Gulati, J. - (1.) THE petitioner was elected Pradhan of Gaon Sabha, Qabulpur in 1972. The second respondent, Jhao Lal, who was one of the defeated candidates, filed an election petition challenging elec tion of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had been convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act within five years of the election and as such disqualified for the office of the Pradhan, as pro vided in Section 5-A(h) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. This plea has been upheld by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bisalpur, district Pilibhit, who has set aside the election of the petitioner and has dec lared the second respondent, who had secured the second highest number of votes, as having been duly elected. The petitioner has challenged this order in this petition under Article 226 of the Consti tution. Under Section 5-A(h) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act a person is not qualified to hold an office in a Gaon Sabha, if he has been con-vacated of an offence involving moral turpitude. The Sub-Divisional Officer has held that conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act involves 'moral turpitude'. "Moral Turpitude' has not been defined in the Act, but it is an expression of every day use and its meaning is well understood. Commonly understood, 'moral turpitude' means wicked disposition, depravity, vileness, something which the society considers as base and immoral. Offences like theft, robbery, dacoity perjury, rape, embezzlement, etc., are offences which are regarded as immoral, wicked and base.
(2.) THE petitioner in the instant case was convicted because he was found in possession of a firearm without a licence. Now the pos session of firearm is not immoral by itself. A person may want to possess a firearm for safety, self-defence and for support. These objects are not immoral and are legitimate. The possession of fire arm without licence is illegal because the law in our country has provided so. A person, therefore, who possesses a firearm without a licence, no doubt, is guilty of an offence, but the offence does not involve any 'moral turpitude'. It is true that a firearm can be used for committing offences like dacoity, robbery and murder. But it is those acts which are immoral and not the possession of firearm. In other words the mis use of a firearm may involve moral turpitude, but mere possession of firearm without a licence does not, in my opinion, involve any moral turpitude. A Full Bench of this Court in Budha v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad and others, 1965 A.L.J. 123 has held that use of prohibited colour in sweets is not an offence involving moral turpitude because under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the use of any colour may be prohibited by the rule-making authority regardless of the fact whe ther it is injurious or not. So that an offence based upon violation of a rule cannot invariably be said to involve moral turpitude. The same view has been taken by this Court in two earlier decisions, namely, Haleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 71 and Mangali v. Chakki Lal and others, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. 527. The Punjab High Court following the view of this Court has in Risal Singh v. Chandgi Ram and others, A.I.R. 1966 Punj. 393 held that conviction of a person under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act (possessing arms without a licence) does not involve moral tur pitude. This case directly deals with the point arising in the instant case. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner was not disqualified be cause of his conviction under Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act.
(3.) THE second contention raised by the learned counsel for the pe titioner is that even if the conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act involves moral turpitude, the period of disqualification has not been specified and as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was disqualified and as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was disqualified on the date of the election. Section 5-A(h) laying down that a person is disqualified for being nominated, if he has been con victed of an offence involving moral turpitude, is subject to the pro viso that 'the period of disqualification shall be five years from such date as may be prescribed;'. When one turns to Rule 13-A, which has been framed to carry out the provisions of Section 5-A of the Panchayat Raj Act, one finds that the rule-making authority has fail ed to prescribe the date from which the period of five years shall commence to run. This contention is also fully borne out by the de cision of the Full Bench in the case of Budha Ram v. S. D. O., Malih abad (supra) where it has been held that Rule 13-A merely prescribe the manner of removal of disqualifications but does not specify the date from which it would commence.;