- (1.) SUDHIR Narain, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The plaintiff respondents filed Suit No. 83 of 1995 in the court of Civil Judge for injunction restraining the defendant-petitioners from compelling the plaintiffs to obtain gate passes for transportation of their Khandsari by any means from their Units to various other Mandis within and outside the State of U. P. and further compelling them to take licence and pay licence fee. The Suit was filed on the allegations that they are running Khandsari Units. They are not governed by the provisions of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam and they are not liable to pay any market fee. They also filed an application for interim injunction. The trial court by its order dated 19-4-1995 granted the injunction order.
(2.) THE petitioners preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No. 67 of 1995. THE Incharge District Judge, Bijnor passed order whereby ha directed the plaintiff-respondents to pay market fee but directed that the amount so deposited shall be refunded to the plaintiffs with interest at the rate of 12%. THE plaintiff-respondents filed objection against this order on which the Incharge District Judge modified his order on 28-4-1995 and directed the plaintiffs respondents to furnish bank guarantee and with this condition permitted to continue the injunction order passed by the trial court on 19-4-1994 whereby he had issued injunction restraining the petitioners compelling the plaintiffs from taking gate passes and to pay market fee. THE petitioner has challenged this order in the writ petition. The Incharge District Judge had passed the earlier order on 26th April, 1995 following the order passed by this Court in F. A. F. O. No. 358 of 1995 passed on 21-4-1995 but latter on while modifying his order he took the interim orders passed by the High Court is not binding upon him and there after he proceeded to consider the merit of the case and equity of the parties and directed the plaintiff respondents to furnish security and further directed that the Misc. Appeal shall be heard on merits on 15-5-1995. The case of the plaintiffs was that they are manufacturer of Khandsari and they send produce to various commission agents, within the State and outside the State. They do not sell or dispose of any produce themselves. The provisions of Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam was not applicable.
(3.) IN writ petition No. 6483 of 1995 - Heinz INdia (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of U. P. , the petitioners contended that they were not liable to pay market fee as they were not selling goods. On behalf of Mandi Samiti reliance was placed on Explanation to Section 17 (iii) (b) of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam and it was contended that in view of the explanation there were presumptions of sale. The Court while considering the application for interim stay passed the following order:- "it would not be proper at this stage to express any opinion on the scope of the explanation. But prima facie, having regard to the provisions of the explanation and the order passed by the Hon'able Supreme Court, referred to above, we are not inclined to grant any interim relief as prayed for, pending disposal of this writ petition. We, however, make it clear that in case the petitioners prefer a revi sion/petition to the Board under Section 32 of the Act, 1964 the same shall be disposed of within four weeks from the date of filing of the same. We further make it clear that in case the petitioners succeed either in the revision/petition or this writ petition, the respondents are liable to refund the market fee paid by the peti tioners with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of payment till the date of refund. List this writ petition for disposal in the week commencing 8th May, 1995. " In a similar case another trader, namely, M/s. Ghanshyam Singh filed Suit No. 123 of 1995 against Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Chandpur, Bijnor. The trial court granted injunction order which was challenged in F. A. F. O. No. 354 of 1995. This Court while admitting the appeal stayed the operation of the order of the trial court and took the similar view which was taken in the writ petition referred to above. The relevant part of the order is given below:- "meanwhile the operation of the impugned order dated 17th April, 1995 passed by the Judge Small Causes Court/civil Judge Bijnor in Original Suit No. 123 of 1995 shall remain Stayed. It shall be open for the plaintiff respondents to furnish such papers of docu ments showing that the sale had taken place outside the market, area, which shall be decided within a period of three weeks and if the Mandi Samiti is satisfied that the sale has taken place outside the market area, the amount shall be refunded with the interest at the rate of 12. " Sd/- R. R. K. Trivedi Sd/- V. P. Goel, -4-1995 7. The District Judge took the view that as the High Court has passed interim orders, they are not binding upon him while deciding an interim matter and he has placed reliance upon Empire Industries Ltd, v. Union of India, 1986 SC 662, wherein observation was made that every Bench hearing a matter on the facts and circumstances of each case should have the right to grant interim orders on such terms as it may consider fit and proper and if it had granted interim order at one stage, it should have a right to vary or alter such interim order. The Supreme Court, however, made observation:- "we venture to suggest, however, that consensus should be developed in the matter of interim order. " The aforesaid observation was made in the context of the orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court while deciding the application for grant of interim relief. It was in respect of orders passed by a co-ordinate court where a Bench on the facts of a particular case may pass an appropriate interim order considering the facts of the case, it was nowhere held that if on similar facts and circumstances the High Court passes a particular interim order it should not be followed by the Subordinate Courts while dealing with a matter which is pending before the High Court and the High Court has passed order after considering the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. 8. The interim order passed by the High Court is binding on subordinate courts where the matter involved are similar on facts as wall as on law. In a cases where there are conflicting orders of the High Court in similar matter, the order which has been passed after considering the rival contentions of the parties should be followed, if a person cannot get interim relief by filing a writ petition in High Court where the High Court has already passed an order in a similar matter, be cannot claim a different interim relief by filing suit in a subordinate court. 9. It will be a total disregard of the 3 order of the High Court if the subordinate courts do not follow the interim orders of the High Court passed in a matter which involves same question of law and fact and such disregard will amount to contempt of the High Court. It cannot escape the liability of flouting the order of the High Court merely on the ground that either the parties are different or the High Court only passed an interim order. 10. it may further be noted that various Division Bench of this very High Court have followed the order passed in Writ Petition No. 6403 of 1995 and there was no justification for the subordinate courts not to follow the same decision while deciding an interim matter involving the same questions of fact and law. 11. In view of the above the order passed by respondent No. 1 dated 20-4-1995 modifying the order dated 26-4-1995 in hereby stayed. Application disposed of. .;