H.N.Seth, J. - (1.) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has come up before this Bench for reconciling the apparent conflict of judicial opinion in this Court vide Pahari Sahu v. District Magistrate, Varanasi, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 5057 of 1973, decided on 30-8-1973 (All) and State v. Om Prakash, Spl. Appeal No. 2 of 1973, decided by the Lucknow Bench of this Court on 13-2-1973 (All), in the light of the Supreme Court decision in the case S. Chandra Sekharan v. Tamil Nadu Government, AIR 1974 SC 1543.
(2.) THE petitioner Sitla Prasad claims that as a result of agreements entered into between him and the District Magistrate Pratapgarh, he was appointed as authorised retail distributor under the provisions of the U. P. Foodgrains Distribution Order and the U. F. Sugar Control Order, 1966, for sale of Government Foodgrains and levy sugar. Terms of the agreement, on which he was so appointed, are contained in the form of declaration (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). It appears that some complaints with regard to distribution of levy sugar by the petitioner, were received by the District Authorities. Accordingly the District Magistrate, after getting certain enquiries made, passed an order on 15-10-1974, directing that petitioner's licence as well as the agreement entered into by him be cancelled. He directed the District Supply Officer to take immediate steps to appoint some other person in place of the petitioner and till such appointment was made, to attach the quota which was to be distributed through petitioner's shop to the nearest shop. Thereafter the District Supply Officer, by his letter dated 22nd October, 1974 informed the petitioner that his agreements in respect of cheap foodgrain and retail sugar shop had been cancelled under clauses 18 and 16 of the respective agreements. The petitioner then filed the present petition and challenged the validity of the order of the District Magistrate Pratapgarh, cancelling his fair price foodgrains and levy sugar shop, as communicated to him by the Dist. Supply Officer, on 22- 10-1974. He urged that the order was vitiated because of the mala fide of the District Magistrate and also because while cancelling petitioner's fair price shop, the District Magistrate did not afford him an opportunity to meet the allegations on which his shop was going to be cancelled and acted in contravention of the principles of natural justice. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been made clear that although in the communication made by the District Supply Officer on 22nd October, 1974, it was stated that petitioner's agreement in respect of his shop for supplying cheap Government Foodgrains had been cancelled, but in fact the District Magistrate did not make any order cancelling any agreement entered into with the petitioner under the provisions of U. P. Foodgrains Distribution Order, 1966. The District Magistrate merely directed cancellation of petitioner's agreement under the U. P. Sugar Control Order, 1966. The respondents further clarified that the petitioner did not hold any sugar licence and there was no question of cancelling any such licence held by him. Any reference to sugar licence, in District Magistrate's order dated 15-10-1974, was redundant. In view of the clarification made by the respondents the controversy in the present writ petition was confined to the question whether or not the District Magistrate was justified in cancelling petitioner's agreement with regard to distribution of sugar and whether any grievance in respect thereof can be agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(3.) ACCORDING to the respondents, petitioner's agreement for selling levy sugar could be revoked under Clause 16 of the agreement (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) which provides that it would be open to the District Magistrate or the Town Rationing Officer to determine the agreement in question at any time without assigning any reason. They denied the allegations of mala fide made against the District Magistrate and took the stand that while cancelling petitioner's agreement the respondents were not obliged to hear him.;