- (1.) S. P. Srivastava, J. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the appellate authority remanding the case to the prescribed authority for dispos ing of the application filed by the landlord respondent under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction; Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act') seeking release of the accommodation in dispute after setting aside the finding holding the said application to be barred by the principle of estoppel, the petitioner tenant has now approached this court seeking redress praying for setting aside of the appellate order.
(2.) I have heard Shri Tarun Agrawal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri N. C. Rajvanshi, learned counsel for the opposite parties and have carefully perused the record. The only contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of this writ petition is that since under the terms and conditions contained in the compromise entered into between the parties in a suit filed by the landlord for the ejectment of the tenant in respect of the premises in dispute whereunder the landlord had agreed not to evict the petitioner from the said premises, his right to seek release of the accommodation in dispute in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act will be deemed to have been waived and consequently no such application could be entertained. The contention is that the prescribed authority was fully justified in rejecting the application seeking release of the accommodation in dispute holding that it was barred by principle of estoppel. In any case, it is urged, the right to get the benefit secured under Section 21 of the Act having been waived by the landlord respondent of his own will and volition the order passed by the pres cribed authority rejecting the aforesaid application on the said ground did not require any interference by the appellate authority. The learned Counsel for the respondent has, however, asserted that there is nothing in the compromise relied upon by the petitioner which can lead to an inference that the landlord has waived his right secured under Section 21 of the Act and in the circumstances, the application seeking release of the accommodation in dispute could not be deemed to be either barred by the principle of estoppel or liable to rejection on the ground that the right to get the premises released stood waived.
(3.) AS observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ASsociated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S. B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, reported in AIR 1968 SC 933, waiver is an intentional reliquishment of a known right. It is obvious therefore, that there can be no 'waiver' unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed has full knowledge of his right and the facts enabling him to take effective action for the enforcement of such a right. There can be no manner of doubt that every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or a public policy. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Lachhumal v. Radhey Shyam, reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1213 observed that if there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute in it then no question can arise of anyone entering into a contract which is so prohibited but whore there is no such prohibition, it will have to be seen whether an act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy. It was noticed in that case that there are many statutory provisions expressed to apply notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. The provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act secure a valuable right in favour of the landlord and afford the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated therein. The pro visions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. However, since Section 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision.;