R.L.Gulati, J. - (1.) THE petitioner has challenged the warrant of -arrest dated March 9, 1974, issued against him by the District Magis trate, Agra, under Section 3 (a) (iii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), by means of this petition. The petitioner is a whole-sale dealer in Kerosene Oil at Agra carrying on the business in the name and style of Ramesh Brothers. He holds a whole-sale licence under the U.P. Kerosene Control Or der, 1962, It is alleged that on three different dates between March 8 and March 14, 1973, he purchased 30,500 litres of superior kerosene oil from the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., New Delhi, from its depot at Shakoor Basti. He disposed of the entire stock of kerosene oil surreptitiously with making it available for fair distribution to the consumers at a time when there was a great scarcity of this commo dity. He did not enter this quantity of kerosene oil in his stock re gister, nor did he show it in the weekly and fortnightly returns sub mitted by him to the District Supply Officer, Agra. He did not pro duce his records, such as stock register, sale register and cash memo, etc., before the District Supply Officer in spite of several demands made on him between June 19, 1973 to February 12, 1974. On May 22, 1973, the District Supply Officer served a notice upon the petitioner as to why his licence under the Kerosene Control Order be not sus pended. On September 4, 1973 his licence was suspended. On Sep tember 14, 1973, he filed in this court a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution being writ petition No. 5993 of 1973 against the order suspending his licence. The petition was allowed on October 17, 1973 on the ground that the licence of the petitioner could not be suspended pending an enquiry beyond a period of two weeks as pro vided in the second proviso to rule 11 of the rules framed under the Kerosene Control Order. No further steps were taken by the autho rities to cancel the petitioner's licence. Eventually on March 9, 1974, a warrant of arrest was issued against him by the District Magistrate Agra, under Section 3 (a) (iii) of the Act.
(2.) IT has been alleged in the counter-affidavit of the District Ma gistrate, Agra, that it has not been possible to execute the warrant of arrest as the petitioner has been absconding and proceedings have been taken against him under Sections 87, 88 and 89 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The only question arising in this case is as to whether the war rant of arrest is justified in law. Under Section 3 (a) (iii) of the Act, a person can be detained, if the District Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Such an order of detention cannot be made as a measure of punish ment for something which a person has already done, even if it is prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The detention can be ordered only to prevent him from repeating the prejudicial act in future. For his past conduct he can be dealt with under the law and punished, if found guilty. How ever, the past conduct and antecedent history of a person can be relevant in forming the belief that such a person may act in the same manner in future and a preventive detention order can be passed against him. But the past conduct and antecedent history must not be very remote. It must relate to recent past so as to induce the ne cessary belief in the mind of the District Magistrate that it is neces sary to prevent the person concerned from indulging in the same anti-social activity. This view has been firmly established by the Supreme Court in its various decisions.
(3.) IN Nagen Murmu v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 844 the Supreme Court in paragraph 2 observed that the past conduct or antecedent history of person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. But in order to justify such an in ference it is necessary to bear in mind that such past conduct or an tecedent history should ordinarily be prosimate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the deten tion of the person is necessary. In that case the order of detention was passed more than two years after the prejudicial act had been committed. The same view has been expressed in Lakshman Khatik v. State of W. B. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1264 and Abdul Munnaf v. State of W. B. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2066. In the latter ease the prejudicial act took place on June 7, 1971 and the detention order was passed nearly nine months later on March 6, 1972. The Supreme Court held that the prejudicial act was too remote to provide a reasonable basis for the detention order.;