N.D.Ojha, J. - (1.) THE Petitioner who is Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha has been served with certain charges and has been required to snow cause. This indicates that proceedings under Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are pending against the Petitioner. The impugned order was passed by the Sub -Divisional Officer suspending the Petitioner pending enquiry into the charges. This order has apparently been passed under Section 95(1)(gg) of the Act. It is this order of suspension which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.
(2.) IT has been urged by the counsel for the Petitioner that before passing the impugned order of suspension the Petitioner should have been given a show cause notice. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. The proviso occurring below Sub -section (4) of Section 95 of the Act reads thus: (i) no action shall be taken under Clause (f), Clause (g) or Clause (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed; (ii) no action shall be taken under Clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government in prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist". The difference in the requirement of Clause (i) and (ii) is apparent on the plain language thereof. Clause (i) contemplates reasonable opportunity of show cause being given against the action if it is proposed under Clause (f) or Clause (g) or clause (h). It does not require such an opportunity being given before passing an order of suspension pending enquiry under Clause (gg). The only requirement for passing an order under Clause (gg) as contained in Clause (ii) at the proviso is that the State Government should be prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under Clause (g) exist. In the instant case powers of the State Government have admittedly been delegated on the Sub -Divisional Officer. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the said officer has. clearly recorded a finding in regard to the prima facie satisfaction as contemplated by Clause (ii) of the proviso aforesaid. It was then urged by counsel for the Petitioner that against the charges levelled against the Petitioner an explanation has already been submitted and the Sub -Divisional Officer has not considered the explanation of the Petitioner and has not recorded any finding in regard to the said explanation. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that the stage of consideration of the explanation of the Petitioner has not yet arrived; that is to be done before passing the final order as contemplated by Section 95(1)(g) of the Act.
(3.) COUNSEL for the Petitioner then urged that before the prima facie satisfaction, as contemplated by Clause (ii) of the proviso aforesaid is recorded, there has to be some material to justify the prima facie satisfaction. The material on the basis of which the Sub -Divisional Officer's prima facie satisfaction is based is mentioned in the impugned order itself. Whether after the explanation of the Petitioner is considered the charges levelled against him will be found proved or not, cannot obviously be considered at this stage inasmuch as a finding in that regard is to be given in the proceedings under Section 95 (1)(g) of the Act. In this view of the matter the impugned order cannot be said to be invalid on the ground that the explanation of the Petitioner has not been discussed and no finding about its correctness or otherwise has been recorded.;