- (1.) G. P. Mathur, J. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel. With the consent of the parties the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage.
(2.) THE agreement executed in favour of the petitioner appointing it as authorised retail distributor was cancelled by the order of the District Supply Officer, Shahjahanpur on 8-10-1992. THE petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order which was dismissed as being |barred by time by the Commis sioner, Bareilly by his order, dated 17-10-1994. THE present writ petition has been filed for quashing of the aforesaid order. It is mentioned in the impugned order that the appeal had been preferred under Clause 10 of U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers' (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989. This statement is not correct. The case of the petitioner society which is an authorised reta 1 distributor is governed by U. P. Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 1989 which deals with distribution of Scheduled Commodities (Government Foodings etc.) to identity card holders as defined in Section l (h) of the control Order U P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers' (Licensing and Res triction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 applies to dealers who carry on business pf purchase or sale of foodgrains etc. after purchasing the same from the agriculturist and whole sellers and they do not deal in Government Food-grains. Clause 10 of this order provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Licensing Authority refusing to grant renew or restore a Licence of cancelling or suspending a licence may prefer an appeal to the Food Com missioner. Therefore this Control Order is not applicable to the case of the petitioner U. P. Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 1989 has no provision of appeal against the order of the District Supply Officer. However a Government order was issued on 3-7-1990 under the signature of Sri Brijesh Kumar, Secretary to Government of U. P. and Para 11 thereof made a provision of appeal to the Commissioner, it read as follows ; "jiladhikari dwara dukaan niyukt/nilamban/nirastikaran/nawinikaran na karne sambandhi paarit adesh ke virudh appeal sambandhit Mandalaayukta ke samaksh prastut ki jawe gi. la maamion me dwitiy appeal ki vyawastha nahi hogi. " The Government order lays down that against au order of appointment suspension or cancellation of a shop made by the District Magistrate an appeal shall lie to the Commissioner. Therefore in the present case appeal had been preferred by the petitioner under Para 11 of the Government. Order.
(3.) IT is noteworthy that Para 11 of the Government order aforesaid does not lay down any period of limitation for filing an appeal. However that does not mean that the appeal can be preferred at any time. In normal course the appeal should be preferred within a reasonable period. In the Present case the order of cancellation was passed on 840-1992 but the appeal has been filed on 22-4-1994. The petition filed an application under Section 5, Limitation Act praying that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. In support of the application an affidavit as filed stating that no information of the order dated 8-10-1992 was given to the petitioner and the appeal had been filed immediately after coming to know about the aforesaid order. The record shows that no counter- affidavit had been filed in reply to the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The specific case of the petitioner is that the Secretary of the Society did not get any knowledge of the order passed by the District Supply Officer. The recent trend of the judicial authorities for that application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive liberal construction. In Collector v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 it has bean held that expression' ovary day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. Again in G Ramegowda v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897 it has been held that expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeal are required to be condoned in the interest of justice, where no cross negligence or deliberate in action or lack of bonafide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.;