PALOK Basu, J. - (1.) Janganvadi Bharat Academy of Constitutionalists of India through its Director was initially arrayed as the sole petitioner in this writ petition. During the course of the arguments it transpired that an application for registra tion of the said society is alleged to be pending before the State Government and consequently for the present the said petitioner was not a registered society. At this, Shri A. P. N. Giri, practising Advocate of this Court, who is arguing the matter in person, was permitted to implead himself as another petitioner. Consequently Shri A. P. N. Giri has been heard at length in support of this petition which in effect contains several prayers regarding the alleged advertisements or publicity news telecasts in which opposite party No. 1 Shri P. V Narsingha Rao, Prime Minister of India is extensively projected whereas the contents of the advertisements are factually incorrect and those advertisements/news telecasts are mala fide and motivated screened with the object to influence voters at the coming Parliamentary Elections. It is also argued that the imposing of the Governor rule in Uttar Pradesh was also motivated with the aforesaid object and has therefore, simultaneously been attack ed in this writ petition. 1. Before proceeding to decide the writ petition on merits it is desirable to quote all the prayers contained at page 11 of paper book which are six in number : (1) Issue an order, direction of writ in nature of certiorari quashing the impugned audio-visual advertisement of Shri P. V Narsingha Rao, respondent No. 1, exhibited on Doordarshan, as recorded in audio-visual cassette made available to the Court with this writ petition. (2) Issue a writ in nature of quo-warranto that quo-jure provision the respondent No. 1 held/termed and project himself as Prime Minister of India, whereas the respondent No. 1 is the Prime Minister in council of Ministers of the President by an under the Constitu tion of India. (3) Issue a writ in nature of prohibition against the respondent No. 1, not to project himself out of council of Ministers as Government of India and superior and Mightere than the President of India. (4) Issue a writ in nature of prohibition against the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 asking and prohibiting, quo-jure authority they exhibit the person acting officially showing his personal individual achievements advertisement of Government of India on the cost of Public money on the T. V. media, Doordarshan. (5) Issue a writ in nature of quo-warranto asking the respondent No. 1 that in quo jure authority he aided and advised the President of India to put the Governor of the State of U. P. Without council of ministers during the President Rule in State of U. P. (6) Allow the writ petition with cost through out passing any other suitable order in" the interest of Public in general as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in uphold ing the Supremacy of the Constitution of India and Democratic Republic Form of Government as up held in AIR 1973 (Sic) 1461. 3. However to be fair to Mr. Giri it may be stated that during the course of arguments he formulated the following six points for consideration of the Court: (1) Opposite party No. 1 is unduly projected through the aforesaid telecast which is not permissible under the law ; (2) The advertisements are offensive of the provisions contained in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India; (3) Wrong facts are projected through the aforesaid publicity news advertisements and the right to get correct information is violated; (4) Other political parties which are concerned with the political activities of this country are kept out and only the political party know as Congress-I is projected through those news items/advertisements; (5) It is not known what is the source of payment for the said news items/advertise ments, as the case may be. It is argued that if the source of payment is from public exchequer, it is illegal; (6) Advertisements/news items are mala fide and are being telecast with ulterior mo tive, and primary objective to influence the voters for the coming Lok Sabha Election. 4. It was in this connection that Mr. Giri argued that the imposition of President's Rule in the State of Uttar Pradesh was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of India. 5. Taking up the first point, it may be noticed that this should be taken alongwith points enumerated at Serial Nos. 2, 3 and 5. 6. It may be mentioned here that the scope of the activities of Doordarshan has been dealt with extensively by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India and others v. Cricket Association of Bengal and others, AIR 1995 SC 1236. In paras 12 and 13 of judgment, the Supreme Court observed as under : "what distinguishes the electronic media like the television from the print media or other media is that it has both auditor and visual appeal and has a more pervassive presence. It has a greater impact on the minds of the viewers and is also more readily accessible to all including children at home. Unlike the print media, however, there is a built-in-limitation on the use of electronic media because the airwaves are a public proper ty and hence are owned or controlled by the Government or a Central National Authority or they are not available on account of the scarcity, costs and competition. " "the next question to be answered in this connection is whether there can be a monopoly in broad casting/telecasting. Broadcasting is a means of communication and, therefore, a medium of speech and expression. Hence in a democratic polity, neither any private individual, institu tion or organisation nor any Government or Government organisation can claim exclusive right over it. Our Constitution also forbids monopoly either in the print or electronic media. The monoply permitted by our Constitution is only in respect of carrying by our Constitution is only in repsect of carrying on a trade, business, industry or service under Article 19 (6) to subserve the interests of the general public. However, the monopoly in broadcasting and telecasting in often claimed by the Government to utilise the public resources in the form of the limited frequencies available for the benefit of the society at large. It is justified by the Government to prevent the concentration of the frequencies pf the hands of the rich few who can monopolise the dissemination of views and information to suit their interest and thus in fact to control and mainipulate public opinion in effect smothering the right to freedom of speech 2nd expression and freedom of information of others. The claim to monopoly made on this ground may, however, lose all its reason d'etre if either any section Of the society is unreasonably denied an access to broadcasting or the Government agency claims exclusive right to prepare and really programmes. The ground is further not avail able when those claiming an access either do not make a demand on the limited frequen cies controlled by the Government of claim the frequency which is not utilised and is avail able for transmission. The Government some times claims monopoly also on the ground that having regard to all pervasive presence and impact of the electronic media, it may be utilised for purposes not permitted by law and the damage done by private broadcasters may be irreparable. There is much to be said in favour of this view and it is for this reason that the regulatory provisions including those for granting licences to private broadcasting where it is permitted are enacted. On the other hand, if the Government is vested with an unbridled. Discretion to grant or refuse to grant the license or access to the media, the reason for creating monopoly will lose its validity. For then it is the Government which will be enabled to effectively suppress the freedom of speech and expression instead of protect ing it and utilising the licensing power strictly for the purpose for which it is conferred. It is for this reason that in most of the democratic countries an independent autonomous broadcasting authority is created to control all aspects of the operation of the electronic media. Such authority is representative of all sections of the society and is free from control of the political any administrative executive of the State. " 7. The conclusions arrived at by my Lord Hon' Mr. Justice P. O. Sawant and Hon. Mr. Justice S. C. Moha, J. are contained in paragraph 24 of the judgment which for ready reference is quoted below : "we, therefore, hold as follows : (i) The airwaves or frequencies are a public property. Their use has to be controlled and regulated by a public authority in the interest of the public and to prevent the invasion of their rights. Since the electronic media involves the use of the airwaves, this factor creates an in built restriction on its use as in the case of any other public property. (ii) The right to impart and receive information is a species of the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. A Citizen has a fundamental right to use the best means "of imparting and receiving information and as soon to have an access to telecasting for the purpose. However, this right to have an access to telecasting has limitations on account of the use of the public property, viz, the airwaves, involved ir the exercise of the right and can be controlled and regulated by the public authority. This limitation imposed by the nature of the public property involved in the use of the electronic media is in addition to the restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. (iii) The Central Government shall take immediate steps to establish an independent autonomous public authority representative of all sections and interests in the society to control and regulate the use of the airwaves. (iv) Since the matches have been telecast pursuant to the impugned order of the High Court, it is not necessary to decide the correctness of the said order. (v) The High Court will now apportion between the CAB and the DD the revenues generated by the advertisements on T. V. during the telecasting of both the series of the cricket matches, viz, the Hero Cup, and the International Cricket matches played in India from October to December, 1994, after hearing the parties on the subject. " 8. It may be mentioned that my Lord Hon. B. P. Jeevan Reddy, J. wrote a separate judgment and formulated certain questions at paragraph 48 of the said judgment and answered them individually. His Lordship has summarised the same at page 1309 (para-97) as follows : "in this summary too, the expression "broadcasting media" means the electronic media now represented and operated by All Doordarshan and not any other services. 1 (a) Game of Cricket, like any other sports event, provides entertainment. Providing enter tainment is implied in freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution subject to this rider that where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of action, the free speech value must be balanced against competing societal interests. The petitioners (CAB and BCCI) therefore have a right to organise cricket matches in India, whether with or without the participation of foreign teams. But what they are now seeking is a license to telecast their matches through an agency of their choice - a foreign agency in both the cases - and through telecasting equipment brought in by such forcing agency from outside the country. In the case of Hero Cup Matches organised by CAB, they wanted up-linking facility to INTELSAT through the Government agency VSNL also. In the case of later international matches organised by BCCI they did not ask for this facility for the reason that their foreign agent has arranged direct uplinking with the Rus sian satellite Gorizon. In both case, they wanted the permission to import the telecasting equipment alongwith the personnel to operate it by moving it to place all over the country wherever the matches were to be played. They claimed this license, or permission, as it may be called, as a matter of right said to be following from Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitu tion. They say that the authorities are found to grant such license/permission, without any conditions, all that they are entitled to do, it is submitted, is to collect technical fees wherever their services are availed, like the services of VSNL in the case of Hero Cup Matches. This plea is in principle no different from the right to establish and operate private telecasting. In principle there is no difference between a permanent TV Station and a temporary one; similarly there is no distinction in principle between a stationary TV facility and a mobile one; so also is there is no distinction between a regular TV facility and a TV facility for a given event or series of events. If the right claimed by the petitioner (CAB) and BCCI (is held to be constitutionally sanctioned one, then each and every citizen of this country must be entitled to claim similarly right in respect of his event or events, as the case may be. I am of the opinion that no such right flows from Article 19 (1) (a ). (b) Airwaves constitute public property and must be utilised for advancing public good. No individual has a right to utilise them at his choice and pleasure and for purpose of his choice including profit. The right of free speech guaranteed by Article 19 (a) does not include the right to use airwaves, which are public property. The airwaves can be used by a citizen for the purpose of broadcasting only when allowed to do so by statute and in accordance with such Statute. Airwaves being public property, it is the duty of the State to see that airwaves are so utilised as to advance the free speech right of the cittizens which is served by ensuring plurality and diversity of views, opinions and ideas. This is imperative in every democracy where freedom of speech is assured. The free such right guaranteed to every citizen of this country does not encompass the right to use these airwaves at his choosing. Conceding such a right would be deterimental to free speech rights of the body of citizens inasmuch as only the privileged few - powerful economic, commercial and politi cal interests - would come to dominate the media. By manipulating the news, views and information, by indulging in misinformation and disinformation, to suit their commercial or other interests, they would be harming - and not serving - the principle of plurality and and diversity of views, news, ideas and opinions. This has been the experience of Italy where a limited right, i. e. at the local level but not at the national level was recognised. It is also not possible to imply or infer a right from the guarantee of free speech which only a few can enjoy. (c) Broadcasting media is inherently different from press or other means of com munication/information. The analogy of press is misleading and inappropriate. This is also the view expressed by several Constitutional courts including that of the United States of America. (d) I must clarify that I say, it is that the right claimed by the petitioners (CAB) and BCCI) - which in effect is no difference in principle from a right to establish and operate a private TV station - does not flow from Article 19 (1) (a); that such a right is not implicit in it. The question whether such right should be given to the citizens of this country is a matter of policy for the Parliament. Having regard to the revolution in information technology and the developments all ground Parliament may, or may not, decide to confer right, if it wishes to confer such a right, it can only be by way of an Act made by Parliament. The Act made should be consistent with the right of free speech of the citizens and must have to contain district programme and other controls, as has been provided, a for example, in the Broadcasting Act, 1991 in the United Kingdom. This is the implicit command of Article 19 (1) (a) and is essential to preserve and promote plurality and diversity of views, news, opinions and ideas. (e) There is an inseparable inter-connection between freedom of speech and the stability of the society, i. e. , stability of a nation State. They contribute to each other. Ours is a nascent republic. We are yet to achieve to goal of a stable society. This country cannot also afford to read into Article 19 (1) (a) an unrestricted right to licensing (right of broad casting) as claimed by the petitioners herein. (f) In the case before us, both the petitioners have sold their right to telecast the matches to a foreign agency. They have parted with the right. The right to telecast the matches, including the right to import, install and operate the requisite equipment, is thus really sought by the foreign agencies and not by the petitioners. Hence, the question of violation of their right under Article 19 (a) resulting from refusal of license/permission to such foreign agencies does not arise. (2) The Government monopoly of broadcasting media in this country is the result of historical and other factors. This is true of every other country, to start with. That India was not a free country till 1947 and its citizens did not have constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms till 1950 coupled with the fact that our Constitution is just about forty five years into operation explains the Government monoploy. As pointed out in the body of the judgment, broadcasting was a monopoly of the Government, to start with, in every country except the United States where a conscious decision was taken at the very beginning not to have State monopoly over the medium. Until recently the broadcasting media has been in the hands of public/statutory corporations in most of the West European countries. Private broadcasting is comparatively a recent phenomenon. The ex perience in Italy of allowing private broadcasting at local level (while prohibiting it at na tional level) has left much to be desired. It has given rise to powerful media empires which development is certainly not conducive to free speech right of the citizens. 3 (a) It has been held by this Court - and rightly - that broadcasting media is affected by the free speech right of the citizens guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). This is also view expressed by all the Constitutional Courts whose opinions have been referred to in the body of the judgment. Once this is so, monopoly of this medium (broadcasting media), whether by Government or by an individual, body or organisation is unacceptable. Clause (2) of Article 19 (does not permit a monopoly in the matter of freedom of speech and expression as is permitted by Clause (6) or Article 19 vis-a-vis the right guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (g ). (b) The right of free speech and expression includes the right to receive and impart information. For ensuring the free speech right of the citizens of this country, it is necessary that the citizens have the benefit of plurality of views and a range of opinions on all public issues. A successful democracy posits an 'aware' citizenry. Diversity of opinions, views, ideas and idealogies is essential to enable the citizens to arrive at informed judgment on all issues touching them. This cannot be provided by a medium controlled by a monopoly - whether the monopoly is of the State or any other individual, group or organisation. As a matter of fact, private broadcasting stations may perhaps be more prejudicial to free speech right of the citizen then the Government controlled media, as explained in the body of the judg ment. The broadcasting media should be under the control of the public as distinct from Government. This is the command implicit in Article 19 (1) (a ). It should be operated by a public statutory corporation or corporation as the case may be, whose constitution and composition must be such as to ensure its/their impartiality in political, economic and social matters and on all other public issues. It/they must be required by law to present news, views and opinions in a balanced way ensuring pluralism and diversity of opinions and views. It/they must provide equal access to all the citizens and groups to avail of the medium. (4) The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is totally inadequate to govern an important medium like the radio and television, i. e. broadcasting media. The Act was intended for an altogether different purpose when it was enacted. This is the result of the law in this country not keeping pace with the technological advances in the field of information and communications. While all the leading democratic countries have enacted laws specifically governing the broadcasting media, the law in this country has stood still, rooted in the Telegraph Act of 1885. Except Section 4 (1) and the definition of telegraph no other provision of the Act is, show to have any relevance to broadcasting media. It is, therefore, imperative that the Parliament makes a law placing the broadcasting media in the hands of a public/statutory corporate or the corporations, as the case may be. This is necessary to safeguard the interests of public and the interests of law as also to avoid uncertainty, con fusion and consequent litigation. (5) The CAB did not ever apply for a license under the first proviso to Section 4 of the Telegraph Act nor did its against over make such an application. The permissions, clearnaces or exemption obtained by its from the several departments (mentioned in judg ment) are no substitute for a license under Section 4 (1) proviso. In the absence of such a license under, the CAB had no right in law to have its matches telecast by an agency of its choice. The legality or validity of the order passed by Shri N. Vithal, Secretary to the Government of India, Telecommunications Department need not be gone into since it has become academic. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the charge of mala fides or of arbitraty and authoritarian conduct attributed to Doordarshan and Ministry of Informa tion and Broadcasting is not acceptable. No opinion need be expressed on the allegations made in the Interlocutory application filed by BCCI in these matters. Its intrervention was confined to legal questions only. (6) Now the question arised, what is the position till the Central Government or the Parliament takes steps as contemplated in para (4) of the summary, i. e. , if any sporting event or other event is to be telecast from the Indian soil? The obvious answer flowing from the judgment (and para (1) (4) of this summary) is that the organiser of such event has to approach the nodal Ministry as specified in the decision of the Meeting of the Com mittee of Secretaries held on November 12, 1993, I have no reason to doubt that such a request would be considered by the modal Ministry and the AIR and Doordarshan on its merits, keeping in view the public interest. In case of any difference of opinion or dispute regarding the monetary terms on which such telecast is to be, made, matter can always be referred to an Arbitrator or a panel of Arbitrators. In case, the nodal Minsitry or the AIR or Doordarshan find such broadcast/telecast nor feasible, then they may consider the grant of permission to the organisers an agency of their own for the purpose. Of course, it would be equally open to the nodal Ministry (Government of India) to permit such foreign agen cy in addition to AIR/doordarshan, if they are of the opinion that such a course is called for in the circumstances. " 9. It may be mentioned here that keeping in view the pronouncement of the Supreme Court noted above it must be atonce made clear that rules and regula tions may have to be framed for permitting advertisement and fixing their price schedule. But so far as the allegation of the petitioner concerning the contents of what is being telecast is concerned those arguments have got nothing to do with the right to telecast a particular matter. That will depend on the mode and method under this a citizen or an authority, permissible under the law, can apply and then get some time allotted to it or him for such telecast. 10. Coming to the merit of the advertisements or news telecast it may be at first mentioned that the petitioner does not make specific allegations in the writ petition as to whether the items, regarding which he has grievance are publicity-news telecast or advertisements. 11. In this connection Sri Giri wanted to file a copy of the alleged items with the help of a cassette. He showed to the Court that the was holding in his hand a cassette which according to him was containing the extracts of those very news items/advertisements which were telecast. For the reasons stated herein there is no need or necessity to go into this issue. To be specific, the reasons are that the content of what is being advertised or publicised shall have to be seen and noticed only as source of entertainment or general information conveyed. The petitioner's grievance that it contains nothing but a wrong information, may be this individual opinion. It may be pointed out that there may be some individuals who may have the view that those advertisements/news telecasts carry correct Information, Consequently those are not the matters which can be permitted to be gone into and decided in the writ petition of the nature as the present one. Therefore, the argu ment that since these telecasts/advertisements allegedly contain wrong facts and are thus yiolative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 must fall for the aforesaid reasons. It may be mentioned that in the above noted case law (Secretary, Ministry of information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India and others v. Cricket Assocn. of Bengal and Others, (supra) Hon. Sawant, J. speaking for himself and on behalf of Hon. Mr. Justice Mohan has gone into merits of this issue and nothing now can be added by this Court in this writ petition and every word of the decision is binding upon this Court. However, it may be stated here that the petitioner can always filed an application before Doordarshan authorities to know the source from which payment of any advertisements is made. There can not be any obstacle in the way of the petitioner to make such an application and it such application is made it is expected that the authorities concerned shall furnish such information to the petitioner. But whether the said news or publicity telecast are at all advertisements is a question of fact to be deter mined first by authorities before application is moved by the petitioner. If not, the question of getting the said information would not arise. 12. Coming now to the argument concerning the fourth point enumerted above that other political parties are being kept apart and only political party known as Congress-I is being projected, it may be pointed out here that in the writ petition it is not mentioned that these are infact advertisements and are presented or publicised by the political party known as Congress-I. Unless the said averment is substantiated by sufficient data, the allegation being totally vague, has to be rejected as wholly unfounded. But simultaneously it may be said that if one politi cal party is permitted to project its policies on any public media, the other political parties who may apply, have also to be given the same opportunity. There cannot be two opinions on the said argument. Since the publicity or news telecasts referred to above are not traceable to any political party; on the basis of the above aver ments made in the writ petition, the aforesaid argument concerning these advertise ments is not available lo the petitioner. 13. Coming to the last argument of Shri Giri it may be stated that it also deserves to be rejected. The last but one prayer in the writ petition as stated above seeks a writ of quowarranto against the respondent No. 1 Shri P. V Narasingha Rao, Prime Minister of India, to disclose as to "on what basis he advised the President of India to put Governor of Uttar Pradesh to rule under the president's Rule without council of Ministers. " It may be mentioned here that entire factual and legal perifery concerning the dismissal of the Government in a State or State Legislature has been gone into by Hon. Supreme Court in extensive details in the case of S. R. Bommai and others etc. etc. v. Union of India and others etc. etc. reported in AIR 1994 SC 1918. It should be mentioned here that perhaps in order to overcome the decision in the case of S. R. Bommai (supra), the petitions has not prayed for a writ of mandamus but has prayed for a writ of quowarranto. However, for the reasons stated above even that prayed is not sustainable and is to be rejected. 14. Before parting it may be mentioned that Shri Giri wanted that since he himself has described opposite party No. 1 as Prime Minister of the President of India, such reference should have been made by this Court in the earlier parts of the judgment. The aforesaid request is not tenable for the reason that the Prime Minister is head of the executive and the council of ministers and is administered oath as such by the President of India. Therefore, Shri P. V Narasimha Rao, the Prime Minister, shall have to be referred to only as Prime Minister of India. This disposes of the aforesaid objection of Shri Giri. 15. In view of what has been stated above there is no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed. .;