- (1.) THIS is an application under S.151 of the Civil Procedure Code for recalling the order dated October 27, 1975, on the ground that the said judgment was given without hearing counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The ground disclosed in the application makes out a case for setting aside the said order inasmuch as Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, who was appearing for these respondents did not have any notice. I accordingly recall the order dated October 27, 1975, Heard counsel for the parties on merits of the case.
(2.) THE only question involved in this case is about the scope of Explanation (iv) to Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said explanation reads as under: "the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for the residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord." The necessary facts are that a house bearing Municipal No. 80, Mohatshimganj, Allahabad belonged to Hira Lal and Smt. Sheo Pyari Devi, respondents Nos. 1 and 2. They filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the New Act for the release of a portion of the aforesaid house in the tenancy of the petitioner on the ground that the same was needed by them for their personal occupation. The application was also founded on the allegation that the building in the tenancy of the petitioner was a part of house No. 80, the remaining part of which was in occupation of respondents 1 and 2 for their residential purposes. The application was resisted by the petitioner and the fact that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were in possession of the remaining part of the building was disputed by him. The prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the remaining portion of the building was not in possession of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. On this finding he rejected the application filed by them. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge under Section 22 of the New Act against the aforesaid judgment of the Prescribed Authority. In the appeal a statement was made before the learned II Additional District Judge that in house No. 80 besides respondents Nos. 1 and 2, there were four tenants one of whom was the petitioner. It was, however, admitted by petitioner's counsel that his tenancy was in the same house in a portion of which respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were residing. On this state of affairs, the learned District Judge found that the only question to be considered was whether respondents 1 and 2 were entitled to the benefit of Explanation (iv) of Section 21 mentioned above. He decided the above question in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and holding that they were entitled to the benefit of the said Explanation, allowed the appeal. Dissatisfied the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
(3.) THE only question that arises for decision in this petition is whether respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to the benefit of the aforesaid explanation. The requirement of the aforesaid explanation is that the building under tenancy is a part of the building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purpose. This explanation has created a legally irrebuttable presumption that in case the aforesaid requirement is established, the same shall be a conclusive proof that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. Strict compliance of the requirement of the aforesaid explanation is, therefore, necessary for holding the need of the landlord to be conclusive in accordance with the aforesaid explanation. The requirement of the aforesaid explanation is that the remaining part of the building a part of which is in occupation of a tenant should be in the possession of the landlord for residential purpose. In other words, the landlord must be in possession of the entire remaining portion of the premises other than that which is in occupation of the tenant against whom an application under Section 21 has been filed. The Hindi version of Explanation (iv) of Section 21 used the word 'shes' in place of 'remaining'. The use of the word 'shes' in the aforesaid Explanation makes it clear that the said Explanation can apply only when the entire portion other than that in possession of the tenant against whom the application under Section 21 has been filed, is in the occupation of the landlord. The Storter Oxford Dictionary gives meaning of the word 'remaining' as 'to be left after the removal' and 'to be left over and above what has already been done'. Similar is the meaning given in Webster's dictionary. The same is 'to be a part not destroyed'. It is, therefore, necessary for the application of the aforesaid provision that the remaining portion of the house must be in occupation of the landlord and not only one of the portions of the said house. In the instant case, there were four tenants apart from respondents Nos. 1 and 2, Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were in occupation of only one portion. They were not in occupation of all the remaining four portions of the said house. They could not, therefore, get the benefit of Explanation (iv) to Section 21. The learned District Judge, therefore, fell into error in holding that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 would be entitled to the benefit of the aforesaid provision. The reasoning of the learned District Judge that the Legislature could not have intended to extend the benefit of this Explanation to only those landlords who have only one tenant in a portion of their residential house, is erroneous. He fell into error as he did not attach importance to the language employed in the Explanation, The learned District Judge has further referred to the intention of the Legislature and on this basis found that in a case where two rooms were let out to one tenant was not distinguishable from one where two rooms had been let to two tenants separately.;