Narain Dutt Ojha, J. - (1.) This special appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 27 -6 -1985 of the learned Vacation Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7736 of 1985. In view of the nature of the subject mailer involved therein writ petition was otherwise cognizable by a Division Bench. Since it was presented during the Summer Vacation, it was heard by the learned Vacation Judge in view of the provisions contained in this behalf in Rule 10 Chapter V of the Rules of Court. Sub -rule (1) of Rule 10 of Chapter V which is relevant for the purposes of this case reads as follows: "Rule 10(1) : " Criminal work shall continue to be dealt with during the vacation by such Judges as may be appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice. They may also exercise original, appellate, revisional, civil or writ jurisdiction vested in the Court in fresh matters which in their opinion require immediate attention. Such jurisdiction may be exercised even in cases which are under the Rules cognizable by two or more Judges, unless the case is required by any other law to be heard by more than one Judge."
(2.) Apart from the Rules of Court no other law e.g. Sec. 57(2) of the Stamp Act which requires a reference under that Act to be heard by three Judges has been brought to our notice which required such a writ petition to be heard by more than one Judge. Under the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction which the learned Vacation Judge exercised in deciding the writ petition by the order appealed against was, however, a jurisdiction which ordinarily was exercisable only by a Division Bench. In view of the provisions contained in Chapter V Rule 10 of the Rules of Court referred to above it will, therefore, have to be assumed that even though the order appealed against was passed by learned Single Judge it was passed by a Division Bench, the same having been passed by him as Vacation Judge, for otherwise a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench could not be entertained by a Single Judge. As a necessary corollary no special appeal will lie against that order before another Division Bench. In this connection reference may be made to the following observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v/s. Finsbury Borough Council,, 1952 Appeal Cases 109 at p. 132: "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it......The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of the state of affairs."
(3.) Reference may also be usefully made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v/s. State of Bihar, : AIR 1955 SC 661 wherein paragraph 33 it was held: "When we apply a fiction all we do is to assume that the situation created by the fiction is true. Therefore, the same consequences must flow from the fiction as would have flown had the facts supposed to be true been the actual facts from the start.";