Brij Mohan Lall, J. - (1.) THE suit which has given rise to this Second Appeal was instituted by the Respondents against the Appellants for ejectment from certain land and for damages. It was alleged that the Respondents were the tenants of the land in question, that the Appellants had previously claimed that land as their tenancy but their claim had been negatived by the revenue court, and that after the decision of the revenue court the Appellants had again taken forcible possession of this land. Hence the suit for ejectment and damages.
(2.) VARIOUS pleas were taken in defence by the Appellants, one of which was that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This plea has been over -ruled by both the courts below but it has been reiterated before me. While the Agra Tenancy Act (III of 1926) was in force, the view held by this Court was that if a person was unlawfully ejected from the land which was in his possession he had the option to sue a trespasser either in a civil court or in a revenue court. It was held in the Full Bench case of Mohd. Muslim and Ors. v. Mahrania and Ors., 25 A.L.J.R. 545 that Section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act (III of 1926) barred the jurisdiction of the civil courts in those cases only where adequate relief could be given by a revenue court. It was pointed out that Section 44 of that Act, which was the section corresponding to the present Section 180, restricted the jurisdiction of the revenue court in the matter of allowing damages to four times the rental value of the land. It was because of this limitation on the court's power that the Full Bench took the view that adequate relief could not be given by the revenue court. It was therefore held that if the Plaintiff was content with the smaller amount of damages which could be awarded Under Section 44 he could take resort to the speedy remedy provided by Section 44 of the Act, otherwise he had the option to pursue his remedy in the civil court.
(3.) IN the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939) the word 'adequate' was omitted from Section 242, which was the section corresponding to Section 230 of the former Act. A question arose whether in view of this amendment in the language of the statute, the aforesaid Full Bench decision continued to be good law. This question came up for decision before a Division Bench of this Court and it held in Parmeshwari Das and Ors. v. Angan Lal, 1944 A.W.R. (H.C.) 56 that the aforesaid change in the language of the statute had brought about no alteration in law and the Full Bench decision in Mohd. Muslim and Ors. v. Mahrania and Ors., 25 A.L.J.R. 545 continued to be good law. This decision was subsequently considered by a Full Bench of this Court in D.N. Rege v. Kazi Mohammad Haider, 1946 A.W.R. (H.C.) 403. The Full Bench over -ruled the decision reported in Parmeshwari Das and Ors. v. Anganlal, 1944 A.W.R. (H.C.) 56 and held that a change in law had been brought about as a result of the omission of the word 'adequate' in Section 242 of the new Act. Further it held that the decision reported in Mohd. Muslim and Ors. v. Mahrania and Ors., 25 A.L.J.R. 545 had ceased to be good law, that the revenue and civil courts did not exercise concurrent jurisdiction, and that their jurisdictions had become mutually exclusive.;