Prem Prakash, J. - (1.) BY these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, who are the ten ant of the buildings in question, have challenged the constitutional validity of Explanation (iv) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (to be hereinafter referred as the Act) and which repealed the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (described hereinafter as the 1947 Act), on the ground that it violates the funda mental rights of the petitioner, guaranteed under Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Counsel for the petitioners conceded and, in our opinion, right ly that since the proclamation of emergency is in operation, under Article 353 of the Constitution, the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 is under suspension and, therefore, the explanation could not be assailed for infraction of Article 19. Counsel, however, submitted that it does violate the guarantee of equal protection of the law and offends Article 14 and in his endeavour for attacking the provision as being violative of Article 14 he has maintained that there is a discrimination in favour of the landlord who is in occupa tion of a part of the building for residential purposes and that there is no rational basis for enacting a rule of irrebuttable presumption that the building is 'bona fide required' by him when in other cases the landlord, in order to obtain the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, is required to prove under sub-section (2) (a) of the section that the building is bona fide required by him. In the course of arguments, counsel for the petitioners also raised the con tention, which we permitted them to do, that Rule 16 (1) of the Rules framed under the Act, in so far as it precludes the prescribed autho rity from taking into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application in a case covered by Clause (iv) of the explanation, is ultra vires of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act.
(2.) LEARNED Advocate General appearing for the State and the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that none of the points urged on behalf of the petitioners has got any substance and there was no violation of the equal protection of laws in Article 14 of the Constitution. For the sake of convenient reference and before we proceed to see the legislative history of the Act, it would be relevant to set out the impugned provision: "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant-(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely- (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its exist ing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for resi dential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or call ing, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in dilapidated condition and is re quired for purposes of demolition and new construction ......" Explanation (iv) to the sub-section reads as thus; (iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building, the remaining part thereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord." The 1947 Act imposed several restrictions on eviction of tenants by landlords from buildings, the policy behind it being to alleviate the sufferings of the tenants, if uncontrolled evictions were allowed. Being a measure castled for a limited period, several amendments in response to the needs of the situation were made from time to time and the courts, as well, construed its provisions with the conside ration that it was piece of official legislation meant for the protec tion of tenants. Amongst the various antinomies pointed out by the Supreme Court in the frame-work of the Act was the one in sub-sec tion (1) of Section 3 which, in the opinion of the Court, did not indi cate the guidelines to regulate the exercise of the power of the Dis trict Magistrate (see Bhagwan Das v. Pram Nath), 1963 A.W.R. 719. The Supreme Court, however, left the question of its validity to be decided to a later occasion. Though there was no express or implied provision in the sub-section requiring the District Magistrate to consider the need of the tenant, the Allahabad High Court, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Laic Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chandra, 1965 A.L.J. 353 held that while considering the application of the landlord, the Dis trict Magistrate was to give consideration to the cases of both the landlord and the tenant (See Asa Singh v. B. D. Sanwal), A.I.R. 1969 Alld. 474. The economic problem, however, continued unabated owing to the acute scarcity of accommodation and lack of fresh building activity. Some of the provisions of the Act attracted the criticism by informed pub lic opinion and, in that state of facts. The Legislature conscious of the 'continuing increase in urban population . . . and the problem of shortage of accommodation had become thronic...' (vide State ments of objects and Reaxons of the Bill) and with a view to provide for the regulation of letting and rent and the eviction of tenants, placed the Act, as a permanent measure, on the Statute Book. The policy underlying the Act manifests that the legislature intended to give greater assurance to tenants against eviction and at the same time it, endeavoring to adapt the conflicting interest of the two segments of the urban population to the social need, placed them upon an ascertainable basis, without leaving such matters to the un bridled discretion of the authorities under the Act. Statutes come out of the past and aim at the future. This being the background, we would not adopt an interpretation leading to the escalation of mischief to suppress which the legislature has regulated, unless the language is plain and strong enough to warrant that conclusion or unless a breach of the fundamental right of the citizen is mani fest. Since it is apparent that the object of the law, was to afford protection to the tenants from eviction, we would not be doing un due violence to the Act to assume that it was implicitly subject to that condition which alone would make the Act as a whole practicable of administration. In other words, the need of the tenant and the hardship likely to be caused to him by his eviction from the building should also, in absence of the language expressly indicating to the contrary ouster the decision of the prescribed authority.
(3.) IN the aforementioned perspective, we now proceed to have a look at the scheme of Section 21 of the Act, which was two-fold situa tion, (1) a building or any specified part thereof may be released under clause (a) when the prescribed authority is satisfied that such building or part is bona fide required, (i) either in its existing form: or (ii) after demolition and new construction. Such requirement may be for purposes of occupation; (i) by the landlord himself; (ii) in the case of trust, for the objects of the trust. In the first three cases, the building may be released for purposes of residence as well as for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, the landlord thus has not only to prove that there was an element of need and the applica tion was not made with the purpose of rack renting or ejectment with a view to indulge into rack-renting, but he has also to establish that the accommodation was needed for the purpose set out in clause (a). In other words, it is not enough that the landlord should merely de sire bona fide to use and occupy the premises. What is necessary is that be should need them for his own use and occupation or by any member of his family or by any person for whose benefit the build ing was held by him. In such an enquiry both sides must adduce relevant evidence before the prescribed authority; the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect. It is only after sifting such evidence that the prescribed authority must form its conclusion as to whether much hardship would be caused by re leasing the accommodation then by refusing to release it. (2) The Explanation to the sub-section in the case of a residential building provides in clause (ii) that where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment, in the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and by reason of the cessation of such engagement he needs the buildings of occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a) and in a similar way in clause (lii) it indicates that where the landlord is a member of the armed forces of the Union and the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, has issued a certificate in his favour that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, then his representation that he needs the building for residential purposes for members of his family shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a). In these two classes of cases the landlord's need has been declared as sufficient relieving the landlord of the obligation to prove it by evidence as has been re quired by sub-section (1) (a).;