singh Shekhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the workman submits that the award was passed on 26-9-1989, it was Satur day and Sunday intervening in between. Therefore the workman could not file any application prior to 28-9-1989 being the next working date. He also draws my attention to Annexure-CAl to Annexure-CAl (sic) to the counter affidavit. It appears therefrom that the award was submitted for publica tion by the Personal Assistant, Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, Kanpur through his latter dated 29-9-1989. According to him the date 29-9-1989 is the date of submission of the award. The direction contained in award is only direction for submission of the award and was not actual submission. The submission pre-supposes the actual submission. The direction for submission cannot be presumed to be the date of submission. Inas much as the expression 'submission' occurring in sub-rule (9) of Rule 10-B is proceeded by phrase 'before the '. It is difficult to conceive that the "submission" also includes direction to submission. A plain reading of the provision, does not support the contention of Sri Gupta. The golden principle of interpretation of the Statute permits the interpretation through a plain reading. If the meaning can be achieved through a plain reading no addition can be permitted. In order to obtain the meaning as contended by Sri Gupta it is necessary to add the word 'direction* as well. There is nothing to indicate that the Legislature ever intended to give the expression 'submission' an inclusive meaning. In order to interpret in such a manner we will have 'to read something more which is not present in the 'expression'. Therefore the application made on 28-9-1989 before the actual submission was made can not be thrown away as not. made before the sub mission of the award. That apart procedure are hand-maid of justice and technicalities can not imprison justice. Even then simple interpretation of the proviso as it appear, means that the application is to be filed before submission of the award and then the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal is empowered to revoke, "the order that the case shall proceed ex parte. " The use of the word "shall" in future may be noted. The Legislature in its wisdom never uses any expression which does not have any meaning or redundant and each word in the Statute has to be given its proper meaning. The power of revocation is in respect of the order that the case shall proceed ex parte, therefore, it presupposes that before passing the award in default, it is necessary to pass an order that the case shall proceed ex parte. The use of the present phrase expressed intention of the Legislature that the party should not be punished for a single default. It was incum bent upon the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal to pass an order in default that "the case shall proceed ex parts" meaning thereby that in future another date is to be fixed. This situation is to be conceived on the basis of principle enunciated in Section 17-A of the Act which provides that the Award shall become final on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication. Therefore, the award become final and the Labour Court become functous officio after expiry of thirty days from publi cation of award. The provision can not be so strict as to have the same effect even before the award is published. Even in some cases the award could be recalled before expiry of thirty days from the date of its publi cation. Grindlays Bank Ltd. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606,. Therefore in my view the liberal meaning which ensure justice is to be given to the present proviso.
(3.) IN that view of the matter I do not find any reason to interfere with the order dated 3-11-1989 passed by the presiding Officer, INdustrial Tribunal/ Labourt Court, in Adjudication case No. 66 of 1989. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. There will be, however, no order as so costs. Petition dismissed. .;