S. K. Dhaon, J. - (1.) THE petitioner, an appointee for sale of Government foodgrains, challenges the legality of an order passed by the District Supply Officer, suspending his appointment as an " authorised retail distributor " by means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) IN exercise of the powers conferred by the provisions contained in Section 3 read with Section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the State Government enforced the U. P. Foodgrains and other Essential Articles Distribution Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the distribution order of 1977). Clause 2 (b) of the Distribution Order of 1977 reads thus 5- ' Authorised retail distributor " means a person appointed as ' agent (Retail) by the District Magistrate, City Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate for sale of Government foodgrains and other essential articles. " The basis of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court is that the petitioner holds a statutory appointment having been appointed an authorised distributor under and in pursuance of clause 2 (b) of the Distribution order of 1977. In our opinion the very premise is unfounded. In Writ petition no. 77 of 1981 decided on 29th January 1981 and in the case of Raj Kumar Sheo Kumar v. Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), 1981 ALJ 261 it was held., that the appointment of retailers as authorised distributors for selling essential commodities was governed by the terms and conditions of the agreement under which the appointment was made and consequently the rights claimed by such retailers were essentially contractual in nature. Both these Division Benches relied on a Supreme Court decision in the case of S. Chandra Shekharan v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 1543 and a Full Bench decision of this court in Shital Prasad v. M. Saidullah, 1975 AWC 529. Some of the petitioners in Writ petition no. 77 of 1984 and the other connected writ petitions assailed the correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench of this court in those cases before the Supreme Court by preferring Special Leave Petition No. 2052-2053 of 1981. On 6th March, 1981, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions and affirmed the decision of this court in the aforementioned writ petitions. Furthermore, in paragraph 1 of the writ petition there is a clear admission that the agreement arrived at between the District Magistrate and the petitioner was a contractual one. The said paragraph reads thus :- " That this instant writ petition arises out of impugned order dated 29-9-1984 passed by the District Supply Officer Farrukhabad suspending the contractual agreement and thereby the Fair Price shop of the petitioner was also suspended holding that he misused the sugar quota and failed to produce stock register and other government record. " Therefore, the petitioner does not possess any legal right so as to entitle him to claim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that in the case of Prashchan Srivastava v. State of U.P., 1983 ALJ 1139 a Division Bench of this Court examined the contentions raised there in on merits on the assumption that the appointments of the petitioners in those cases were statutory in character being relatable to clause 2 (b) of the Distribution Order of 1977. Without entering into any controversy we shall also examine the merits of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner.
(3.) FOUR submissions have been made on behalf of the petitioner. They are : (1) Neither the terms of the Distribution Order of 1977 nor the terms of the agreement confer any power in any authority to suspend the authorisation given in clause 2 (b) of the Control Order of 1977. (2) The appointment having been made by the District Magistrate, no other officer except him could pass the impugned order of suspension. (3) In any case, the District Supply Officer could not exercise the powers of the District Magistrate as he had not been authorised in writing by the District Magistrate to do so; and (4) the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of showing cause before the impugned order was passed. In order to appreciate the submissions, we may have a quick look at the few averments made in the Writ petition as well as the relevant terms of the agreement. The petitioner has not produced before us either the original or a true copy of the agreement. Instead, he has contented himself by filing the proforma of the agreement as Annexure III to the writ petition. Paragraph 1 of the proforma provides that it shall come into force on a specified date and shall continue till a specified date " unless otherwise terminated earlier by the said District Magistrate or the DSO/TRO/SDO under the provisions hereafter contained." Paragraph 16 of the proforma provides that the District Magistrate/TRO/SDO shall have the right to terminate the agreement at any time without assigning any reason therefor.;