- (1.) R. B. Mehrotra, J. The present writ petition has been filed by New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, for convenience hereinafter referred to as NOIDA, praying for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in various execution cases enforcing the orders of the District Judge passed in reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(2.) THE contentions made in the writ petition are - (1) That the land has been acquired by the State of Uttar Pradesh, as such the liability for paying the compensation is on the State of Uttar Pradesh and the petitioner cannot be compelled to pay the compensation determined by the District Judge while deciding a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. (2) That the order of attachment of the petitioner's account, impugned in the writ petition, whereby the account of the petitioner has been attached, has been passed without any opportunity or notice to the petitioner, as such the order is arbitrary and is liable to be set aside on the said ground. In the writ petition, notice was issued to the respondents by this Court on 18-5-1995 and an interim order has also been passed in favour of the petitioner staying the execution of the orders passed in Annexures 'i' to '8' to the writ petition, referred to above, on the basis of a Division Bench deci sion of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3544 of 1988, Ghaziabad Development, Ghaziabad v. IV Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad, decided on 17-5-1988. On notice being issued, respondents Nos. 9 to 56 have put in appearance and have filed counter-affidavit. I have heard learned counsel foe the petitioner Sri A. K. Mishra and the learned counsel for the respondents Sri M. D. Singh, Sri S. N. Singh and Sri Pankaj Mittal at length. The sheet anchor of the petitioner's case is a Division Bench decision, referred to earlier wherein this Court has held : "the matter in regard to the payment of compensation and its realisa tion is, in our opinion, one between the State Government through the Collector on the one hand and the person who are held entitled to receive compensation on the other. The authority for which the land is acquired cannot hence be proceeded against in the execution of the award
(3.) ON the basis of the aforesaid decision, the contention of the peti tioner's counsel is that the Division Bench has held that the payment of compensation awarded to the persons whose land have been acquired is on the State Government and the petitioner for whose benefit the land was acquired cannot be proceeded against for recovery of compensation. In this connection, the learned counsel the petitioner has also submitted that in U. P. Avas Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, reported in 1995 (2) SCC 326, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the authority in whose favour the land is being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, is only a proper party and not a necessary party in a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The contention of the petitioner's counsel is that since the petitioner was not a necessary party, the order passed for payment of compensation cannot be enforced against the petitioner and the respondents are free to execute the aforesaid order against the State Government. The Division Bench decision, referred to above and relied upon by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable in the context of the present case. In the aforesaid decision, a categorical finding has been recorded by the Division Bench that Ghaziabad Development Authority was not a party before the District Judge and "even the execution application was not directed against the Ghaziabad Development Authority. " At another place in the judgment, the Division Bench again stressed on the same point and noticed - "as mentioned above, the decree-holders had not even applied for execution against the Ghaziabad Development Authority. ";