B.D. Agrawal, J. - (1.) THE petitioner was Principal of the Government English Language Teaching Institute, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad. In the ordinary course he will have retired with effect from April, 4, 1977, on attaining the age of superannuation which was 58 years. During the period of his service, it appears, he was recipient of a National Award. On May 12, 1977, there was policy decision taken by the State Government to the effect that teachers who had been recipients of National or State Awards, shall be given extension in service for two years so as to continue upto 60 years instead of being retired at the age of 58 only. The award was received by the petitioner on 28th of April, 1975. In terms of this policy decision, extension was given to the petitioner for two years commencing from 4th April, 1977 as will appear from the Government Order dated 19th January, 1977. This was in exercise of powers under the Fundamental Rule 56(a). Subsequently on February 6, 1978, there was reversal of the aforementioned policy decision by the then Government. Accordingly the extension in the age of superannuation on account of receipt of such award was not to continue beyond June 30, 1978. In terms of this Government Order the petitioner was made to retire before he could complete two years from April 4, 1977. The claim preferred before the Public Services Tribunal was dismissed on April 15, 1985. Aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged in the first place that from the extension granted to him by the order dated 19th January, 1977 it should be inferred that the relationship was contractual and since he was made to retire before attaining the age of 60 years, it be taken to be a breach of the contract on the part of the State Government. This contention, in my opinion is misplaced. The petitioner was an employee of the State Government having been the Principal in a Government maintained educational institution. The retention beyond the normal age of superannuation in terms of the Fundamental Rule 56(a) Financial Handbook, Vol. 11 was one of the conditions of service governing the petitioner in capacity as the Principal. Even though service under Government originates in contract, the Government servant acquires a status and he is governed by such conditions of service as the Government may from time to time lay down and which may be done even retrospectively vide Roshan Lal Tandon : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1889. State of J.K. v. T.N. Khosa etc. : (1974) 1 S.C.C. 19. Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India : A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 250 on which the learned counsel relies in this connection, the distinguishing feature is that the employment was expressly on contract for a period of five years. Reliance was placed on the Explanation to Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which provided that the discharge of a person engaged under contract in accordance with the terms of his contract did not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this Rule.
(2.) LEARNED counsel then assails the reasonableness of the decision arrived at by the State Government as exhibited by the Government Order dated 6th February, 1978. It is argued that there were only two persons eligible to the benefit under the earlier notification dated May 12, 1977 and hence there could have been no justification for reversing the same. This essentially is a matter of policy decision. The decision arrived at on 6th of February, 1978, reversing the earlier policy decision of 12th of May, 1977, is in the exercise of the executive powers which are co -extensive with the legislative powers in this behalf. After the decision in the case of K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P. : (1985) 1 S.C.C. 523 by the Supreme Court there remains little room to doubt that in these matters the law permits free play in the joints. In the formulation of such policy decision the Government is allowed a free, though fair, play. There is no one fixed or focal point of reasonableness. There can be a large and wide area within which the administrator or the legislator, it has been held, can act, without violating the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. It is not for the Court to sit in judgment over the wisdom of what the Government decides as a matter of policy applicable in general. The material upon which the State Government choose the reversal of the earlier policy decision is not before us. The court is not in a position to say that the decision arrived at subsequently which was made applicable in general is arbitrary. It is contended also that later Government again reversed the Government Order dated 6th February, 1978 and provided for extension being given in the age of retirement in such cases. The Government Order dated May 15, 1982, may not be of avail to the petitioner for the reason firstly, that he had ceased to be in employment of the Government when this Government Order came into force. Secondly, even though the Government chose on May, 15, 1982, to revert back to what had been decided upon on January 19, 1977, it may not be claimed on this footing that the general decision taken on 6th February, 1978, was arbitrary or irrational. The petitioner has retired with effect from June 30, 1970 in accordance with the rules then in operation. No question arises to compensate him for the period of 1.7.1978 to 3.4.1979 as he claims. A rule of retirement reducing the retirement cannot be deemed to deprive a person of his right to livelihood for, if that be so, it would be impermissible to provide for an age of retirement at all which would be contrary to public interest. Rules of retirement limit his right to hold office to a stated number of years.
(3.) THE petitioner did not acquire a vested right by virtue of extension in the age of retirement being granted at one stage - -he being governed by such conditions of service as may be laid from time to time in exercise of the powers of the Government as envisaged under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Reliance placed for the petitioner on the principle of promissory estoppel may definitely be of no avail for the reason that there is no estoppel against Government in the matter of such policy decision, nor can the petitioner claim that due to the retention beyond 58 years for some period there was detriment suffered by him or that he altered the position to his prejudice. For the reasons stated above, the petition is devoid of merits and is, consequently, dismissed in limine.;