P.N.Bakshi, J. - (1.) THIS appeal arises out of the land acquisition proceedings with respect to 0.50 acre of land of Khasra Plot No. 1095 situate in Village Kartero, Pargana Loni, Tahsil Ghaziabad, District Meerut. On July 16, 1960 the State Gox-enment issued Notification No. 2138-H/XXXVII-50 (26)-H/59, Section 4(1) of the Land Acqui sition Act for acquiring land in Village Karhera. This notification was subsequently modified by another Notification No. 545-H/XXXVI.0050(58)-H/60 dated February 9, 1962. Compensation with respect to the plot in dispute belonging to H.C. Mithal was assessed by means of an award dated November 26, 1963 by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Assessing Authority treated the sale deed of Khasra Plot No. 9P8 executed on June 23, 1960 as an exemplar and on its basis fixed the rate of compensation with respect to the disputed land at the rate of Rs. 1.68 P. per sq. yard. Thus the appellant was awarded a total compensation of Rs. 4388.40 P. A reference was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Judge, Meerut, who dismissed the reference and confirmed the award given by the Land Acquisition Officer, vide his judgment dated August 19, 1968. Hence the present first appeal. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties at considerable length and have also perused the record of the case.
(2.) THE first question for determination is as to which notification would constitute the basis for the assessment of the compensation to the claimant for acquisition of the land. In this connection, as men tioned above, the first notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on July 16, 1960. No objection under Section 5-A of the Act was filed in respect to this notification. It was only after the subse quent notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acqui sition Act on February 9, 1962 that the objector filed his objection on April 19, 1962 which were considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. It appears from the record that the earlier notification dated July 16, 1960 had been issued with respect to 1317 acres of land of Village Karhera, while the subsequent notification confined itself only to 274 acres of land of the said village. It also appears that subsequently on ins tructions from the Government ex gratia payment was made with respect to acquisitions which had been made between July 16, 1960 and February 9, 1962. Sri M.Z. Hasan, Special Land Acquisiton Offi cer, Ghaziabad made his award on February 22, 1966, on the basis of which the difference in the market rate prevalent between July, 1960 and February, 1962 were paid to the landholders. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that the subsequent notification which has been issued on February 9, 1962 should be taken as the basis for the determination of the market rate of the property in assessing the amount of compensation payable to the claimant. In support of this contention he has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Bhui Nath Chaterjee v. State of West Bengal and others 1969(3) S.C.C. 675. In that case the Government of West Bengal had issued successive notifications under the Land Acquisition Act on January 12, 1955, November 12, 1956 and June 3, 1958. In the last notification the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act were sus pended under Section 17 (4) as to waste or arable portions of the lands. Pursuant to those notifications steps were taken for compul sory acquisition of land belonging to the appellant. The Land Acqui sition Officer determined compensation on the basis of the market value prevailing on January 12, 1955. A reference was made to the District Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The District Judge upheld the contention raised by the objector that the compensation payable for the plots of land notified for acquisition ought to have been determined on the basis of the market value pre vailing on November 12, 1956 and June 3, 1958. The Government of West Bengal moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Consti tution of India. The High Court was of the view that there was no absolute rule to the effect that when successive notification were is sued under Section 4 compensation must be determined on the basis of the market value prevailing at the date of the last notification. The Supreme Court set aside this order of the High Court and remanded the case to the district court to determine the compensation payable to the claimant. In arriving at this decision the Supreme Court ob served as follows: - "In the present case the notification issued by the Government of January 12, 1955, set out a general route for the survey of the lands 'likely to be needed for a public purpose'. We may assume for the purpose of the appeal that the lands within the 'general route for the survey of the lands' which were notified as likely to be needed for a public purpose included the same lands in respect of which the subsequent notifications were issued. But there is no evidence that pursuant to those notifications any ob jections were invited or any inquiry was made by the Collector under Section 5-A of the Act and any report was submitted to the Government. There is also no evidence that by a notification un der Section 17(4) of the Act an inquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with. No attempt was also made to explain why it was thought necessary to issue the two later notifications under Section 4(1), dated November 12, 1956 and June 3, 1958. The cir cumstances that an inquiry under Section 5-A after consideration of the objections raised by the claimants, and that the report of the Collector were not made may reasonably, justify the infer ence that the previous notification doted January 12, 1955" was not acted upon or was not intended to be acted upon. The learned Judges of the High Court assumed that in the absence of special circumstances when there are successive notifications under Sec tion 4(1) in respect of the same land; the first notification will govern the assessment of the market-value under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the question in each case is whe ther there was an intention to supersede the previous notification and if the Government, does not choose to explain the reasons which persuaded it to issue a second notification, the Court may be justified in infering that it was intended to supersede the ear lier notification by the later notification." From the record in the present case learned counsel for the State is unable to point out to me as to what were the special reasons which persuaded the Government to issue a second notification. As such it would be legitimate to infer that the second notification was intended to supersede the earlier notification. From the record of the case it is also evident that enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was conducted after the issue of the second notification in 1962. Objec tions thereto by the objector were also filed. Section 5-A of the Act provides that any person interested in any lane which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose. . .may. . . object to the acquisition of the land . .The Collector must consider these objections after giving an opportunity of being heard to the party raising these objections and making such further enquiry as he may deem fit. He then sub mits his decisions to the appropriate Government with the record of the proceedings held by him and the report containing his recommendation. In the instant case it is evident from the record that the objections under Section 5-A of the Act were filed only after the issue of the second notification on February 9, 1962. In the absence of any explanation on behalf of the Government to show the reasons which impelled the Government to issue a second notificaton, it would be reasonable to infer that the Government intended to supersede the earlier notification by the later notification. In my opinion, the Sup reme Court case, cited above applies on all fours to the present case. In that view of the matter the relevant date for the assessment of the market-value of the land for payment of compensation would be the date of the second notification, viz., February 9, 1962.
(3.) THE next question for consideration is as to what is the reason able and fair amount of compensation payable to the appellant. I find from a perusal of the record as also from the award given by the Land Acquisition Officer that, he has taken into consideration the va rious sale-deeds which have been executed between the year 1958 till July 1980 in assessing the value of the land in question. Several sale-deeds have been filed to cover that period and after a consideration of these sale-deeds he came to the conclusion that the fair amount of compensation payable was Rs. 1.68 per sq. yard. On behalf of the claimant also four exemplars have been filed Exts. 2 to 5. The District Judge, Meerut in his judgment has considered Ext. 2 dated April 22, 1961. He was of the view that this sale-deed pertained to the land which was on the G.T. Road and as such its value was higher than the land in question which was situate on the Loni Road. He, there fore, opined that the rate of compensation as given in Ext. 2 could not afford a safe basis for the assessment of compensation". The District Judge, however, did not take into consideration the sale-deeds. Exts. 3 and 4 which are both dated July 24, 1961. I have perused both these sale-deeds. They pertain to the sale transaction entered on July 24, 1961 of the land situate in village Karhera, Pargana Loni, Tahsil Ghaziabad, District Meerut facing the main Loni Road. Sale-deed Ext. 3 has been executed by Mr. Srichand in favour of M|s. L.N. Gadolia and Sons Private Ltd., having their registered office at Kucha Katwan, Chandni Chawk, Delhi. The other sale-deed xt. 4 has been executed by Munshi in favour of the same vendees. There is nothing on the record to suggest that these sale-deeds were ficti tious or were not genuine transactions. In each of these sale-deeds the transactions have taken place at the rate of Rs. 4.00 per sq. yard. From a perusal of the site-plan it is quite clear that the subject-matter of these two sale-deeds Exts. 3 and 4 was situate across almost the road opposite to the land which is now sought to be acquired. As such, in my opinion, these sale-deeds could form a reasonable basis for the assessment of compensation to the claimant. These exemplars should not have been overlooked by the courts below in awarding the amount of compensation. Perhaps the courts below have been misled into the belief that these sale-deeds being subsequent to the first notifica tion dated July 16, 1960 were not relevant and could not be taken into consideration. But as I have held above, this is an erroneous view of the law and the date of the subsequent notification is the relevant date for the assessment of the market-value of the land acquired. Therefore, the courts below have incorrectly ignored Exts. 3 and 4 which have been filed as emernplars on behalf of the claimant. In my view, therefore, the proper rate for the assessment of compensation with respect to the land in dispute is Rs. 4'- per sq. yard and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree at this rate.;