JUDGEMENT
B. N. Katju, J. -
(1.) THE applicant was convicted on two counts under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur by his judgment dated 3-4-1981 passed in case No. 1197 of 1979 for selling adulterated milk and for contravening rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred to as the rules) and was sentenced to six months' R. I. and a fine of Rs. 1000/- or in default to undergo further RI for six months for selling adulterated milk and three months' RI and a fine of Rs. 500/- or in default to undergo further RI for three months for contravening Rule 50 of the Rules. He filed criminal appeal No. 104 of 1981, which was dismissed by III Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur by his judgment dated 2-5-81.
(2.) THE applicant thereafter filed this revision in this Court, which was originally heard by a Single Judge.
It was contended before the Single Judge that the prosecution of the applicant was illegal in view of Section 20 of the Act as the sanction was not valid. The Chief Medical Officer, who was the sanctioning authority, bad accorded sanction by signing the printed form Ext. ka-6, in which the name of the applicant, his residence and the offence committed by him had been typed, from which it could not be inferred that he had applied his mind. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the applicant relied on a Single Judge decision of this Court in criminal revision no. 114 of 1980, Ayub Ahmad v. State of U. P. In which It has been held :-
" Courts notice was drawn to Ext. ka-6, the alleged sanction, proved by the prosecution. It is apparent that no details at all regarding the nature of the offence, the nature of the sample of fond taken, the nature of the adulteration etc. was mentioned in the sanction. It is a printed form in which only the name of the accused and his address was filled in and the sanctioning authority merely appended his signature. It doss not show that the sanctioning authority applied his mind. "
A contrary view has, however, been taken in Mast Ram v. State of U. P., 1982 ACrR 35 in which it was held by at learned Single Judge of this Court :
" It is first contended that there was no proper sanction. The sanction appears to have been given without applying one's mind. Initially it may be pointed out that this objection was neither raised in the trial court nor before the appellate Court. I was not inclined to allow appellants' learned counsel to raise this plea but as it is only a technical point, I have heard him. Exhibit Ka-8 Is the sanction given by Chief Medical Officer, Gonda. The learned counsel says that it is on a cyclostyled proforma and only the blank have been filled up perhaps by some one else and so the Chief Medical Officer does not appear to have applied his mind to the fact of this case. No such presumption can, however, bet raised. If a document is signed by certain person the presumption is rather to the contrary and it would be presumed that he signed it after understanding its application. It is only when certain facts are brought on record which militate againt this presumption that something can be said but no such facts have been brought on record. The mere fact of document being cyclostyled does not lead to the presumption that he had not applied his mind. There are generally numerous cases in which sanction has to be given and as normally speaking the form of sanction is common so if the same is got cyclostyled and then details are filled up according to the special facts of each case it cannot be said that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind while sanctioning prosecution. "
(3.) IN these circumstances, this application was referred to a Division Bench by the learned Single Judge for decision. That is how it has come up before us.
It has been held in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Moraka v. King, AIR 1948 PC 82-
".........In their Lordships' view, in order to comply with the provisions of clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential, since clause 23 does not require the sanction to be tin any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. "
;
Click here to view full judgement.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.