K.S.VERMA, J. - (1.) THE dispute in the instant writ petition is a dispute between landlord and tenant in respect of accommodation situate at 6-B, Adarsh Nagar, Police Station Alambagh, Lucknow. It is owned by respondent No. 3 and the petitioner is a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 110/-. The record indicates that petitioner has been residing in the house in question for the last 26 years. Respondent No. 3 is an employee of the State Government whose services were transferred to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. After that he was posted as Second Secretary, Embassy of India, Tehra, Irann. The said respondent retired on January 31, 1984 and one year before his retirement he applied for release of the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner taking the aid of Section 21(1-A) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act XIII of 1972). It may also be noted that respondent No. 3 after having been posted in Tehran was accommodation in a residential building taken on lease by the Government of India. In this way, respondent No. 3 was in occupation of a building for residential purposes in Tehran. The respondent No. 3 has applied for release of the accommodation and has contended that since he has retired from Government service and has been required to vacate it the Government accommodation in his possession, the accommodation belonging to him, which is in the tenancy of the petitioner, should be released in his favour and the tenant be required to vacate it. The Prescribed Authority as also the appellate Authority have held that consequent on the retirement of respondent No. 3 and further in view of the fact that he is required to vacate the building in his possession in tehran his application for release of the accommodation is genuine and bonafide and deserves to be allowed. Aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate Court, the petitioner has come up to this Court by way of this writ petition.
(2.) THE first contention raised by the petitioner is that Section 21(1-A) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 has no application in the instant case. The contention is that if the petitioner is occupying a building in Tehran for residential purposes while he is posted in Iran as Second Secretary, Embassy of India, the residential accommodation in his possession is not a 'public building' within the meaning of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. Public 'building' has been defined by Section 3(o) of the Act as follows :- "Public building' means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State) and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any Public Sector Corporation." (Emphasis supplied). By reference to the above definition, it is submitted by the petitioner that if the Central Government or a State Government is owner of a building or takes it on lease or requisitions it for the purposes of the Central Government or the State Government such a building will be a 'public building' within the meaning of the Act but a building taken on rent by the Central Government or the State Government in another country will not constitute a 'public building' within the meaning of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner further elaborates his argument by submitting that respondent No. 3 who is the landlord is in occupation of a building in another country for residential purposes which he is required to vacate on account of cessation of his employment but the said building would not be a 'public building' so as to attract the application of the said section. In my opinion, the argument is not tenable. If we revert back to the definition of 'public building' quoted above, it would appear that such a building means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government. The definition does not limit the right of the Central Government to take residential accommodation on lease in another country. It is matter of common knowledge that the Indian Government has its Embassies in various countries and the country is required to provide accommodation to persons who serve the country abroad. For this purpose it is inevitable that the Central Government may either own a building in that country or take it on lease to accommodate its officials. The staff employed by the Central Government in a foreign country has to be provided with accommodation and for this purpose the Central Government is required either to own building in that country or take it them on lease. The word in Section 3(o) of the 'public building' means any building taken on 'lease' do not restrict the Central Government to take a building on lease in this Country alone. The words are wide enough to empower the Central Government to take residential accommodation on lease in a foreign country. This interpretation appears to be reasonable in view of the fact that the Central Government has to provide residential accommodation to its employees in foreign countries. Apart from that the definition of 'public building' contained in Section 3(o) of the Act is wide enough to include the taking on lease any building by Central Government to accommodate its employees. There is no warrant to restrict the meaning of 'public building' in the manner indicated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. One of the recognized principles of interpretation of Statutes is that the construction which best accords with the purpose of the Act and which has the effect of bringing about harmonious working of the Statute in its application should be adopted. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted it will make the working of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 unworkable in that the owner of a building who is posted in a foreign country and has been provided with an official accommodation in that country cannot take advantage of Section 21(1-A) of the Act after his retirement when he is required to vacate a building in his occupation in a foreign country. This could never have been the intention of the farmer of the Act. The scheme of the Act indicates that it has stuck balance between the needs of the landlord and of the tenant in regard to accommodations which are let out. The landlord under Section 21(1-A) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 may have his building vacated by a tenant if his need to occupy the building owned by him is bonafide and genuine. The legislature has laid down guidelines to determine the question when the need of the landlord would be genuine and when the need of the tenant should override the needs of the landlord. Section 21(1-A) of the Act is in the nature of an exception carved out from the main section which provides for a contingency when the accommodation of a person is let out to a tenant but he is in occupation of a building provided to him for residential purposes by the Central Government or a State Government. it is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a Government employee retires, he has to vacate the accommodation in his possession provided to him by the Central Government or the State Government. In such an eventuality, the Legislature has provided that if the landlord is required to vacate the accommodation in his possession provided by the Central Government or the State Government then that would itself be a pressing need for the landlord get the accommodation in possession of the tenant released and be made available to him for accommodation himself and his family. If the argument pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then the position of the landlord would be very difficult. On the one hand, he is required to vacate the accommodation provided to him by the Central Government or the State Government on the other hand, he cannot get the accommodation in occupation of his tenant for his own use. By enacting Section 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972, the Legislature has provided an protection to Government servants who own house but are provided a accommodation at Government expense. The protection available to Government employees under Section 21(1-A) of the Act is that as soon as they retire they can get possession of the accommodation owned by them by requiring the tenant to vacate the accommodation. In that respect the said section has made elaborate provision by providing that an application for release of such an accommodation should be made within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of the employment of the Government servant. In the instant case, the respondent has moved the application within a period of one year before his retirement. This provision has been made so that within the period of one year the Government employee may get the accommodation released in his favour and he is not left with no accommodation on his retirement. It is, indeed, unfortunate that in spite of the fact that the respondent had moved an application for release under Section 21(1-A) of the Act within one year of the cessation of this employment, the case could not be decided. In my opinion, the case of the respondent falls squarely within the meaning of Section 21(1-A) of the Act and on his superannuation from Government service he is entitled to get the accommodation in possession of his tenant vacated to be made available to him for his occupation.
(3.) IT was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Courts below did not afford the petitioner the opportunity to show cause against the genuineness of the document indicating the terms and conditions on which the respondent was required to occupy the accommodation in Tehran. In this respect reliance was placed on M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The workmen and others, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 330. By reference to this decision it in submitted that it is not clear from the record where the building in situate and what are its details. It further indicates that the document is not genuine. It is further contended that the particulars of the building in occupation of the respondent in Tehran have not been given. The document referred to above does not disclose the situation of the building nor does it indicate sufficient particulars to identify the same. This argument of the learned counsel has to be rejected outright as no such plea was taken by him in the lower Courts. If the plea had been taken the respondent would have met the case and produced such evidence as was necessary. The affidavit filed before the Prescribed Authority which is Annexure C-12 to this petition accompanies an annexure which is marked as Annexure-1. This document indicates the terms and conditions on which the respondent was to occupy the public building. It is a certificate from the counsellor, Embassy of India, Tehran signed by Shri Nigam Prakash. His signatures have been proved by respondent No. 3 as is clear from paragraph 4 of the affidavit. The authenticity of Annexure I has been duly provided by law. The affidavit sworn by the respondent clearly proves Annexure I attached to it. Annexure I to Annexure C-12 is a genuine document and no tangible reason has been shown by the petitioner to doubt the genuineness of the document. As a matter of fact, no effort was made by the petitioner in the Courts below in this respect.;