RAM NATH KOERI Vs. LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS AND 2 ORS
LAWS(ALL)-1955-11-35
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on November 25,1955

RAM NATH KOERI Appellant
VERSUS
LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS AND 2 Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother; I agree with his conclusion for the reasons which he has given and there is little that I can usefully add. The principal question is whether the findings of the industrial court can be enforced as an award under Section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That section deals with awards and the action to be taken on them, and it is to be noted that the word "award" is not defined in the Act, nor is it used elsewhere in the Act than in this section. The word must there-fore bear its ordinary meaning which is defined by Murray as " a decision after examination of a judicial sentence, especially that of an arbitrator or umpire" and in Webster's international Dictionary as "judgment," sentence or final decision, specially the decision of arbitration in a case submitted. The question is therefore whether the finding of the industrial court under Clause 13 of the Government notification dated 10 March, 1948, is an award as so defined.
(2.) THAT notification refers both to "findings" and "an award" and in my opinion both expressions are used in the same sense. Sub-clause (1) of Clause 7 requires a conciliation board to record its findings on each issue; Sub-clause (3) and (4) of the same clause refer to these findings as an award and Clause 12 provides for an appeal from such award. The notification by Clause 13 requires the industrial court after hearing the appeal to do what the board was required to do after making an enquiry, namely, " to record its findings. " I see no sufficient reason why this phrase should bear construction different in Clause 13 to what it bears in Clause 7; and in any case the finding of the industrial court is, in my opinion, a determination of, or a decision on, the matters before it and is therefore an award within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act.
(3.) CLAUSE 25 of the notification certainly contemplates an order being made by the Government under Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act after an appeal has been heard, for until such an order is made, the appeal will, it seems, be deemed to be still pending with the consequence that under clause 23 of the notification the employer cannot, while that state of affairs exists, discharge or dismiss any workman without the permission of the industrial court. I agree however with my brother that there is nothing in the notification or the Act which is a bar to the Government making an order under Clause (b) of Section 3 and at the same time enforcing the award under section 6 of the Act.;


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