- (1.) D. K. Seth, J. The petitioner in this writ petition has prayed for a direction upon the respondents namely, the Government of India through the Ministry of Finance, President, Indian Congress Committee, Sri Yishwanath Pratap Singh and Sri Chandra Shekhar, Ex. Prime Ministers, Government of India, Samajwadi Party through President Sri Devi Lal, Ex. Deputy Prime Minister, Government of India, President, Bhartiya Janta Party and President, Communist Party of India, to maintain cohesion with the petitioner in the national interest as well as public in solving the country's internal and external problems within the approachable period.
(2.) THE petitioner sought to move this writ petition as a public interest litigation. By now exception has been made to the strict rules relating to affidavit and locus standi and the like in the case of class litigation termed as 'public Interest Litigation' in which public in general are interested for vindication of some tight or enforcement of some public duties. Following the Supreme Court which entertained such litigations, the High Courts have also entertained such litigations and such practice is approved by the Supreme Court. In such class of litigation, it is by now well established that the Court should take care and caution so that the process of the Court are not abused or misused and should prima facie satisfy itself that the information laid before the Court is as such nature that it calls for examination. Such prima facie satisfaction may be derived from (i) the credentials of the infor mant i. e. the character and standing of the informant, (ii) the nature of the information given by him viz. whether it contains vague and indefinite or contains specific allegations as a result of survey or investigation or (iii) the gravity or seriousness of the complaint set out in the information ; or (iv) any other circumstances appearing from the communication addressed to the Court. However, in the present case, the petitioner having been supported by affidavit, the above question need not be gone into. On the other hand, the Court cannot exercise this power at the instance of a person who seeks to espouse the cause of unnamed and undisclosed person unless the petitioner may be held to possess a representative capacity. It is by now well established that the court must be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redres sing public grievance it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. Neither it can direct the State Government to initiate legislation nor it can advise the executive autho rity of the Government in the matter of administration in effecting cohesion in between the petitioner and the respondents named above.
(3.) IN the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of a student of Medical College, Simla and others, 1983 (3) SCC 169, it was held : "the direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of regging. . . . . . . . . . . . This the Division Bench was clearly not entitled to do. It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation. Of course, any member of the Legislature can also introduce legisla tion but the court certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the Legislature to initiate legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable the court may consider it to be. That is not a matter which is within the sphere of the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. If the executive is not carrying out any duty laid upon it by the Constitu tion or the law, the court can certainly require the executive to carry out such duty and this is precisely what the court does when it entertains public interest litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the court certainly can and must intervene and compel the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . When the court passes any orders in public interest litigation, the court does so not with a view to mocking at legislative or executive authority or in a sprit of confrontation but with a view to enforcing the Constitution and the law, because it is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law that the obligations which are laid upon the executive by the Constitution and the law should be carried out faithfully. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . But at the same time the court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the Executive and the Legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the executive to introduce a particu lar legislation or the Legislature to pass it or assume to itself a supervisory role over the law-making activities of the executive and the Legislature. " In the present case, no particular breach of any constitutional obligation has been mentioned. The prayers made are vague to the highest degree. The pleadings made out and the relief sought are thoroughly miscon ceived and does not come within the public interest litigation, as has been established by now through various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.;