S.K. Dhaon, J. - (1.) THE Petitioner, a Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha, challenges the order dated 3rd April, 1985, passed by the Sub -Divisional Officer, Manjhanpur, suspending him from the office of the Pradhan.
(2.) A perusal of the order dated 3rd April, 1985, shows that the Sub -Divisional officer prima -facie feels that there are grave charges of financial irregularities against the Petitioner. He, accordingly appointed the Tahsildar, Manjhanpur as an Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges and submit his report. In the order details of lapses committed by the Petitioner have been mentioned. The Sub Divisional Officer forwarded a copy of his order to the Block Development Officer with a direction that the same should be served upon the Petitioner and a receipt obtained from him (the Petitioner). Learned Counsel has contended that the impugned order suspending the Petitioner from the office of the Pradhan has been passed without jurisdiction. According to him the provisions of Section 95(1)(gg) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are not attracted. In order to appreciate this submission we may have a quick look at the legislative history of the aforementioned provision. Prior to the enforcement of the U.P. Rural Local -self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 (U.P. Act III of 1973) Section 95(1)(gg) was not in the statute book. Under Section 95(1)(g) power was conferred on the Government to suspend or remove a member of a Gaon Panchayat or Joint Committee (Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti) or an office bearer of the Gaon Sabha etc. In Sub Divisional Officer Sadar Faizabad v. Shambhoo Narain Singh : AIR 1970 SC 150 the Supreme Court held that the power given to the State Government under Section 95(1)(g) was a power to punish an office bearer of the Gaon Sabha. No specific power to suspend a Pradhan pending enquiry into the charges levelled against him had been conferred upon the State Government. Their Lordships held that the Pradhan could not be suspended pending enquiry into the charges against him. The U.P. Act III of 1973 substituted the existing clause (g) in Section 95(1) and inserted the existing Clause (gg). The result, therefore, was that under clause (g) a distinct power to remove an office bearer of a Goan Sabha and under Clause (gg) a separate power to suspend an office bearer of the Gaon Sabha was conferred upon the State Government. Clause (gg) may be read: (1) The State Government may ...(gg) suspend a Pradhan...against whom proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated or against whom prosecution for an offence, which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending. The other provisions are not material. However, the two provisions to Sub -section (4) may also be read: Provided that - (i) No action shall be taken under Clause (f), Clause (g) or Clause (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed; (ii) no action shall be taken under Clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist.
(3.) THE question, therefore, is: are proceedings under Clause (g) for the removal of the Petitioner pending or contemplated? Here we are not concerned with the third situation, namely, the prosecution for an offence, which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude. For answering the question we revert to the impugned order. We have read it more than once and we are satisfied that the proceedings for the removal of the Petitioner from the office of the Pradhan are pending and an enquiry as to whether he should or should not be removed is going on. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the provisions as contained in Clause (gg) are squarely attracted to the case of the Petitioner. Since no final order has yet been passed, the question of fulfilling the requirements of the conditions enumerated in the first proviso to Sub -section (4) of Section 95 does not arise. So far as the requirement of the second proviso is concerned, we have already stated that the sub -divisional Officer has passed a detailed order. A bare reading of the order indicates that he is more than prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which the action should be taken against the Petitioner under Clause (g) exist.;