Om Prakash, J. - (1.) RAISING a very interesting question, this revision is filed by the tenant (revisionists) against the judgment and decree dated 5.1.1985 of the learned IV Additional District Judge, Varanasi (briefly the A.D.J.) arising from the suit filed by the landlord (respondent) for recovery of possession after ejectment of the tenants and for recovery of arrears of rent, mesne profits and other charges. Briefly, the facts are that the plaintiff claimed that ground floor was completed in January, 1975 and the first floor was completed in 1976 and thereafter, the house tax assessment was made. The plaintiff had purchased the site of the present constructions with certain constructions vide sale deed dated 10.9.1974 (Ext. 1) from Gokul, his son and his wife and then carried out constructions. The ground -floor was completed in January, 1975 and the construction of the first floor was carried out in 1976. On 24.11.1980, the plaintiff gave a notice to the tenant having demanded arrears of rent from 1.2.1979 and having terminated their tenancy. The suit was resisted by the defendants denying the contention of the plaintiff that the former were tenants only of the ground -floor. They also averred that the portion under the tenancy is governed by the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act, 1972). It was contended that the rent for the period upto 31.8.1980 had been paid to the plaintiff. This is how the defendants denied their liability of eviction. The suit was first decided by the landlord II Additional District Judge, Varanasi vide order dated 25.8.1982 dismissing the suit with costs to the defendant No. 1 who alone was found to be the tenant. Then the plaintiff filed revision before this Court. All the findings of the lower court except the one that the Act, 1972 applied to the portion under tenancy, were confirmed by this Court vide order dated 28.4.1983 and the case was sent back to record a fresh finding as to whether the Act, 1972 applied to the suit premises. Then the suit was decided by the IV Addl. District Judge, Varanasi by the impugned order dated 5.1.1985 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for ejectment of the defendant and for recovery of rent and other charges. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned A.D.J. the defendants have filed the instant revision. I have heard Sri S.N. Singh, learned counsel for the defendants and Sri Rajeshwari Prasad, learned counsel for the plaintiff. Approach of Sri Singh is very clear and simple. What he urged is that before the trial court in the first round, the plaintiff categorically stated that the ground floor was constructed in 1975 and that the first floor became complete in 1976. He says that the trial court vide order 25.8.1982 clearly held that the plaintiff had let out only ground -floor. In the impugned order dated 5.1.1985, the learned A.D.J., clearly observed that all the findings of his learned predecessor except the findings on issue No. 1 were confirmed in revision by this Court and the case was sent back for a fresh decision with a direction only to decide the following points: - - 1. When was the construction in question actually completed?
(2.) WHAT is the date on which the first assessment relating to the building in question came into effect? Whether, in view of the first assessment made in relation to the building in question, the date or the period when the building was actually completed is rendered immaterial?
(3.) WHETHER the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is applicable to the building in question? Then the learned A.D.J. found that the Act of 1972 did not apply to the suit premises. The findings of his learned predecessor given in the first round on other issues having been confirmed, the learned A.D.J. accepted the case of the plaintiff and decreed the suit for eviction of the defendants. 2. The main question for consideration is whether the Act of 1972 applies to the suit premises. The suit premises in this case is the ground -floor, as it was so found by the learned A.D.J. vide order dated 25.8.1982 and that finding was not disturbed by this Court in revision under the order dated 28.4.1983. The learned A.D.J. vide order dated 25.8.1982 also found that the ground -floor had been constructed in January, 1975. This finding has also become final after the decision of this Court dated 28.4.1983. The argument of Sri Singh is that the finding that the defendants were tenants only of ground -floor which was constructed in 1975, having become final, the provisions of the Act, 1972 clearly attracted to the suit premises in view of rule laid down in the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, : A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 817 that the premises which was not ten years old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the operation of the new Rent Act, can be governed by it if ten years expired during the pendency of the litigation. The Supreme Court was of the view that the moment a building becomes ten years old to be reckoned from the date of completion, the Rent Act would become applicable. The suit for eviction of the defendants was filed by the plaintiff against the defendants on 10.2.1981 and the period of ten years expired during the pendency of the instant revision, which was filed on 11.1.1985 Litigation having remained pending even after the expiry of 10 years, Sri Singh relying on the case of Vineet Kumar (supra) submits that the Act, 1972 is applicable to the suit premises and the defendants are not liable to be evicted, as the finding of the trial court under the order dated 25.8.1982 that no rent was due upto the date of notice has become final. 3. On the other hand, the submission of Sri Rajeshwari Prasad is that it is undisputed fact that the assessment of the building was made in the year 1976, when the entire building was completed relying on Explanation I to Sub -section (2) of section 2 of the Act, 1972. Sri Rajeshwari Prasad argued that this is the case of building which is subject to the assessment and therefore, the date on which the first assessment thereof came into effect, shall be deemed to be the date of completion of the building His argument is that no date of completion was reported by the plaintiff to the Municipal Board and, therefore, only the date or assessment made in respect of the building shall be taken to be the date of completion thereof. It is argued that the court has to strictly see the language of the statute and if that is unambiguous, then full effect be given to that without importing any foreign words into it. His precise argument is that clause (a) of Explanation I to sub -section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, 1972 lays down the scheme as to which of the dates shall be deemed to be the date of completion and this provision makes clear that either it will be a date when the completion was reported to the local body by the owner of the building or the date which was recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction on its own enquiry and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof came into effect shall be deemed to be the date of completion of the building. There being no date of report to or the date of record by the local authority, Sri Rajeshwari Prasad urged that the building being the one which is subject to assessment, only the date of assessment will be the date of completion in this case. I do not feel persuaded by this argument made on behalf of the plaintiff. The categorical case of the plaintiff before the trial court was that the ground -floor which alone was held to be let out by the plaintiff was constructed in January, 1975. The question is if no actual date of completion has been reported to the local authority but if the date of actual completion is known to and stated by the plaintiff,' then whether the court will decide the date of completion taking into account the actual date, as averred by the plaintiff or by fiction, as created by clause (a) of explanation I to Sub -section (2) of Section 2. The argument by Sri Singh is that when actual date of completion is stated by the plaintiff then the court will not give any consideration to the fiction and that the fiction will not over ride the reality. The real fact as was stated by the plaintiff before the trial court is that the ground -floor while is in dispute, was constructed in January 1975 and in face of this explicit case, Sri Singh argued that the date of assessment which was made in the year 1976, cannot be held to be the date of completion. I find substance in the submission of Sri Singh. The question is what is to be reported to by the owner of a building to the local authority? The answer is simple that a citizen who has constructed a building is supposed to report actual date of completion. The actual date of completion which is known to and is averred by the plaintiff will not cease to be the date of completion, simply because it was not reported to the local authority. The dominant purpose of the Act, 1972 is to protect the interest of the tenants and the whole Act is to be interpreted bearing this purpose in mind. When the legislature in tended to protect tenants, then it will be preposterous to think that the legislature would give an over riding effect to the fiction to the detriment of the tenants. In the situation of a kind that has arisen in this case, if the fiction is given an over riding effect over the actual date of completion as averred by the plaintiff then the tenants will be deprived of the protection, which the legislature sought to give to them. In my view, the words "is reported to" occurring in clause (a) of Explanation I to sub -section (2) of section 2 deserves a liberal construction which is consistent to the object of the Act. If the words "is reported to" are construed liberally, then in my view these words may be read meaning as 'is reported to or averred by the owner of a building". The literal interpretation which is canvassed by Sri Rajeshwari Prasad of the words "is reported to", therefore, cannot be accepted, because that is contrary to the object of the Act, 1972. So the date of assessment can not be taken to be the date of completion if the date of completion is reported to or averred by the owner of a building precedes the date of assessment. When the plaintiff himself averred that the portion under tenancy was constructed on an earlier date then the date of assessment, then there would be no justification to hold that the building was completed on a later date i.e. the date of assessment and thereby denying the protection to the tenant, which is given by the Act, 1972. There is no conflict in the date reported to or averred by the owner of a building, because if at all the owner had reported the date he would have reported the date which he averred to be the date of completion. 4. Reliance was placed for the plaintiff on Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendra Pal Gupta, A.I.R. 1982 SC 1230. The facts of this case are entirely different. In para 4, the Supreme Court stated the facts thus: - - The appellant sought the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the ground that if the date of occupation was taken to be the date of the completion of the shop, then ten years having elapsed during the pendency of the revision before the High Court, the Act would be applicable. From the facts as stated in said para 4, it is also clear that undisputed fact was that the first assessment of the shop took place on 1st April, 1968. Taking the date of assessment as the date of completion within the meaning of Explanation I to sub -section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, 1972, the contention of the appellant that he was entitled to the benefit of the Act, 1972 was rejected. So the question before the Supreme Court was whether the tenant could press the date of occupation to take the benefit of the Act, 1972. The date of occupation as it is manifest from clause (a) of Explanation I to Sub -section (2) of Section 2 can be availed of only when there are no dates, that is a date reported to or the date recorded by the local authority and the date of assessment. When such neither date is available then only the date of completion shall be determined by resorting to the date of occupation. As the date of assessment viz, 1st April, 1968 was available, the Supreme Court took the view that the provisions of Explanation I to Sub -section (2) of Section 2 were clear enough requiring no interpretation and the date of occupation could not be taken to be the date of completion. So the facts of that case were entirely different from the facts of the case in hand. So this case has been mispleaded by learned counsel for the plaintiff. Then for the plaintiff, his learned counsel alluded to the case of Deoki Nandan and others v. IV Additional District Judge, 1983 Alld. L.J. 733. The ratio of this decision also cannot be applied to the instant case on account of distinguishing facts. In this case the admission made by the respondent No. 2 when read as a whole, indicated that the report about the completion of the shops in question had been made either in the month of May or June 1973. Learned single Judge before whom the case was, observed that if the admission was to be ignored and the case was to be decided on the basis of other evidence produced by the parties then apparently it was a case where there was nothing on the record to indicate that any report about the completion of the shops in dispute had been made or otherwise recorded by the local authorities and in this view of the matter it is the date on which the first assessment in respect of the shops in question came into effect which would be the date on which the construction of the shops shall be deemed to have been completed. Then the learned Judge added whether May or June 1973 when the report of completion of the construction is said to have been made is taken as the crucial date or 24.4.1973 when the first assessment was made is taken to be the crucial date, the result is the same, namely, that in the year 1979 when the suit was instituted ten years had not expired from the date on which the construction of the shops shall be deemed to have been completed and, therefore, the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the shops. So the factual position in the case of Deoki Nandan and others (supra) was entirely different and the said decision cannot be taken into aid to decide the case of the parties before me.;