M.Wahajuddin - (1.) BY the provisions of Sec. 9 of the Amending Act No. 16 of 1976 of U. P. the provisions for anticipatory bail earlier provided under Sec. 438 CrPC were deleted. The applicant has come forward here challenging the vires of Section 9 of Act 1.6 of 1976 deleting the provisions regarding anticipatory bails so far as U. P. is concerned. The arguments advanced are (1) though Criminal procedure falling under List III entry No. 2 of the Constitution as State subjects, actually it should be treated to fall under entry no. 97 of List I contained in the Constitution as Central subject (2) that the provisions for bail affects the liberty of the citizen and so there should be uniform law throughout India while the amendment deleting the provisions for anticipatory bail in U. P. or any other proviso would be discriminatory qua some other slates where such provisions continue and thereby Article 14 of the Constitution of India providing for equality in law throughout India would be violated, (3) the aforesaid amendment also contravenes and violates the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, providing that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law, (4) the expression 'procedure established by law' is to be read in context with the various pronouncements interpreting this expression and holding that a procedure is to be just, fair and reasonable and should stand that test and should not be fanciful or arbitrary. Reliance is placed upon AIR 1983 SC 873, AIR 1978 SC 597, AIR 1978 SC 1675, AIR 1984 SC 781, AIR 1970 SC 228, AIR 1978 SC 1594 and AIR 1984 SC 1261, and it is urged that on account of subsequent pronouncements on legal interpretation there has been wider developments qua fundamental rights, personal liberty and reasonableness of the statute. This is being urged to explain away the Division Bench case of this Court, Km. Parvati v. State of U. P., 1979 ACrR 409 which relying upon the earlier pronouncements of the Supreme Court including Gopalan's case held that Section 9 of the Amendment Act 16 of 1976 is not ultra vires and not violative of the Constitution. It has been further urged that the Supreme Court itself has admitted a Writ Petition regarding this matter, namely, writ petition No. 5883 of 1980, Ram Narain Singh v. State of U. P., 1981 SC Cases Criminal 597. An admission of any writ for consideration of any important legal point raised does not amount to over-ruling the earlier pronouncement already existing. It would simply indicate that the Supreme Court may now also consider the matter. It can take one view or the other and no one can anticipate it. I may observe that even the Supreme Court while admitting the petition itself observed that 'perhaps it may be reasonably argued that the State (U. P.) legislature was competent to pass this legislation as it has received the assent of the President under Article 254 (2) and the impugned Act would prevail in the State of U. P.'. It still admitted the petition observing that it has to be examined whether the Act would stand the scrutiny of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. As regards Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the various schedules referred to during the argument, the matter has been thread bare and expressly considered in the case of Km. Parvati v. State (supra). Sitting as a single Ju ge I am bound by the view of the Division Bench and I must follow it most respectfully. The Supreme Court itself while dealing with the law of precedence held that in case of pronouncements of equal number of Judges of the same Court, the later pronouncement by larger number of judges it is pronouncement of the larger number of judges which must prevail and followed so far as that High Court is concerned. It was argued that the position of law has changed in the sense that there have been a number of pronouncements. In fact, this Court has only two options, either to follow the Division Bench or to have larger Bench constituted if it differs from Division Bench's view. I find myself in full agreement with the Division Bench view, at least speaking prima facie Art. 254 (2) would render the subsequent legislation of the State Government to prevail upon the earlier legislation even of the Parliament. Of course a rider is there by way of proviso but the rider will come into play only if after the State legislature enactment the Parliament subsequently makes some modification for guidelines etc. The Parliament has not enacted any provision subsequent to the enactment of Section 9 Amending Act. I may also observe that if a view is taken that there should not be different provision of law in the different States and there should be one uniform law for all the States on all subjects the constitutional provisions for legislation by different States on State subjects on concurrent list would itself be defeated. In fact, so many enactments are special features of particular State or States while there are no such enactments in other States depending upon the situation and circumstances prevailing in that State.
(2.) I, therefore, following the Division Bench pronouncement of Km. Parvati v. State (Supra) dismiss this petition under section 482 CrPC summarily. A verbal request for leave to appeal to Supreme Court is made under Article 134-A of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has already entertained another petition on this very matter, treating the same as a very important question of law and also mentioning those particular Sections of the Constitution which need scrutiny hence it is a fit case for granting such permission and permission is accorded. Application dismissed.;