Pathak J. - (1.) THE question before this Bench for its opinion is: "When the State Government deals with a proceeding under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act under Section 7-F of the same Act, does the State Government act administratively or in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity?"
(2.) THE petitioner is in occupation of a portion of a house, No. 7/152, Swarup Nagar, Kanpur, as the tenant of the fourth respondent, Mrs. Kalindri Mitter, who is the owner of that house. Mrs. Mitter applied under Section 3 (1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, for permission to sue the petitioner for her eviction. THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted permission. THE petitioner applied in revision to the Commissioner, Allahabad, but the latter upheld the grant of permission. THEn the petitioner applied to the State Government. On June 27, 1961, the State Government, acting under Section 7-F, considered the application and revoked the permission granted to Mrs. Mitter. It appears that subsequently, upon a review application by Mrs. Mitter, the matter was reconsidered by the State Government, and by its order of October 12, 1961, Mrs. Mitter was permitted to file a suit for the petitioner's eviction. The petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the jurisdiction of the State Government to make the order of October 12, 1961, the challenge being founded principally on the ground that having once passed the order of June 27, 1961, there was no power in the State Government to reconsider it and to pass a different order. The petition came on for hearing before our brother Oak and he, being of the opinion that the earlier decisions of this Court on the nature of the powers of the State Government under Section 7-F required further consideration in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 S C 436 and of our brother Dhavan in Ram Chand v. Bhagwan Das, 1963 All L J 752 referred the aforesaid question to a larger Bench for its opinion. The case was then listed before a Bench of our brothers Gupta and Tripathi, and they directed that the question should be considered by a Full Bench. Judicial tribunals, it is now commonly recognised, may exercise both judicial and administrative powers. So also administrative bodies may enjoy not only administrative but also quasi-judicial powers. Whether a proceeding or an order is quasi-judicial or administrative must be determined by reference to the nature of the function discharged. It is of no great moment that the proceeding has been taken or the order made by an administrative tribunal or a judicial body. In drawing the line between administrative orders and judicial or quasi-judicial orders, it has been observed: "Administrative law is concerned with the operation and control of the powers of administrative authorities, with emphasis on function rather than oil structures."
(3.) THE problem is one of ascertainment of the nature of the function. How then is this problem to be approached? In his celebrated article on "Administrative Tribunals and the Courts" (1933) 49 L Q R 94, 419 Mr. D.M. Gorden, Q. C., pointed out that judicial functions involve the decision of rights and liabilities, so that an investigation is a material part of the functions, whereas non-judicial functions may be either ministerial duties or administrative powers. Ministerial duties, he observes, are exercised by taking active, often coercive measures, and administrative powers by meting out policy and expediency, with an unfettered discretion; a judicial body administers justice through the agency of, and in accordance with, legal evidence. When a body is acting ministerially it has no power to consult its own wishes. When it is acting administratively its standards are subjective and it follows its own wishes. But when it is acting judicially it professes to be bound in theory by fixed legal objective standards. It is when an authority has a duty to decide matters judicially, or has certain quasi-judicial powers, that its decision is liable to be reviewed in the ordinary courts. Whether a function is judicial or quasi judicial may be identified by reference to the incidents attaching to its exercise. Those incidents have been broadly summarised by saying that there is a duty in the tribunal to act judicially. It is easy enough to ascertain this if the statute conferring jurisdiction contains such clear requirement. But often the statute is silent and the question has to be decided by reference to a number of circumstances. Over the years, the Courts have evolved various tests for determining whether there is a duty to act judicially. THEy are not conclusive, and indeed having regard to the complexity of different situations which necessitate the conferment of widely differing jurisdiction in modern life, they cannot be. THEy are always subject to a contrary intention expressed in the statute or contained in it by necessary implication. The Courts in England trace the development of the law from Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 C B N S 180 and even earlier, until they come to the principles formulated in the historic passage by Atkin, L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee, 1924-1 K B 171 at p. 205: "Wherever any body, of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.";