- (1.) THIS is the second revision. The courts below held, while deciding an issue framed thus in a pending suit "whether the suit is liable to be stayed?" that the suit was not liable to be stayed. That was the finding of the trial court and the lower revisional court affirmed the said finding. In the second revision before me it is contended that the courts below have not properly construed the pleadings in the two suits in question and they were too much pre-occupied with the ingredients of Section 10, Civil P. C. and they failed to consider the applicability of a Section 151, Civil P. C. In my opinion, the courts below were right in holding that the suit in question could not be stayed under Section 10, Civil P. C. This conclusion can be arrived at on the simple and undisputed ground that the court where the earlier suit was filed did not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. The first suit was filed in the court of the Munsif and the second suit was filed in the court of the District Judge. It is obvious that one of the basic ingredients of Section 10 has not been made out in the instant case, and, therefore, the suit could not be stayed under Section 10, Civil P. C. However, I agree with the learned counsel for the applicant that it was possible for the trial court to stay the suit under Section 151, Civil P. C. and the courts below have not properly considered the ingredients of Section 151, Civil P. C. Learned counsel for the opposite party, Shri H. S. Joshi, has contended before me that Section 10 is exhaustive of the situations in which the court can stay a suit and apart from the said provision it is not open to a court to act under Section 151, Civil P. C. to stay the proceedings in a suit. Learned counsel has placed his principal reliance on Manohar Lal v. Hira Lal, (AIR 1962 SC 527) where it was laid down : "When there is a special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the contingencies of two such suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers of Section 151 is not justified. The provisions of Section 10 do not become inapplicable on a court holding that the previously instituted suit is a vexatious suit or has, been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract." Apart from the said case he has placed reliance on four other cases which are as follows : (1) Union of India v. Ram Charan, (AIR 1964 SC 215); (2) Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, (AIR 1964 SC 993); (3) Ramkaran Das v. Bhagwan Das, (AIR 1965 SC 1144); (4) Khalli Panda v. Dharam Gouda, (AIR 1967 Ori 172).
(2.) IN AIR 1964 SC 215 it was laid down as under : "The court is not to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151, Civil P. C. for the purposes of impleading the legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had abated on account of the appellant not taking appropriate steps within time to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on the record and when its application for setting aside the abatement is not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for not impleading the legal representatives of the deceased in time and for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time." In AIR 1964 SC 993 the Court laid down : "Thus every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-a-vis the non-appearance of the defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for and Order 9, Rule 7 and Order 9, Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise during the course of the trial." And on the said finding the court further observed : "The inherent power of the court cannot override the express provisions of the Law. In other words, if there are express provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be express but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates :
(3.) IN AIR 1965 SC 1144 it was laid down as under : "The inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no procedure. Rule 4 of Order 37 expressly gives power to a Court to set aside a decree passed under the provisions of that order. Express provision is thus made for setting aside a decree passed under Order 37 and hence if a case does not come within the provisions of that rule, there is no scope of resort to Section 151 for setting aside such a decree." ;