Hirdai Narain Seth, A.C.J. - (1.) By this petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution, Petitioner Km. Raj Kumari seeks relief against an order, dated 6th of November, 1980 passed by the VI Additional District Judge, Lucknow, in Civil Revision No. 208 of 1979.
(2.) Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that Respondent No. 2 filed a suit on 3rd of November, 1970 with the allegation that Brij Mohan Das, father of the Petitioner, was his tenant in House No. 40, Model House, Lucknow and that he had defaulted in payment of rent and had also rendered himself liable to ejectment as he had denied his title. Defendant Brij Mohan Das filed a written statement and contested the suit. However, on 9th of February, 1972 parties entered into a compromise as a result of which the Plaintiff's suit was decreed for arrears of rent, eviction and damages. The decree also allowed three years time to Brij Mohan Das to vacate the premises. When, after the lapse of three years, the decree -holder (Respondent No. 2) put his decree into execution, the Petitioner filed objections, Under Sec. 47/151 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the decree -holder's right to execute the decree. She claimed that on the date of compromise late Brij Mohan Das was a neurotic patient and had been admitted in the hospital for treatment and that the alleged compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed was null and void. She further claimed that subsequently the decree -holder had entered into a fresh compromise of tenancy with late Brij Mohan Das by demanding arrears of rent at an enhanced rate, vide his letter, dated 8th of August, 1982 and he had thus waived his rights under compromise decree, dated 9th of February, 1972. Inasmuch as the said decree had been adjusted and stood satisfied, it could not be executed against the Petitioner.
(3.) The executing court accepted the objection filed by the Petitioner. It observed that the compromise decree was a nullity inasmuch as the statutory grounds for directing eviction of Brij Mohan Das did not exist. It is also held that the conduct of the parties indicated that a fresh agreement of tenancy in favour of judgment debtor Brij Mohan Das had come into existence and as much the decree was not executable.;