Satish Chandra, J. - (1.) THE petitioner-respondent was em ployed as Assistant Supervisor in the office of the Sub-Divisional Offi cer (Hydel). On November 14, 1967, he was promoted to officiate as senior electrician. Some complaints against him were enquired into, and ultimately he was exonerated of the charges. Subsequently, by an order of February 15, 1971, he was reverted to his substantive post. The petitioner- respondent filed a writ petition to question the validity of the order of reversion. He raised a two-fold plea. It was urged that the reversion was by way of punishment and operated as a reduction in rank within meaning of Article 311 of the Constitu tion. Since no opportunity of showing cause was given to him, the order violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The learned single Judge repelled this plea, He held that from the affidavits it appeared that the charges of misconduct were not the basis of the order of reversion. The respondent was given an officiating chance in a stop-gap arrangement, because at that time qualified hands were not available. When the shortage disappeared, he was reverted. It was also found that the petitioner's work was not found up to the mark, and since qualified hands were available, the respondent was reverted.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon a deci sion of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Sughar Singh A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 423 in support of the submission that the order of reversion violated Article 16 of the Constitution. In that case it was found on facts that the order of reversion was based upon a misconduct entry made in the character roll. It was held that the order was passed by way of punishment. Sughar Singh's case came up for consideration before a Bench of this Court in State of U. P. v. Tilak Singh 1975(1) A.L.R. 11. It was held that the mere circumstance that the petitioner's service was terminated when on an over-all assessment of the service record it was found that he was not fit to be confirmed cannot lead to the inference that the termination order is founded on the right to punish the petitioner by way of dismissal or removal from service. In the present case the respondent was reverted because his performance was not found up to the mark. In an officiating promotion it is implicit that the offi cer is liable to be reverted if he is not found suitable. Reversion on such ground cannot be a punishment.
(3.) IN Dhanpat Lal v. State of U. P. Writ No. 8655 of 1973, decided on February 22, 1974 another Division Bench of this Court considered the effect of Sughar Singh's case. It was held where an order of reversion was passed upon an assessment of the annual confidential remarks, it will not amount to imposition of a punishment so as to attract Article 311 of the Constitution, nor could such an order be said to be discriminatory. In this connection the Division Bench referred to the Supreme Court decision in R. L. Butail v. Union of India 1970(2) S.C.C., 876. In that case the Supreme Court held that the annual remarks in the character roll are intended for enabl ing an authority to make a general assessment of the work perform ed by a Government servant, and an order based upon such assess ment is not the imposition of any punishment.;