K.N.SINGH, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is tenant of house No. 95 situ­ate in Mohalla Dindarpura in the town of Moradabad. Smt. Ram Rati Devi is the landlord of that house. In 1970 she made an appli­cation before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for grant of per­mission under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, to file suit against the petitioner for his adjustment on the ground that she required the accommodation in question for her own use and occupation. The tenant contested her application. After necessary enquiry the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated September 10, 1971 granted permission to her. The peti­tioner challenged that order in revision before the Commissioner, but the Commissioner upheld the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Thereafter, the petitioner made representation to State Gov­ernment under Section 7-F of the Act. The State Government issued an interim order on February 5, 1972 staying the operation of the order of the Commissioner. But before the order of the State Gov­ernment could be communicated to the landlord she filed suit on February 7, 1972 in the Civil Court for the petitioner's eviction. On receipt of the State Government's order of stay she made an application before the State Government that since the suit had already been filed prior to the communication of the interim order proceed­ings under Section 7-F of the Act were rendered infructuous. The State Government accepted her contention and rejected the peti­tioner's representation on the ground that it had been rendered in­fructuous. The petitioner thereafter made an application for review of the said order but that application was also rejected on October 21, 1972 on the ground that the State Government had no jurisdiction to review its order. Aggrieved the petitioner approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the order of the State Government as well as the order of the Commissioner and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granting permission to the landlord.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the State Gov­ernment committed a patent error of law in rejecting the petitioner's representation as the same had not been rendered infructuous. It is urged that the petitioner had sent a telegram to the landlord on Feb­ruary 7, 1972 which had been received by her prior to the actual institution of the suit in the Civil Court, therefore the landlord had no right to file the suit and the proceedings before the State Govern­ment were not rendered infructuous. On behalf of the landlord it is urged that the petitioner had no doubt sent a telegram which re­ferred to the interim order passed by the State Government but the same was received by the landlord after 12 o'clock on February 7, 1972 but before the receipt of the telegram she had already filed the suit. It is further urged that the communication from the State Gov­ernment relating to the issue of interim order was received by the landlord on February 11, 1972 therefore the order could not be effec­tive prior to February 11, 1972. In Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath A.I.R. 1970 S.C, 971, it was held that if a suit is validly instituted after obtaining permission as required under Sec­tion 3(1), it does not cease to be maintainable even if the State Government revokes the permission granted before the institution of the suit then there would be no valid permission to sue. In other words, once the suit is validly instituted State Government's power to revoke the permission granted under Section 3(1) is ex­hausted. In Mohd. Ismail v. Nanhey Lal A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1919, (2) the Supreme Court ob­served: - "The words of Section 7-F indicate that the State Government can only exercise its jurisdiction to revise the order of the Com­missioner before the actual institution of the suit. The language of Section 7-F shows that on the facts of the case before it the State Government must consider whether the grant of or refusal to grant permission for the filing of a suit should be upheld or not. The Section does not seem to be aimed at invalidating a suit already instituted and can only operate at a stage before the landlord launches his proceeding. There is nothing in sub-sec­tion (4) of Section 3 read with Section 7-F to show that a land­lord should wait till the powers of the revising authorities have been exhausted."
(3.) AFTER making the aforesaid observation the Supreme Court held that the State Government's jurisdiction under Section 7-F could be exer­cised only prior to the institution of the suit but once suit is filed after the Commissioner's order it has no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Commissioner granting permission to the landlord. The juris­diction of the State Government therefore must be exercised prior to the institution of the suit and if any order is passed after the insti­tution of the suit such an order would be disregarded by the Civil Court before which the suit may be pending and the suit would be maintainable.;